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THE RISE AND FALL OF SUPREME COURT CONCERN
FOR RACIAL MINORITIES
JOHN E. NOWAK'
* David C. Baum Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. The author
thanks Greg Jordan, who was then a second-year student at the College of Law, for
assistance with the research for this Article, and Ms. Ruth Manint, for her assis-
tance with the preparation of this manuscript.
This Article was written in connection with "Confronting the Promise," a confer-
ence honoring the fortieth anniversary of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education. The conference, which was sponsored by the Howard University
School of Law and the Institute of Bill of Rights Law of the College of William and
Mary, was held on May 17, 1994. I added two footnotes after I completed the origi-
nal Article: note 169 refers to Supreme Court decisions rendered after the confer-
ence, but before the end of the October 1993 Term. I did not make any other at-
tempts to update the Article. Thus, I have not included references to the published
versions of the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings regarding Justice Ginsburg's
confirmation. I inserted the name of Justice Breyer at several places in the Article
in which I had originally used the phrase "whomever is appointed to replace Justice
Blackmun." I did not make any attempt to predict how Justice Breyer might vote in,
or affect, future Supreme Court decisions involving racial minorities. But I must
express here my hope that Judge Breyer's opinion in Latino Political Action Comm.,
Inc. v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1986), in which he took what I would
describe as a Rehnquist Court like view of the Voting Rights Act even before the
Supreme Court had forced the lower federal courts to do so, is not indicative of how
he will vote in Supreme Court cases that involve the interests of minority race vot-
ers.
Although one would never guess it by the number of footnotes in this Article, I
really hate footnotes. I made that point in John E. Nowak, Woe Unto You, Law
Reviews!, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 317 (1985). I swiped that title from one of my heroes, the
late Professor Fred Rodell. Unlike Professor Rodell, I do not have the courage of my
convictions, and I will give citations to what I believe are relevant authorities
throughout this Article. [Editors' & Author's Note: In addition, the editors added 250
footnotes.] The notes, however, contain little of substance. They primarily will be
citations to Senate confirmation hearings, cases, and law review articles that argu-
ably support a point I have made in the text. The reader need not read any of the
notes to evaluate the substantive arguments presented in this Article. I take some
solace in the fact that Judge Abner Mikva, a former student of Professor Rodell's, as
well as a noted scholar and jurist, has also made somne accommodation to the need
to use notes to support statements in law reviews today. Because Judge Mikva is a
person of more character than myself, he has made less of a departure from Profes-
sor Rodell's approach to legal writing than I have. Compare Abner J. Mikva, Good-
bye to Footnotes, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 647 (1985) (arguing against the importance of
footnotes in legal writing) with Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress Over-
rules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729 (1991) (recognizing the usefulness of footnotes
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I. INTRODUCTION
Let me tell you a story about the Supreme Court and racial
minorities. No, I am not going to tell you a story about real or
fictional persons whose experiences make a point about the
oppression of racial minorities in our society. I wish that I could
tell that kind of story, but I lack the ability and the background
of scholars who are associated with the critical legal studies
movement or who can bring race consciousness to their writing.
Those scholars might be able to tell you that kind of story.' In-
only as means of citation).
1. Professor Jerome Culp, an author in this Symposium, previously has given us
an insightful analysis of the problems encountered by scholars who use storytelling
to explain aspects of racial discrimination in our society, and he cites many authors
who use forms of storytelling in their scholarship. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., You Can
Take Them to Water but You Can't Make Them Drink: Black Legal Scholarship and
White Legal Scholars, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 1021. This Article was in a symposium
on race consciousness and legal scholarship, which offers the reader an introduction
to critical race studies and race conscious legal scholarship. See Symposium, Race
Consciousness and Legal Scholarship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 945; Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461
(1993); see also Symposium-Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989). For a
critique of the use of storytelling in legal scholarship see Daniel A. Farber &
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45
STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). Compare William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46
STAN. L. REV. 607, 644 (1994) (stating that questions of narrative jurisprudence are
not just about technical issues of standards in legal scholarship) with Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The 200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflection
on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L. REV. 647 (1994) (challenging legal narrators'
reliance on social constructionism). See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism,
24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racism: A Prophecy for the Year
2000, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 93 (1989); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1984
Term-Foreword: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985).
My views, as expressed in this Article, are similar to the views of two of my
favorite legal realists: the late Professor Fred Rodell and the late Judge Jerome
Frank. See generally FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SU-
PREME COURT FROM 1790 TO 1955 (1955); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND (1930). Professor Rodell and Judge Frank held different "realist views" about
the nature of judicial rulings. See generally ROBERT J. GLENNON, THE ICONOCLAST AS
REFORMER: JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAW (1985). For an overview of
the development of legal realism and a sampling of writings from legal realist schol-
ars, see AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher et al. eds., 1993). In other
speeches and essays, I have attempted to resurrect Professor Rodell's brand of legal
realism in analyzing constitutional issues. See John E. Nowak, Professor Rodell, The
Burger Court, and Public Opinion, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 107 (1984); John E.
Nowak, Evaluating the Work of the New Libertarian Supreme Court, 7 HASTINGS
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stead, I am an old fashioned legal realist who believes that sim-
ply exposing the relationship between the political backgrounds
of the Justices and their rulings is an important end in itself.
The story I want to tell you is about how the Justices of the
Supreme Court have used their power to either protect or harm
the interests of racial minorities during the past sixty years.
Because the events leading to the Supreme Court's initial
concern for protecting racial minorities from political oppression
have been examined by others,' I will focus on the decline of
Supreme Court concern for racial minorities between 1973 and
1993. That story is really about how fifteen people used the nine
voting positions on the Court. Those people are Chief Justices
Burger and Rehnquist, and Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas.
My contribution to this Symposium will not involve an exami-
nation of constitutional theories regarding civil rights, or racial
equality. Rather, I would like to show that as the membership of
the Court has changed, the Court's approach toward protecting
racial minorities has also changed. I believe that the rise and
fall of Supreme Court protection for racial minorities simply
reflects the political background of the Justices on the Court in
each era. This argument was the only point of my presentation
at the conference, and this Article is, in one sense, the "support-
ing evidence" for my presentation. I will try to prove my point by
first giving my reader an overview of the membership of the
Supreme Court during the past six decades. I will then examine
CONST. L.Q. 263 (1980).
2. Two excellent works concerning the forces that influenced the Supreme Court
to protect racial minorities in constitutional rulings are written by Professor Mark
Tushnet, a contributor to this Symposium. See MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL
RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 (1994)
[hereinafter TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW]; MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP:
LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) [hereinafter
TUSHNET, THE NAACP]; see also DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW
§§ 1.1-1.17, 7.1-7.14 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing racism in the context of public
schools); Derrick Bell, Law, Litigation, and the Search for the Promised Land, 76
GEO. L.J. 229 (1987) (book review of TUSHNET, THE NAACP, supra); Dennis J.
Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court,
1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979).
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the Court's rulings concerning four major civil rights topics: (1)
the enforcement of federal civil rights statutes, (2) the invalida-
tion of open and "hidden" racial classifications, (3) benign racial
classifications (affirmative action), and (4) school desegregation.3
3. I do not mean to imply that I believe I have the ability to identify those legal
issues of most importance to racial minorities. Rather, I have made my best effort to
choose issues that I believe might reflect the attitudes of Justices toward protecting
racial minorities from suppression in our country. I realize that the Justices' atti-
tudes toward racial minorities might be reflected in all of their rulings or, at least,
in many areas that I have not focused upon in this Article.
I have chosen not to focus on two areas of constitutional law-state action and
freedom of speech-implicated by important decisions of the United States Supreme
Court concerning the civil rights movement. I believe that the Supreme Court has
taken a somewhat more narrow view of the types of private action that sufficiently
involve "state action" to be subject to the restriction of the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment than did the Warren Court. However, I do not believe that
the Burger and Rehnquist Court rulings on state action can be taken as true indica-
tions of the Justices' attitudes regarding racial minorities. By the mid-1970s, the
Supreme Court had upheld the power of Congress to regulate racial discrimination
in the private sector and had read a variety of civil rights statutes very broadly in
order to prevent private sector racial discrimination. Since then, most of the Court's
rulings concerning state action have considered when the Court, in the absence of
federal civil rights legislation, should use the Fourteenth Amendment to protect
groups other than racial minorities from private sector discrimination. For a com-
ment on the change in the Court's state action rulings in the mid-1970s, see Robert
J. Glennon, Jr. & John E. Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221. For an examination of all
of the Court's state action rulings, see 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 16.1-16.5 (2d ed. 1992).
I am not addressing First Amendment topics in this Article for three reasons.
First, the important subject of "hate speech" is being dealt with in this Symposium
by Professor Delgado. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of
Brown v. Board of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 547 (1995). I do not believe that there are a sufficient number of
cases analogous to hate speech that would give me a basis for comparing the atti-
tudes of the Justices in the 1990s to the attitudes of the Justices of the 1960s
(which I will identify as the primary time of Supreme Court protection of racial mi-
norities) regarding hate speech. Second, I believe that a smaller percentage of the
First Amendment cases in the 1980s and 1990s involve civil rights demonstrations
or racial issues than did the cases involving freedom of assembly in the 1960s. In
recent years the Supreme Court has invalidated some government actions that seem
to pose a direct threat to the freedom of association or the freedom of assembly of
groups associated with the civil rights movement. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Some scholars may claim that the Supreme
Court's decision in NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994), allowing the use of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against persons who
committed multiple crimes in attempting to stop the operation of abortion clinics,
would allow the RICO statute to be used against civil rights demonstrators who
348
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The Supreme Court's approach to civil rights issues of impor-
tance to racial minorities has undergone dramatic shifts during
this century. The attitudes and rulings of the Justices concern-
ing civil rights issues can be divided into six time periods. First,
in the pre-New Deal era, the Court did virtually nothing to pro-
tect racial minorities from discrimination and oppression in our
economic and political system. Second, from the late 1930s
through the early 1950s, the Justices slowly began to protect
racial minorities with incremental shifts in the Court's rulings
concerning the meaning of equal protection and the scope of
congressional power. Third, in the "first Warren Court," from
1954 to the early 1960s (while Earl Warren was Chief Justice),
the Court made dramatic statements about the principle of ra-
cial equality but proceeded cautiously, as it faced a society un-
willing to accept a more liberal view of civil rights. Fourth, in
the "second Warren Court," from the early 1960s to the early
1970s (during the first years when Warren Burger was Chief
Justice), the Court was an active leader in the protection of civil
rights through its rulings concerning equal protection and its
expansive reading of federal civil rights statutes. Fifth, from the
mid-1970s through the mid-1980s the Court seemed to vacillate
in its rulings regarding civil rights issues. Finally, since the late
1980s, the Supreme Court seems to have turned against racial
minorities, as it has narrowed earlier rulings concerning the
Equal Protection Clause and restricted the efforts of legislatures
to help racial minorities.
II. THE PLAYERS IN THE GAME-YOU CAN'T IDENTIFY THE
JUSTICES WITHOUT A SCORECARD
The efforts of litigators and civil rights workers, whose accom-
plishments we honor in this Symposium, in bringing an end to
engaged in protests at government buildings. However, Scheidler did not involve a
civil rights demonstration; it would be unfair to the Justices of the Court to claim
that their decision protecting abortion clinics shows that they would not protect civil
rights demonstrators charged with some type of trumped-up RICO prosecution.
Third, the First Amendment presents such a wide range of topics that it would take
at least a separate article, and probably a book, to attempt to translate the Su-
preme Court's rulings in First Amendment decisions into an analysis of the Supreme
Court's attitudes toward racial minorities.
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the separate but equal doctrine were made easier by the fact
that Democratic Presidents Franklin ikoosevelt and Harry Tru-
man were changing the membership of the Supreme Court.4 In
1938 the Court had only three Justices who were appointed by
Democratic Presidents: Justice Brandeis, who was appointed by
President Wilson, and Justices Black and Reed, who were ap-
pointed by President Roosevelt. Those three Justices were joined
by three Republican Justices in making one of the first decisions
that began the erosion of the separate but equal doctrine.5 By
1941 the Supreme Court was composed of Justices who reflected
the goals of the Democratic Party at the time. Chief Justice
Stone, originally a Coolidge appointee, was named Chief Justice
by President Roosevelt. Seven of the eight Associate Justices
were Roosevelt appointees; Owen Roberts was the only Republi-
can appointee who remained on the Court at the start of World
War II. The other Justices during this time were Justice Black
(appointed in 1937), Justice Reed (appointed in 1938), Justice
Frankfurter (appointed in 1939), Justice Douglas (appointed in
1939), Justice Murphy (appointed in 1940), Justice Jackson
(appointed in 1941), and Justice Byrnes (appointed in 1941 and
replaced in 1943 by Justice Rutledge).'
The Vinson Court, which spanned the years from 1946 to
1953, was composed completely of Democratic appointees. Presi-
dent Harry Truman appointed Chief Justice Vinson, who re-
placed Chief Justice Stone in 1946, and three Associate Justices.
Justice Burton replaced Justice Roberts in 1945, Justice Minton
replaced Justice Rutledge in 1949, and Justice Clark replaced
Justice Murphy in 1949.
On May 17, 1954, when the Supreme Court decided Brown,
the Court was composed of eight Democratic appointees and
4. I will refer to the confirmation hearings for specific Supreme Cour Justices
when those hearings are noteworthy when evaluating my impression of Supreme
Court Justices. I am not going to give citations to the confirmation hearings regard-
ing, or law review articles about, most of the Justices on the Supreme Court. For a
general overview of the background of the members of the Supreme Court, see HEN-
RY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS (3d ed. 1992); ELDER WITT, CONGRESSION-
AL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE SUPREME COURT 789-880 (2d ed. 1990).
5. Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); see infra text accom-
panying note 281.
6. See ABRAHAM, supra note 4, app. D at 424.
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Chief Justice Warren. President Eisenhower's appointments to
the Court did not slow the pace of the Court's movement toward
the protection of racial minorities. From 1954 until 1969, the
Supreme Court was dominated by members of the Democratic
Party. At the height of what we often think of as the Warren
Court Era, the only Republicans on the Court were Justices
Harlan aid Stewart, and Chief Justice Warren. Republican
Justice Whittaker would serve only from 1957 to 1962. Justice
Brennan, who would serve on the Court from 1956 until 1990,
was a Democrat who was appointed by a Republican President.'
The Supreme Court appointments by Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson were crucial to the Court's enforcement of civil rights in
the 1960s. When Felix Frankfurter left the bench in 1962, his
successors might, in retrospect, be easier to categorize as liberal
Democrats-Justice Goldberg (who served on the Court from
1962 to 1965) and Justice Fortas (who served from 1965 to
1969). Justice White, who served in President Kennedy's cam-
paign and as a Deputy Attorney General for Robert Kennedy,
replaced Justice Whittaker in 1962.8 Justice Clark, a Truman
appointee, was replaced by Thurgood Marshall in 1967.
The Supreme Court in the early 1970s seemed to differ only
slightly from the Warren Court in the Justices' approach to civil
fights issues despite the turnover of four judicial positions be-
tween 1969 and 1972. Only two of the four Nixon appointees
7. Justice Brennan received a recess appointment to the Court from President
Eisenhower in 1956; he was nominated and confirmed in 1957. The hearings con-
cerning the nomination of William Joseph Brennan, Jr. to be an Associate Justice
are documented in Nomination of William Joseph Brennan, Jr.: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in 6 THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL
AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JU-
DICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1972 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1975)
[hereinafter HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-19721.
S. The hearings concerning the nomination of Byron R. White to be an Associate
Justice are documented in Nomination of Byron R. White: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 6 HEARINGS AND
REPORTS, 1916-1972, supra note 7.
9. The hearings concerning the nomination of Thurgood Marshall to be an As-
sociate Justice are documented in Nomination of Thurgood Marshall: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 7
HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1972, supra note 7.
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could have been identified as being very "conservative" from
their pre-Court records. Chief Justice Burger, appointed in
1969, l" and Justice Rehnquist, appointed in 1972,11 could have
accurately been predicted to be very conservative in their rul-
ings. Today Justice Blackmun might be described as a liberal in
Republican clothing. Justice Blackmun was 'what the media
would now term a "stealth nominee." His non-controversial ap-
pointment in 197012 followed two unsuccessful attempts by
President Nixon to place other persons on the Supreme Court.
Justice Powell, who replaced Justice Black in 1972, had no prior
judicial service, and no clear "track record," despite his involve-
ment in local government and in the American Bar Association.
The Senate hearings concerning Lewis Powell were quite brief,
at least when reviewed in the light of Senate practices in the
1980s and 1990s; there was little controversy regarding his
appointment." One possible explanation for the smooth confir-
10. The hearings concerning the nomination of Warren E. Burger to be Chief
Justice are documented in Nomination of Warren E. Burger: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 7 HEAR-
INGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1972, supra note 7. The Senate's consideration of the Bur-
ger nomination is documented in 115 CONG. REC. 15,174-96 (1969).
11. The hearings concerning the nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be an
Associate Justice are documented in Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis
F. Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971), reprinted in 8 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1972, supra note 7. The
Senate's consideration of the Rehnquist nomination is partially documented in 117
CONG. REc. 45,411-45, 45,463 (1971).
The hearings concerning the nomination of William H. Rehnquist to be Chief
Justice are documented in Nomination of Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in
12, 12A THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON
SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1986, at 305-1445 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron
Jacobstein eds., 1989) thereinafter HEARINGS AND REPORTS 1916-19861.
12. The hearings concerning the nomination of Harry A. Blackmun to be an Asso-
ciate Justice are documented in Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun: Hearings Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 8
HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1972, supra note 7. The Senate's consideration of the
Blackmun nomination is partially documented in 116 Cong. Rc. 14,853-58 (1970).
13. The hearings concerning the nomination of Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to be an Asso-
ciate Justice are documented in Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971), reprinted in 8 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1972, supra note 7. The Senate's
consideration of the Powell nomination is partially documented in 117 CONG. REC.
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mation is that Lewis Powell might have been perceived as a
moderate Southern Republican with views on political issues
that were, at least arguably, similar to the Southern Democrat
whom he replaced on the Court.
The 1975 appointment of Justice Stevens to replace Justice
Douglas made the Court more conservative only because of
Douglas' unwavering record as a promoter of liberal causes.
There was no reason to think that Stevens would not champion
the interests of racial minorities and little questioning of
Stevens on racial issues in his confirmation hearings.14 Perhaps
Justice Stevens' appointment may have reflected the views of
then Attorney General Levy, as much or more than the views of
President Ford. A decade after his appointment, Justice Stevens
joined a core group of Justices that consistently voted to give the
widest scope to federal legislative actions protecting racial mi-
nority interests. He has been, however, something of a "wild
card" vote in racial affirmative action cases.
President Reagan's appointment of Supreme Court Justices in
the 1980s led to a clear shift in the Court's rulings concerning
racial minorities. The Reagan appointments, at first glance,
might not seem to have made much of a change in the Court's
composition if we think only in terms of political party affilia-
tion. Justice O'Connor in 1981 replaced Justice Stewart, who
was also a Republican appointee. 5 Justice Scalia in 1986, in
44,737-45 (1971). There was some opposition to the appointment of Lewis Powell
because of his service on the Richmond, Virginia School Board. See 8 HEARINGS AND
REPORTS, 1916-1972, supra note 7, at 361-97.
14. The hearings concerning the nomination of John Paul Stevens to be an Associ-
ate Justice are documented in Nomination of John Paul Stevens to be a Justice of
the Supreme Court: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 8A HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1972, supra note 7,
at supp. The Senate's consideration of Stevens' nomination is reprinted in 121 CONG.
REc. 41,123-28 (1975).
15. The hearings concerning the nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor to be an
Associate Justice are documented in Nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1982), reprinted in
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESS-
FUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-1981 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., Supp.
1983). See generally Thomas R. Haggard, Mugwump, Mediator, Machiavellian, or
Majority? The Role of Justice O'Connor in the Affirmative Action Cases, 24 AKRON L.
REV. 47 (1990) (providing critical analysis of Justice. O'Connor's affirmative action
1995] 353
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one sense, took Justice Rehnquist's seat on the Court, as Justice
Rehnquist became the Chief Justice who succeeded Warren
Burger. 6 In 1988 Justice Kennedy replaced Justice Powell fol-
lowing the defeat of the Robert Bork nomination and the with-
drawal of the Douglas Ginsburg nomination.17 As we will see
when we examine the Court's rulings since 1988, the Reagan
Republicans reflected the conservative views of the President
who appointed them.
In his confirmation hearings, then Judge Kennedy was clear
about his commitment to the desegregation principle, but he
made some unclear references to the first Justice Harlan's dis-
sent in Plessy.18 In retrospect, his statements should have led
us to believe that he might take a "color-blind" approach to civil
rights issues, thereby justifying his refusal to support legislative
efforts to promote civil rights.
Less than two years after his appointment to the Supreme
opinions); Rocco Potenza, Affirmative Action: Will Justice O'Connor Author Its End?,
22 U. TOL. L. REV. 805 (1991) (examining Justice O'Connor's views on the consti-
tutionality of race-based affirmative action); Alfred Slocum, At the Crossroads of Civil
Rights: Tension Between the Wartime Amendments in the Jurisprudence of Justice
O'Connor, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 105 (1991) (discussing the tension between Jus-
tice O'Connor's racial neutrality and the Thirteenth Amendment).
16. The hearings concerning the nomination of Antonin Scalia are documented in
Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in 13 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-
1986, supra note 11, at 89-464. See generally George Kannar, The Constitutional
Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990) (suggesting that Scalia is
driven as a Justice by his methodological commitments); Richard Nagareda, The
Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 705 (1987)
(predicting Justice Scalia's Supreme Court role based on an analysis of his appellate
writings).
17. The hearings concerning the nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be an
Associate Justice are documented in Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be As-
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), reprinted in 15, 15A THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL
AND .UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JU-
DICIARY COMMITEE, 1916-1987, at 261-1393 (Roy M. Mersky & Gary R. Hartman
eds., 1991) [hereinafter HEARINGS AND REPORTS 1916-1987].
18. HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1987, supra note 17, at 148-53, 182-83. Regard-
ing the error of persons who read Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy as advocating a
"colorblind" approach to equal protection issues, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Read-
ing Justice Harlan's Dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citizen-
ship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 961.
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Court, Justice Kennedy emerged as a key vote in forming a
Supreme Court majority that would impair civil rights statutes.
Justice Kennedy was appointed to the Court in February 1988;
his first full Term was the October 1988 Term of the Supreme
Court. In the Spring of 1989, Justice Kennedy: (1) voted to use
"strict scrutiny" to eliminate virtually all forms of state or local
affirmative action for racial minorities,' 9 (2) voted to make it
difficult for racial minority workers in low paying jobs to show
that the predominance of white workers in higher paid positions
was the result of racial discrimination, ° (3) provided the fifth
vote for increasing the ability of white persons to challenge pri-
vate sector affirmative action programs that had been undertak-
en pursuant to consent decrees,2' (4) provided the fifth vote for
finding that women were barred from challenging seniority sys-
tems that had an alleged discriminatory purpose by finding that
the limitation period for- such suits ran from the date at which
the seniority system was adopted, rather than the date at which
the system was used to harm the women workers, 22 and (5)
wrote a majority opinion that drastically limited the scope of one
of the Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes.3 Some of the
1989 decisions in which Justice Kennedy played a key role
would be reversed by statute during the Bush Administration in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.4
* 19. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
20. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Atonio has been su-
perseded by federal statute. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166,
105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
21. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). Martin has been superseded by federal
statute. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071
(1991). For a discussion of the bar against collateral attacks of consent decrees, see
Susan S. Grover, The Silenced Majority: Martin v. Wilks and the Legislative Re-
sponse, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 43.
22. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). Lorance has been
superseded by federal statute. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
23. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989). Patterson has been
superseded by federal statute. See The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Justice Kennedy .also provided the fifth vote for the
majority opinion in Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 (1989). In Jett the
Supreme Court ruled that a city could not be held liable for its employees' violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 under a respondeat superior theory.
24. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was adopted after President Bush had vetoed
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Perhaps because of the performance of Justice Kennedy in
civil rights cases, Justice Souter was questioned more closely
regarding the need to protect racial minorities in his confirma-
tion hearing." He was specifically questioned about whether
positions he had taken when with the Office of the New Hamp-
shire Attorney General meant that he would not support the
Voting Rights Act or that he would oppose all forms of racial
affirmative action. During those hearings, then Judge Souter
avoided directly answering questions concerning his position on
constitutional issues. He gave answers that could be understood
as indicating that he supported the goals of the Voting Rights
Act and that he believed that Congress had the power to use
benign racial classifications to remedy the plight of racial minor-
ities in our society who had suffered from societal, as well as
governmental, discrimination." Indeed, in later years Justice
Souter would prove true to his word. In 1993, he joined Justices
White, Blackmun, and Stevens as they dissented from a ruling
in which the Rehnquist Court threw into doubt the ability of the
federal government to require states to avoid changes in voting
laws that harmed racial minorities.27
legislation that was in many ways similar to the final act.
For analysis of the interaction of Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Presi-
dent regarding the creation of civil rights, see Symposium, Civil Rights Legislation
in the 1990s, 79 CAL. L. REV. 591 (1991). See also Grover, supra note 21 (discussing
the bar against collateral attacks as developed through case law and congressional
action).
25. The hearings concerning the nomination of David H. Souter to be an Associate
Justice are documented in Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1991), reprinted in 16 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: HEARINGS AND REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMI-
NATIONS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES BY THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 1916-
1990, at 123 (Roy M. Mersky et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter HEARINGS AND REPORTS,
1916-1990]. For a discussion of Justice Souter's first term, see Scott P. Johnson &
Christopher E. Smith, David Souter's First Term on the Supreme Court: The Impact
of a New Justice, 75 JUDICATURE 238 (1992); Christopher E. Smith & Scott P. John-
son, Newcomer on the High Court: Justice David Souter and the Supreme Court's
1990 Term, 37 S.D. L. REV. 21 (1992).
26. See 16 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1990, supra note 25, at 202-10, 256-57,
263, 276-77, 316-18, 364-65, 374-75, 385, 429, 460-63.
27. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). I will discuss Shaw in the sections of
this Article concerning the Court's enforcement of the civil rights statutes, the
Court's approach to "hidden" racial classifications, and racial affirmative action is-
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Despite his earlier service in the executive branch and on the
United States Court of Appeals, Justice Thomas' views concern-
ing civil rights were left unclear in his nomination hearings."
With some help from Republican Senators, then Judge Thomas
was able to remain noncommittal about Supreme Court rulings
concerning racial affirmative action and Supreme Court rulings
concerning Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that were made
while he was the chairperson of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission. 9 His views concerning the role of the judi-
ciary regarding civil rights issues remain unclear. After his first
two Terms on the Court, we do not have a sufficient basis to
predict whether, throughout his service on the Court, he will be
a defender of racial minorities. Justice Thomas voted with the
Reagan appointees to significantly reduce the ability of the fed-
eral government to control changes in voting laws that had the
effect of harming racial minorities."0 However, he also wrote
opinions indicating his support for punishing "hate crimes"'"
and supporting the ability of the government to support "histori-
cally black colleges." 2
The Senate confirmed Justice Ginsburg's appointment to the
sues.
28. The hearings concerning the nomination of Clarence Thomas to be an Associ-
ate Justice are documented in Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter Thomas Hearings].
29. For example, then Judge Thomas, in an interchange with Senator Specter, was
able to avoid taking a position on the Supreme Court decisions regarding racial
affirmative action issues and the burden of proof a plaintiff must meet in a Title
VII case. See id. pt. 1, at 2316-36, 2489-90.
30. See Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993); Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n,
112 S. Ct. 820 (1992). For a closer examination of those decisions, see infra notes
149-69 and accompanying text.
31. In Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993), the Justices unanimously
upheld a statute allowing for enhancement of the sentence of a defendant convicted
of committing certain crimes based upon evidence that the defendant had chosen his
victims on the basis of their race. In Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992),
the Court prohibited the introduction into a sentence hearing of the fact that the
defendant was a member of a racist organization. Justice Thomas dissented from
that ruling. Id. at 1100-05. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), Justice Thomas joined the majority opinion that invalidated
a "hate speech" statute.
32. United States v. Fordice, 112 S. Ct. 2727, 2744 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Court without any clear explanation of her opinion on the role of
courts in protecting racial minorities.33 Her record as a federal
appellate judge provides little basis for predicting how she will
vote in cases involving racial discrimination. In one court of
appeals case she concurred in a judgment that merely imple-
mented the Supreme Court's decision striking down preferences
for minority race contractors.34 Then Judge Ginsburg wrote sep-
arately in that case to say that "Justice Stevens reasoned [in
some racial affirmative action cases], and I agree, that remedy
for past wrong is not the exclusive basis upon which racial clas-
sification may be justified."35 Her agreement with Justice
Stevens' position tells us very little about the approach Justice
Ginsburg will take towards the protection of racial minorities in
the future.
Having identified the "players," I will now examine the Su-
preme Court rulings regarding the interests of minority race
persons in several specific areas.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES-FROM
THE CIVIL WAR TO THE BURGER COURT
The Supreme Court, in one sense, is always "behind" the other
branches of the federal government when it comes to the en-
forcement of civil rights statutes. The Supreme Court cannot
enforce civil rights statutes until Congress has enacted them; in
many instances, the Court will not have the opportunity to in-
terpret a statute unless the executive branch takes steps toward
its enforcement. Nevertheless, the attitudes of Supreme Court
Justices toward racial minorities may be reflected in their rul-
ings concerning federal civil rights statutes. Examining the
Court's decisions regarding these statutes allows us to decide
whether the Justices are keeping pace with the other branches
33. At the time this Article was written, the early months of 1994, a printed copy
of the hearing of the Judiciary Committee regarding the nomination of Ruth Bader
Ginsburg to the Supreme Court was not yet available. Anyone who watched or lis-
tened to even a small portion of these confirmation hearings should not be surprised
by, or doubt, the statement that then Judge Ginsburg disclosed nothing about how
she might rule on constitutional issues.
34. O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
35. Id. at 429 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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of the federal government in the protection of minorities. Su-
preme Court Justices can cause harm to racial minorities by
finding constitutional barriers to the congressional protection of
civil rights; the Court can impede the protection of racial mi-
norities in our society by reading civil rights statutes in a nar-
row manner. Conversely, a Court with a majority of Justices
who see themselves as protectors of the interests of racial minor-
ities will endorse the constitutional power of Congress to pass
civil rights statutes, read civil rights statutes as broadly as pos-
sible, and, when necessary, point out the shortcomings of exist-
ing federal civil rights statutes in a way that invites Congress to
expand the protection of racial minorities.
Other scholars have analyzed the relationship of the Court
and Congress in the protection of civil rights in the 1980s and
1990s using a variety of academic perspectives from equal pro-
tection analysis to game theories. 6 I want to demonstrate that
we do not need legal or public choice theories to explain the
Court's rulings. I believe these rulings simply are a reflection of
the political background of the Justices and the Presidents who
appointed them.
In this section of the Article, I do not attempt to canvass the
Court's rulings concerning all federal civil rights statutes. I do
not intend to present an exhaustive analysis of the Supreme
Court's rulings concerning any specific portion of our federal
civil rights statutes. After describing some of the most important
Supreme Court decisions prior to the 1960s regarding the scope
of congressional power to protect racial minorities, I will focus
on the rulings of the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts
regarding the Voting Rights Act, Thirteenth Amendment legisla-
tion, and Title VII.
In the era from the Civil War until World War II, the Justices
can be described as being active opponents of, or at least com-
pletely indifferent to, the interests of racial minorities. In the
1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court took important, but limit-
ed, steps toward using federal statutes to protect racial minori-
ties. Only in the 1960s and early 1970s did the Supreme Court
36. For articles analyzing this topic from a variety of academic perspectives, see
Symposium, supra note 24.
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protect racial minorities by expansively reading federal civil
rights statutes and recognizing a wide scope of congressional
power to protect civil rights. In the late 1970s, and much of the
1980s, the Court was more of a spectator of the congressional
protection of racial minorities. While the Court did not invali-
date the attempts of Congress to protect civil liberties, the Jus-
tices of this era did not give an expansive reading to congressio-
nal civil rights statutes unless required to do so by precedents
set in the earlier era. Finally, since the late 1980s, the Supreme
Court has impaired congressional efforts to protect civil liberties
through the narrow reading of federal civil rights statutes. In
some cases the Court upheld federal civil rights statutes by a
closely divided vote, and those rulings may now be in danger of
being overruled following the retirement of Justices Brennan
and Marshall.
A. Before the New Deal
From the 1870s until the 1930s, the Supreme Court actively
protected the interests of those who sought to suppress racial
minorities through Jim Crow laws and outright violence. In
United States v. Cruikshank,37 the Supreme Court held that
Congress was without constitutional authority to criminalize the
assault or murder of African Americans by private individu-
als.3" Though the Court in the 1890s recognized the limited
power of the federal government to protect individuals from
interference when voting in federal elections" or to protect
them from violence when they were in the custody of a United
States Marshal, 0 the Court did not allow the federal govern-
ment to prevent private violence against minorities. These cases
prevented the federal government from punishing individuals
who had caused the death of scores, or perhaps hundreds, of
37. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
38. Id.; see also United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (finding no constitu-
tional authority for a law preventing conspiracy to deprive a person of equal protec-
tion of the laws); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (finding no constitution-
al authority for a law punishing those who prevent an African American from exer-
cising his right to vote).
39. Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
40. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
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members of racial minorities.41 The Court's refusal to endorse
federal power to criminalize racially motivated crimes until the
middle of the twentieth century probably was a contributing
factor to thousands of murders.42 Prior to the New Deal era, the
Supreme Court also blocked congressional protection of racial
minorities through civil rights laws. In the Civil Rights Cases,43
the Supreme Court held that Congress could not use its powers
under the Fourteenth Amendment to restrict the activity of
private individuals in denying due process or equal protection to
members of racial minorities." The Court recognized that Con-
gress could control state action under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, but it held that Congress could not declare illegal under
its section 5 powers any state activity that the Court would not
have independently found to be a violation of section L." That
ruling rendered section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment mean-
ingless, as these Justices endorsed the separate but equal prin-
ciple and found that very few government actions violated the
Equal Protection Clause.46 The Supreme Court in the Civil
41. For a discussion of the violence that led up to and followed the Supreme
Court rulings that restricted the ability of the federal government to punish the
persons who had murdered more than 100 African Americans, see Brooks D.
Simpson, "This Bloody and Monstrous Crime," CONSTITUTION, Fall 1992, at 38.
42. There appear to have been, by a conservative estimate, almost 5000 lynchings
of racial minorities. Tuskegee University Lynching Reports (unpublished). The state-
by-state lynching estimates contained in the Tuskegee University study are quoted
in Mark Mayfield & Tom Watson, Guilt, Innocence Blur with Passage of Time, USA
TODAY, Sept. 25, 1992, at 2A; see also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THE STATISTI-
CAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 422
(1976) (showing the number of persons lynched, by race, from 1882 to 1970).
43. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases have been superseded by federal
statute. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1988) and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The
Court in this case examined provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335,
ch. 114.
44. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 18-19.
45. Id. at 18.
46. By the end of the century, the Court endorsed the separate but equal doctrine
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court declined to enforce the
"equal" aspect of the separate but equal doctrine when it considered education cases,
as the Court did not require local school boards to provide equal education for Afri-
can American children. For a listing of the cases in this era, and a discussion of the
Supreme Court's approach to racial classifications immediately following the Civil
War, see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, § 18.8. In this Article, I will make
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Rights- Cases also ruled that Congress had no power to protect
racial minorities pursuant to section 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, except insofar as Congress was literally eliminating slav-
ery or some activity that the Supreme Court would have found
to be a violation of section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment."7
B. The New Deal to the 1950s
The second phase of Court civil rights activity began with the
election of Franklin Roosevelt, his proposed "court packing plan"
that may have influenced the Justices in the 1930s to change
their view of the scope of federal power, and his ability to name
a majority of the Justices to the Court by 1941.4" The Supreme
Court slightly expanded the scope of the criminal statutes pro-
tecting civil rights in the 1940s and 1950s. In 1941, in United
States v. Classic,49 the Supreme Court began to endorse the
federal protection of racial minorities when it held that Congress
reference to the multivolume treatise that Professor Rotunda and I have published,
which is supplemented annually. Student readers of this Article who do not have
access to the multivolume treatise will find most of the sections I refer to in this
Article appearing in a shortened and renumbered single volume ("hornbook) version
of our treatise: JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th
ed. 1991).
47. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 20-22. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this
position in Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906), overruled by Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Congress was not able to make use of its Article
I commerce power to control racial discrimination in the private sector during this
era because the Justices from the late 1800s until 1938 significantly restricted
Congress' power to regulate any aspect of private sector commercial activity. See 1
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, §§ 4.5-4.7.
48. I have no intention of getting into a debate as to whether the "court packing
plan" actually changed the views of the Justices on the Supreme Court in the 1930s
regarding civil rights or commercial matters. See generally Barry Cushman, Rethink-
ing the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994) (discussing potential justifica-
tions for the Supreme Court's 1937 reversal of position). I suppose it is possible that
a variety of other social factors might have made the Justices in the late 1930s
start to rethink their positions concerning the civil rights of racial minorities. As we
began to face the possibility of fighting fascist governments, the open suppression of
civil rights at home was becoming less popular. In 1939, for example, the three
original states that had not ratified the Bill of Rights in the 1700s, Connecticut,
Georgia, and Massachusetts, passed legislation to formally ratify the first ten amend-
ments to the United States Constitution. See 4 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3,
app. N, at 795 n.2.
49. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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could protect an individual's right to vote in federal elections or
primaries from interference by private individuals and state offi-
cials.5 o In 1945, the Supreme Court in Screws v. United
States 1 upheld the conviction, under what is now 18 U.S.C. §
242, of police officers who beat an African American victim to
death. The Court of the 1940s did not, however, totally repudi-
ate its prior narrow reading of this statute. Screws was a very
tentative decision in which the Court, without a majority opin-
ion, found that the actions taken under "color of law" could be
punished by the federal government,52 and the trial judge's in-
structions were not so vague as to deprive the defendants (the
police officers who beat the African American victim to death) of
due process.53
Even prior to the New Deal era, the Court had invalidated
state statutes that prohibited the sale of residential property to
a member of a different race. These decisions were based pri-
marily on a reading of the Due Process Clause that protected a
property owner's right to dispose of his property as he saw fit.54
On May 3, 1948, the Supreme Court decided two cases that
began to give more meaningful protection to racial minorities in
the housing market. In Shelley v. Kraemer,55 the Court ruled
that state court enforcement of a racially restrictive covenant
prohibiting a white homeowner from selling his property to
racial minorities violated equal protection." In Hurd v.
Hodge,57 the Court found that Congress had intended to prohib-
50. Id. at 323-24.
51. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
52. Id. at 107-08.
53. Id. at 106-07.
54. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917). It is possible to construe the
Supreme Court decision as evidencing some concern for racial minorities as well as
the rights of property holders. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's race relations
decisions from 1910 to 1921, see Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The
Supreme Court and Race in the Progressive Era. Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1982).
55. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
56. Id. at 20. In the early 1950s, the Supreme Court extended Shelley by ruling
in Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), that a white property owner who sold
land to a member of a racial minority could not be subjected to monetary damages
for the breach of a racially restrictive covenant. Id. at 258.
57. 334 U.S. 24 (1948). The Hurd decision was a very narrow one in which the
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it the enforcement of racially discriminatory covenants in the
District of Columbia in the portion of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 that is now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982 and that Congress
had the power to do so under the Fourteenth Amendment.58
C. The 1950s and 1960s
The 1950s marked a crucial turning point in the Supreme
Court's approach to equal protection problems," but they were
also a time in which the Court proceeded rather cautiously in its
opposition to racial discrimination."0 In two 1951 cases, the Su-
preme Court left open the question of whether Congress intend-
ed to punish private conspiracies to deprive individuals of Four-
teenth Amendment rights.6
In the 1940s and 1950s the Supreme Court widened Congress'
Article I Commerce Clause power to deal with commercial mat-
ters. During those decades, the Court also endorsed Congress'
use of the Commerce Clause to prohibit racial discrimination in
Supreme Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited the enforcement of
racially discriminatory covenants without ruling on whether Congress had the power
to invalidate private, racially-restrictive agreements completely. In contrast, the Su-
preme Court in the 1960s and 1970s would interpret the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to
simply proscribe racially discriminatory property contracts. See infra notes 84-90 and
accompanying text.
58. Hurd, 334 U.S. at 32-34.
59. For a discussion of the development of the Supreme Court's changing attitudes
towards racial discrimination problems, see TusHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTs LAW,
supra note 2; TUSHNET, THE NAACP, supra note 2.
60. The Court's rulings concerning racial discrimination in the 1950s will be dis-
cussed later in this Article. For analysis of the divisions of the Justices in many
cases during this era, see sources cited supra note 2.
61. In Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), the Supreme Court found
that a private investigator who was accompanied by a City of Miami police officer
when he investigated thefts of his client's property and beat four suspects until they
confessed could be convicted of violating an individual's rights "under color of law."
In a companion case, United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951), the Court by a
five to four vote, and without a majority opinion, reversed the conviction of the
same private detective and his employees who participated in beating the suspects
on the charge of conspiracy to violate the civil rights of the victims. The four dis-
senting Justices in that case believed that the conspiracy statute used in the case
could, and should, have been read to make criminal a conspiracy of private persons
to intentionally deprive other private individuals of constitutionally guaranteed
rights. Williams, 341 U.S. at 93 (Douglas, J., dissenting, joined by Reed, Burton, and
Clark, JJ.).
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channels of interstate commerce.62 In 1964 the Supreme Court
upheld the application of Title II of the Civil Rights Act so as to
prohibit race discrimination in places of public accommodation
and service establishments.63
In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States6 and Katzenbach
v. McClung,65 the Court ruled that Congress had authority un-
der the Commerce Clause to eliminate racial discrimination in
commercial dealings. Justice Clark wrote the majority opinion in
each case; he found that there was no need to address the ques-
tion of whether Congress could have prohibited this type of ra-
cial discrimination based solely on the authority granted to it to
enforce the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. Only Justic-
es Douglas and Goldberg, who concurred in these cases, were
ready to say that the Civil War Amendments, in addition to the
Commerce Clause, granted Congress the power to eliminate
private sector racial discrimination.66
Viewed from the perspective of 1994, the majority opinions by
Justice Clark may seem surprisingly conservative in refusing to
address questions of congressional power under the Civil War
Amendments. But in 1964, when viewed against the background
of seventy years of Supreme Court opposition to civil rights
legislation following the Civil War and decades of treading cau-
tiously in upholding very limited federal statutory protections
62. See, e.g., Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Henderson v. United
States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941). For an
examination of the Supreme Court's expansion of the federal commerce power during
this era, see 1 ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 3, § 4.9.
63. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
64. Id.
65. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
66. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 279-80 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 292
(Goldberg, J., concurring). The Court would continue to expand the application of
this portion of the Civil Rights Acts just as it expanded the scope of congressional
power under the Commerce Clause.
In Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), the Supreme Court, by an eight to one
vote, upheld Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as it was applied to an amuse-
ment park. Justice Black dissented in Daniel because he did not believe that the
commerce power of the federal government should extend to this type of court ruling
despite the fact that he was appointed by President Roosevelt. See id. at 309-10
(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black indicated that he would have voted to uphold
the result in the case if Congress had clearly embraced the Public Accommodation
Act on its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 309.
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for racial minorities, the Supreme Court was taking a major step
in endorsing the ability of Congress to proscribe private sector
racial discrimination. On the same day that it issued the Heart
of Atlanta and McClung decisions, the Supreme Court, in Hamm
v. City of Rock Hill,7 by a five to four vote, used the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 as a basis for overturning prior convictions of
several African Americans who engaged in "sit-in" demonstra-
tions at lunch counters that refused to serve racial minorities."
In the spring of 1966, the Supreme Court decided two cases
that strengthened the ability of the federal government to im-
pose criminal sanctions on persons who violated the civil rights
of other individuals. In United States v. Price,69 the Court held
that government law enforcement personnel and pfivate individ-
uals who conspired to kill civil rights workers could be subject to
criminal sanctions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242. In United States
v. Guest,7" the Court ruled that persons who conspired to
threaten, beat, and kill members of racial minorities were sub-
ject to prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 241, because the in-
dictment contained a sufficient allegation of the state's participa-
tion in the conspiracy.71
Both the Price and Guest majority opinions stated that the
Court was dealing with questions of statutory construction rath-
er than constitutional issues. Nevertheless, the cases were
significant for two reasons. First, the opinions of the Justices in
these cases, particularly that of Justice Brennan in Guest,"
explained how federal statutes imposing criminal sanctions for
civil rights violations could be clarified to provide for easier
enforcement. In 1968, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 245, which
clarified and strengthened the federal government's ability to
impose criminal sanctions for civil rights violations. Second, six
Justices in Guest, though not in a majority opinion, advanced
67. 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
68. See id.
69. 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
70. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
71. Id. at 756.
72. Id. at 749; Price, 383 U.S. at 789.
73. Guest, 383 U.S. at 774 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.).
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the view that Congress had the authority under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to directly regulate individuals in the
private sector who interfered with the civil rights of other per-
sons.
74
The Supreme Court in 1966 also strengthened the ability of
the federal government to protect the voting rights of racial
minorities. Despite a series of Supreme Court rulings declaring
the most obvious, formal denials of voting rights on the basis of
race unconstitutional, some state and local governments in the
1960s continued to use a variety of practices to effectively ex-
clude racial minorities from exercising the right to vote. 5
74. The majority opinion in Guest, written by Justice Stewart, did not reach the
question of whether Congress could prohibit private interferences with all types of
civil rights under the power granted to Congress by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The six Justices who agreed that Congress could regulate such activities had
different interpretations of the majority opinion. See id. at 761 (Clark, J., concurring,
joined by Black and Fortas, JJ.); id. at 774 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part, joined by Warren, C.J., and Douglas, J.).
75. For an analysis of the Supreme Court rulings concerning racial discrimination
and voting rights through the 1980s, see BELL, supra note 2, § 4.1-4.17.
In 1915, the Supreme Court invalidated the open exclusion of racial minorities
from voting through the use of new voter tests that provided a "grandfather clause"
to allow previously registered (white) voters to vote without passing the tests. Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). In 1927, the Court invalidated the exclusion
of racial minorities from primary elections in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
In 1932, the Court invalidated a state law delegating power to political parties to
exclude racial minorities from party connections and the candidate selection process
in Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932). In 1935, however, the Court refused to find
that exclusion of racial minorities from a party candidate selection process violated
the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments when the political party did not rely on a
state law or state administrators to establish or carry out its exclusion of racial mi-
norities. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), overruled by Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (finding that a state delegation of power to a political organiza-
tion to exclude racial minorities from its primary elections violated the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments). Finally, in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), the
Court found that a state could not allow a supposedly private, voluntary organiza-
tion to conduct a pre-primary election and exclude racial minorities when that elec-
tion realistically decided the outcome of the official Democratic primary election in
Texas.
Federal statutes enacted in 1957, 1960, and 1964 made some inroads on racially
discriminatory voting practices of state and local governments. The Civil Rights Act
of 1957, Pub. L. No. 83-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957), allowed the Attorney General to
take some actions in court to stop public or private racial interference with the right
to vote. The Act was amended in the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449,
74 Stat. 86 (1960), to allow states to be joined as defendants and to allow the Attor-
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In the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress attacked racial
discrimination in election systems in a variety of ways. In South
Carolina v. Katzenbach,76 the Supreme Court upheld the por-
tions of the Voting Rights Act that eliminated certain state and
local voting qualifications in identified areas of the United
States where voting tests had been used to exclude most poten-
tial racial minority voters.77 In these areas of the country, Con-
gress eliminated the use of various tests or devices (including
literacy tests) as conditions of voting. These jurisdictions were
required by section 5 of the Act to receive the approval of the
Attorney General of the United States, or the United States
District Court in the District of Columbia, for any change in
their voting laws. The Voting Rights Act also created a system
for federal examiners to be appointed to monitor elections and
voting registration practices under certain circumstances. The
Court in South Carolina v. Katzenbach found that all of these
aspects of the Voting Rights Act were justified by Congress'
power under section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment.7"
In the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court consistently assisted
Congress in protecting the voting rights of racial minorities. One
ney General to have some access to local voting records. The Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1964), provided for expedited voting cases before three judge
courts and outlawed certain tactics used to keep racial minorities from voting.
It was not until the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437 (1965), that Congress finally created a comprehensive structure for the federal
supervision of state and local voting practices that might involve racial discrimina-
tion. As late as 1959, the Supreme Court upheld the use of a literacy test as a
condition for voting in state elections. Lassiter v. North Hampton Election Bd., 360
U.S. 45 (1959). In Lassiter, the Court examined a decision from North Carolina in
which the state court had stricken the grandfather clause provision from the North
Carolina literacy test requirement. The Court upheld the literacy test because there
was no proof that it would be used in a racially discriminatory manner. See id. at
53. In the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and later amendments to the Act, Congress
eliminated the use of literacy tests as a condition of voting. The cases upholding
those congressional actions are examined in the next paragraphs of the text. See
infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
76. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Justice Black dissented from the portion of the Supreme
Court's ruling upholding § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 356 (Black, J., dissent-
ing). Section 5 prohibited a change in local voting laws in a jurisdiction covered by
the Act without the approval of the Attorney General of the United States or the
District Court in the District of Columbia. Id. at 357.
77. Id. at 315.
78. Id. at 327.
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section of the Voting Rights Act prohibited any state or local
government from using an English language literacy test as a
condition of voting when it served to prevent a person from
voting who had successfully completed at least the sixth primary
grade in a school in the United States or its territories in which
the predominant language was not English. 9 In Katzenbach v.
Morgan,8" the Court found that section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to determine that the ex-
clusion of voters on the basis of an English language voting
requirement would constitute a denial of equal protection. This
section of the Voting Rights Act also was justified under the
Fifteenth Amendment."'
In 1969, the Court held that private individuals had standing
to bring suit in a federal court to prevent a governmental entity
subject to the preclearance requirements of section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act from implementing a change in its voting laws
without prior approval of the U.S. Attorney General or the Fed-
eral District Court for the District of Columbia. 2 In 1970, the
Justices unanimously held that Congress had the power, under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, to prohibit all state
and local governments from using literacy tests as a condition of
voting.'
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) (1988).
80. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In Cardona v. Power, 384 U.S. 672 (1966), a companion
case to Morgan, the Court vacated a lower court decision due to a lack of clarity in
the individual's complaint alleging a violation of the Voting Rights Act and the
Fourteenth Amendment.
81. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 646.
82. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
83. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In Mitchell, the Court unanimously
upheld the provisions of the Voting Rights Act amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
285, 84 Stat. 314 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1973), insofar as the law barred the use of
literacy tests. Id. However, through an odd division of the Justices, the Court invali-
dated the portion of the Act that extended the right to vote to 18-year-olds in state
and local elections while it upheld the portion of the Act that gave otherwise quali-
fied 18-year-olds the right to vote in federal elections. Id. at 118. For an examina-
tion of all aspects of this decision, see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, § 19.3.
The portion of the Mitchell decision restricting the power of Congress to grant the
right to vote to 18-year-olds is not relevant to the topic of this Article. In any event,
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which gives citizens of the United States who are
otherwise qualified to vote, the ability to vote in all elections at age 18, overturned
that aspect of the Mitchell decision. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
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The Warren Court also gave an expansive reading to
Congress' power under section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment
and revived some Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes. A pro-
vision of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §
1982, guarantees the same rights to each person "as [are] en-
joyed by white citizens [of the state, territory, or locality] to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property."' For a century, this statute did little to protect the
interests of racial minorities. Finally, in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co.,85 the Court found that the statute was a proper ex-
ercise of Congress' power under section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and that it made illegal the actions of builders and
realtors in refusing to sell or lease property to racial minori-
ties.86 The Court endorsed the view that Congress, under the
powers granted to it by section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment,
could prohibit racial discrimination that the Justices might not
independently believe constituted an incident of slavery that was
proscribed by section 1 of the Amendment." Congress could
rationally conclude that racial discrimination in our society to-
day might be one of the consequences of the fact that we were
once a society that legalized slavery.88 The Court found that
any restriction on the congressional authority to enforce this
statute would mean that the Thirteenth Amendment promise
that slavery had ended would be a "mere paper guarantee." 9 In
the next year, the Supreme Court found that section 1982 pro-
scribed racial discrimination in rental properties and in transac-
tions related to membership in a recreational facility."
84. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
85. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
86. Id. at 413.
87. See id. at 441 n.78.
88. Id. at 440.
89. Id. at 443 (quoting Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1151). See generally 4
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, § 19.8.
90. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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IV. THE SHIFTING ATTITUDES OF JUSTICES TOWARD CIVIL
RIGHTS
A. Legislation in the Burger Court and Rehnquist Court: The
Voting Rights Cases
During the past two decades, the Supreme Court slowly re-
treated from strict enforcement of the federal civil rights stat-
utes. The Court in the 1970s, despite some inconsistencies in its
rulings, remained committed to interpreting civil rights statutes
in a manner that protected racial minorities. The Court in the
1980s began to issue opinions that enforced federal civil rights
statutes through closely divided votes of the Justices and began
to take a "this far and no farther" approach to defining the scope
of federal civil rights statutes. In the past six years, the Su-
preme Court has issued rulings that have undercut significantly
the scope and importance of several federal civil rights statutes;
in the past two Terms, the Court has diminished the importance
of the Voting Rights Act.
A brief sketch of the Supreme Court's major rulings concern-
ing the Voting Rights Act demonstrates that the Court's attitude
toward the protection of racial minorities shifted when Republi-
can Presidents were able to control the membership of the
Court. We should now realize that we cannot rely on the Su-
preme Court to protect the voting rights of racial minorities. In
other words, Professor Guinier was correct in saying that we
must look for new ways to protect the voting power of racial
minorities, and the political attackl on her reflect political atti-
tudes that were evident in some of the Supreme Court's recent
opinions."
91. See Lani Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of
Single-Member Districts, 14 CARDOzo L. REv. 1135 (1993); Lani Guinier, Groups,
Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's Clothes, 71
TEX. L. REV. 1589 (1993); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting
Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991);
Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413 (1991); Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era,
24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1989); Lani Guinier, Who's Afraid of Lani Guinier?,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 41; see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff &
Richard H. Plides, Guinier Aims for Consensus Building Without Quotas, L.A. DAILY
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In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Supreme Court gave a
very expansive reading to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
Section 5 requires certain jurisdictions to clear any change in
their laws that might affect the voting power of racial minorities
with either the Attorney General of the United States or the
District Court in the District of Columbia.2
In the mid-1970s, the Court began to waver in its approach to
the meaning of section 5. In City of Richmond v. United
States,93 the Court ruled that not all city annexations of land
that affected the voting population of a jurisdiction subject to
section 5 preclearance had to receive the approval of the Attor-
ney General or the District Court.94 Justice Powell did not par-
ticipate in this five to three decision. 95 Justice White wrote for
the majority and was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justic-
es Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stewart. 6 Justices Brennan,
Douglas, and Marshall dissented.9 The City of Richmond deci-
sion apparently drew a battle line between some of the Demo-
cratic Justices who had served during the Warren era and the
J., June 2, 1993, at 6; Clint Bolick, Showdown Over Civil Rights-Lani Guinier
Would Turn Electoral Process Into a Racial Spoils System, L.A. DAILY J., June 2,
1993, at 6.
92. The preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act are codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). In 1969, the Supreme Court gave private persons the ability
to invoke district court jurisdiction to require that a jurisdiction subject to the § 5
preclearance provisions followed those provisions and did not hold an election under
a change in voting laws that had not been cleared by the Attorney General or the
District Court in the District of Columbia. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544 (1969). In 1971, the Court applied the § 5 provisions to require preclearance of
changes in polling places and the annexation of property to a city that might lessen
the voting strength of racial minorities. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971).
In 1973, the Supreme Court, by d six to three vote, held that the § 5 preclearance
requirements required jurisdictions covered by § 5 to receive the approval of the
Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia for a state reap-
portionment plan. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973). Justices White,
Powell, and Rehnquist agreed with the application of the § 5 preclearance re-
quirements to reapportionment plans, but dissented on the grounds that the Attor-
ney General did not make an objection contemplated by § 5. Id. at 542 (White,
Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
93. Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
94. Id. at 378.
95. Id. at 379.
96. Id. at 361.
97. Id. at 379.
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new Republican appointees with Justice White being a "swing
vote."
Some of the Court's mid-1970s decisions gave conflicting sig-
nals regarding the Court's commitment to protecting racial mi-
nority voters. In 1976, the Court in Beer v. United States9
ruled that a jurisdiction, which was subject to section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, would not be allowed to change its voting
laws if the change reduced the voting strength of racial minori-
ties.99 However, the majority opinion by Justice Stewart also
stated voting procedure changes clearly burdensome to racial
minority voters were not subject to section 5 preclearance. 0°
In United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey (UJO),'0' the
Supreme Court, without a majority opinion, approved the State
of New York's use of racial criteria to redraw districts for the
state legislature to protect the voting power of racial minori-
ties."0 2 A majority of the Court held that the government's
race-conscious action designed to support minority voting power
did not violate the Voting Rights Act, the Equal Protection
Clause, or the Fifteenth Amendment.' 3 Although there was no
majority opinion in this case, clearly UJO is a ringing endorse-
ment of the power of the federal government to force states to
actively enhance the voting power of racial minorities. In a plu-
rality decision, Justice White stated that the Court's earlier
98. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
99. Id. at 141.
100. Id. Justice Marshall's dissent, which was joined by Justice Brennan, explained
that the Court's new reading of § 5 sounded in part as if it were protecting the
interest of racial minority voters, but, in fact, the Court was freeing changes in
redistricting plans that would result in discrimination against racial minority voters
from the § 5 preclearance procedures. I& at 145 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dis-
senting). Justice White also dissented and agreed with much of Justice Marshall's
analysis. Id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting). In a separate opinion, Justice White ex-
pressed the view that the Court should give a wider scope to the § 5 preclearance
requirements. Id. Ultimately, the five member majority (with Justice Stevens not
participating in the case) created an indecisive ruling that seemed to prohibit any
retrogression in the voting strength of racial minorities while freeing from § 5 pre-
clearance procedures many types of changes in voting practices that lower courts
might find to be ones that on their face did not result in the dilution of minority
race voting strength.
101. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
102. Id. at 168.
103. Id. at 155.
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rulings on the meaning of the Voting Rights Act established that
the use of racial criteria to protect racial minority voting power
complied with the Voting Rights Act, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and the Fifteenth Amendment.1 4 In a later section in
this Article, I will reconsider UJO as a means of examining the
Supreme Court's definition of racial discrimination and the
Justices' attitudes towards the use of racial criteria to help ra-
cial minorities." 5
Through the mid-1980s, the Court seemed committed to
strong endorsement of the Attorney General's powers under
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 6 However, increasing dis-
104. Id. at 162 (White, J., joined by Stevens, Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
105. See infra notes 326-45, 503-04 and accompanying text.
106. In 1978, Supreme Court support for the Voting Rights Act lessened even
though a majority of the Justices continued to vote to protect racial minorities under
the Act. In Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 (1978), the Court
held that the Voting Rights Act preclearance requirements applied to a school board
that changed its rules for leaves of absence for its employees who ran for election,
because of the potential for discrimination against racial minorities and dilution of
the voting power of racial minority voters. The White decision, however, was ren-
dered by a five to four vote of the Justices. Justice Stevens concurred only because
he believed that prior cases required its result. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and in part by
Justice Stewart, dissented. In 1978, the Court applied the Voting Rights Act
preclearance requirements to a municipality's plan to use an at-large election for city
council. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110 (1978). The Court, by a
six to three vote, found that § 5 applied not only to counties and political units
within a state that register voters, but to any unit with power over the electoral
process. Id. at 118. The Court reasoned that the mere failure of the Attorney Gener-
al to object to the holding of a referendum election that adopted the voting changes
did not constitute preclearance under § 5 when the proposal had not been formally
submitted to him pursuant to the formalities required by the Court's interpretations
of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. Justice Powell concurred in part and concurred
in the judgment. Id. at 139. Justice Stevens,'joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist, dissented. Id. at 140.
The Supreme Court had held that reapportionment plans that are ordered by
courts are not subject to the preclearance requirements of § 5, but in 1981 the
Court, in McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981), found that the preclearance
requirements did apply to a court-adopted reapportionment plan if a legislative body
originally had submitted the plan to the court.
In City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159 (1982), the Supreme
Court ruled that the district court properly conditioned clearance of a new election
plan following annexation of territory on a requirement that a plurality of voters
could control the election in certain districts. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor dissented. Id. at 169.
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sension developed within the Court concerning the scope of the
Voting Rights Act preclearance requirements. In 1982, the Court
issued a per curiam ruling that affirmed a lower court order
enforcing section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and prevented a
local jurisdiction from changing its voting laws in a way that
might dilute racial minority voting strength.0 7 But Justices
Rehnquist and Powell wrote a concurring opinion for the sole
purpose of criticizing the extent to which the Voting Rights Act
allowed the federal government to control the decisions of state
and local governmental entities concerning their electoral prac-
tices. °8 In 1985, the Supreme Court unanimously ruled that
section 5 required preclearance for setting a new filing date for
general elections in covered jurisdictions, but Justices Powell
and Rehnquist concurred only in the judgment of the Court.0 9
In 1987, by a vote of six to three, the Court found a city's
In 1983, the Court found that a new city election plan that altered the election
procedures for city council and mayor required approval even though the plan did
not change racial minority voting strength. Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125
(1983). Justice White dissented without an opinion. Id. at 136. Justice Marshall and
Justice Blackmun each issued an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Id. at 136 (Marshall, J.); id. at 148 (Blackmun, J.).
In 1984, the Court unanimously held that changes in an election statute that
had not been formally presented to the Attorney General in 1966 was not later
retroactively cleared by the Justice Department when the Attorney General failed to
object in 1971 to amendments to the 1966 state statute. McCain v. Lybrand, 465
U.S. 236 (1984). Although the Court was unanimous in its ruling, Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist concurred in the judgment without issuing any
written opinions. Id. at 258.
In 1984, dissension within the Court was evident concerning the scope of § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. Section 2 prohibits government actions that deprive persons
of voting rights by diluting the voting power of racial minorities. In Mississippi
Republican Executive Comm. v. Brooks, 469 U.S. 1002 (1984), the Supreme Court,
without opinion, summarily affirmed a lower court ruling concerning a violation of §
2. Justice Rehnquist joined by Chief Justice Burger dissented; they categorized the
lower court ruling as construing the 1982 amendment to the Voting Rights Act to
entitle racial minority plaintiffs to a district in which they constituted a majority of
the voters. Id. at 1005 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J.). Justice
Stevens wrote a concurring opinion to rebut the implications concerning the meaning
of the Court's summary judgment that had been made in the Rehnquist dissent. Id.
at 1002 (Stevens, J., concurring).
107. Blanding v. DuBose, 454 U.S. 393 (1982) (per curiam). Chief Justice Burger
concurred in the judgment without opinion.
108. Id. at 401 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by Powell, J.).
109. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 183 (1985).
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annexation of land to be used for residential development sub-
ject to section 5 and that the annexation or any new voting prac-
tices should not receive preclearance unless the city met the
burden of proving that the state action would not dilute the
voting strength of minorities."' Justice Powell dissented in an
opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor.'"
In 1991, the Court gave mixed signals concerning its attitude
towards the scope and meaning of the Voting Rights Act. In
Clark v. Roemer,"' Justice Kennedy wrote for a unanimous
Court in ruling that in covered jurisdictions, section 5 requires
preclearance for changes in the election of judge."' In two oth-
er 1991 cases, the Court held that the standards established in
earlier cases concerning section 2 of the Voting Rights Act for
the determination of whether a change in voting laws constitut-
ed an illegal dilution of minority race voting power should also
apply to the election of judges."' Justice Scalia, joined by Jus-
tice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the
rulings concerning the applicability of section 2 standards to
judicial elections."' Justice Kennedy also filed a dissent in
Chisom in which he questioned whether section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, as it had been amended in 1982, was "consistent
with the requirements of the United States Constitution.""6
In 1992, Reagan and Bush appointees undercut the authority
of the Attorney General under section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act. In Presley v. Etowah County Commission,"7 the Court
ruled that changes in the decisionmaking authority of elected
members of the county commissions in two Alabama counties
110. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 469-72 (1987).
111. Id. at 472 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor, J.).
112. 500 U.S. 646 (1991).
113. Id. at 652.
114. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991); Houston Trial Lawyers' Ass'n v. At-
torney Gen., 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
115. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Kennedy, J.); Houston Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 501 U.S. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.).
116. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 418 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
117. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
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were not subject to the section 5 preclearance requirements.'18
The changes to the powers of the county commissioners at issue
in Presley had been made immediately after racial minorities
first were elected to those commissions."' The minority candi-
dates prevailed in elections held after consent decrees that re-
quired that each county commission be elected on a district,
rather than an at-large, basis. 2 ' After the election, the lame
duck commission adopted resolutions that stripped the commis-
sion of some of its powers and eliminated the prior practice of
allowing each commissioner the authority to determine how to
spend road district funds.' 2 ' Decisionmaking authority regard-
ing matters such as road districts was transferred to a county
engineer who was a -commission appointee.'22 The Attorney
General of the United States during the Bush Administration
found that this change in the allocation of authority within the
county governmental units was a change in voting practices that
was subject to the section 5 preclearance requirements. 2 ' The
Justice Department took the position that the action of the ma-
jority race commissioners, in altering powers of individual com-
missioners, was a change in the local laws "with respect to vot-
ing" because these actions reduced the political voice of minori-
ties. 24  The Court held that section 5 did not require
preclearance of the change.'25 Justice Kennedy, writing for six
Justices, found that the Court did not need to defer to the execu-
tive branch's interpretation of section 5.26
Justice White (the last Democratic appointee), Justice Stevens
(who had been appointed during the Ford Administration), and
118. Id. at 832.
119. Id. at 822.
120. Id. at 826.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 827.
124. See id. at 824 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)). The Justice Department, as
amicus curiae to the Court, argued that § 5 should be interpreted as applicable to
all "routine actions of state and local governments at all levels." Id. at 824. The
Justice Department has denied preclearance where changes in elected officials' power
"had a potentially discriminatory impact on black voters." Id. at 833 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting, joined by White and Blackmun, JJ.).
125. See id. at 832.
126. Id. at 831.
1995]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Justice Blackmun (who had a long voting record of supporting
the interests of racial minorities) were the only three members
of the Court in 1992 willing to find that the preclearance provi-
sions of the Voting Rights Act applied to the transfer of
decisionmaking authority away from a county commission that
had just been integrated. 127  The scope of the section 5
preclearance provision of the Act had not been limited by Con-
gress, or by President Bush's Justice Department, but by the
Reagan and Bush appointees on the Supreme Court.
A later section of this Article will examine the willingness of
the Justices of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to uphold laws
that, although written in racially neutral terms, harm minorities
when challenged as violations of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court's refusal in the last quarter century to protect racial
minorities from even the most mildly disguised discriminatory
laws is reflected in its decisions concerning whether changes in
voting laws should be held to violate section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, which prohibits denying the vote to, or diluting the
voting power of, racial minorities.'
Early in the Burger Court, the Supreme Court ruled that
legislative redistricting plans do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause or the Fifteenth Amendment if the only proof of racial
discrimination in the voting plan was the fact that it resulted in
the dilution of minority voting strength.'29
127. Id. at 840 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by White and Blackmun, JJ.)
128. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
129. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149-53 (1971). The Supreme Court upheld
a state legislative apportionment law that created a multimember legislative district,
which included an area that the Supreme Court described as a racial minority "ghet-
to." Id. at 129. If the state had used only single member districts, creating a district
where African American voters controlled, the outcome of the election would have
been difficult to avoid. See id. at 149. However, the effect of the multimember
districting was not sufficient to persuade a majority of the Burger Court that the
state had engaged in racial discrimination. Id. at 149-53.
Two years later in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), the Court found that
a legislative redistricting plan violated the Equal Protection Clause because there
was clear proof that the creation of two multimember state legislative districts in
Texas were racially discriminatory. Id. at 765-70. The Court deferred to the findings
of the district court that the history of official racial discrimination in Texas played
a part in the creation of multimember districts designed to reduce or eliminate the
voting strength of African American and Hispanic American voters. Id The Court
affirmed the district court ruling that the two multimember districts were invalid on
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The Burger Court Justices were equally unsympathetic to
claims under the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that the effect of
electoral systems diluted minority race voting power. In 1979, in
Mobile v. Bolden,"' the Court held that the use of at-large
elections for members of a city commission did not violate the
Voting Rights Act or the Fifteenth Amendment, 3' even though
no racial minority member had ever been elected to the commis-
sion.132 No majority arose in Bolden; Justice Stewart, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, found
that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act did not ease the burden
of plaintiffs trying to show that the creation or maintenance of
an electoral system was designed to dilute the voting power of
racial minorities.33
the basis of racial discrimination. Id. at 765. In the same opinion, however, the
Court reversed the district court and upheld the statewide redistricting plan as com-
plying with one person, one vote principles. Id at 763-64. At the same time it decid-
ed White, the Supreme Court in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), upheld
the reapportionment plan for the Connecticut legislature despite claims that it violat-
ed the one person, one vote principle. Id. at 741. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Douglas and Marshall, concurred in White insofar as the Court found a violation of
equal protection in the Texas multimember districts; however, they dissented from
the Court's rulings upholding the Texas and Connecticut statewide legislative maps
against the one person, one vote challenge. Id. at 772 (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part in White and dissenting in Gaffney, joined by Douglas
and Marshall, JJ.) (the combined opinion of Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall
with respect to White and Gaffney is located in White).
130. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
131. Id. at 60-65.
132. Id. at 122 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 61. (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court in an opinion
joined by Burger, C.J., Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.). Justice Blackmun concurred only
in the result because he thought that the district court's remedy was improper even
though he agreed that there might be a basis for finding purposeful discrimination.
Id. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment of
the Court; however, his analysis focused on the objective effects of the change in the
voting laws or voting practices rather than the "subjective motivation of the
decisionmaker." Id. at 90 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' test would make
it even more difficult to show that an electoral system was created or maintained
for a racially discriminatory purpose. Justice White dissented because he believed
that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of racially discriminatory purpose
that met the standards established in the cases decided in the early 1970s. Id. at
103 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall, in separate dissenting
opinions, argued that proof of discriminatory impact on minority race voters was
sufficient to show a violation of the Voting Rights Act as well as the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments. Id. at 94 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 104 (Marshall, J.,
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In 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act to provide
for greater protection of minority voters.' In the same year,
the Supreme Court, in Rogers v. Lodge,' upheld lower federal
court rulings that invalidated an at-large election system for a
county board of commissioners."' The Court in Rogers found
that evidence existed, beyond the statistical underrepresentation
of minority members of the governmental board, to show that
the at-large system was maintained for discriminatory purposes
to preclude racial minorities from being elected to the county
commission.'37
In 1986, the Supreme Court interpreted the 1982 amendments
to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Justice Brennan an-
nounced the judgment of the Court in Thornburg v. Gingles38
and delivered an opinion that was, in part, a majority opinion
and, in part, a plurality opinion.'39 The result of Gingles was a
finding that the 1982 amendments only slightly eased the bur-
dens of plaintiffs who challenged a voting law on the basis that
the law diluted the voting strength of minority race voters. "'
A majority of Justices in Gingles required a plaintiff to meet
three conditions in order to establish a prima facie case of racial
discrimination under amended section 2.' First, the plaintiff
must show that the minority group that allegedly suffered dis-
crimination is sufficiently large and geographically compact so
that the group might have constituted a majority in an electoral
district drawn with no racially discriminatory purpose.' Sec-
ond, the plaintiffs must show that the minority voters are "polit-
dissenting). Mobile was decided on the same day as Williams v. Brown, 446 U.S.
236 (1980). The dissents of Justices Brennan and Marshall apply to both cases. Id.
at 236.
134. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131,
134 (1982) (amending 42 U.S.C. 1973b (1976)).
135. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
136. Id. at 627.
137. Id. at 623.
138. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
139. Id. at 34.
140. See Jim R. Karpiak, Voting Rights and the Role of the Federal Government:
The Rehnquist Court's Mixed Messages in Minority Vote Dilution Cases, 27 U.S.F. L.
REV. 627, 639 (1993).
141. 478 U.S. at 50-51.
142. Id. at 50.
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ically cohesive," so that they likely would influence or control
elections in fairly drawn districts. 43 Third, the plaintiffs must
show that white voters in the challenged legislative districts
were likely to engage in racial bloc voting, so that the districting
system dilutes the voting power of minority voters and insures
the defeat of minority candidates.'"
The Supreme Court has extended the impact of Gingles, and,
thereby, maintained a narrow reading of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act. Gingles established the conditions for challenging a
multimember district on the basis that it diluted the strength of
minority race voters. 45 In 1993 the Supreme Court ruled that
plaintiffs who alleged that a legislative redistricting plan created
single member districts that violated section 2 through the dilu-
tion of minority voting strength also must meet the three
Gingles conditions.'46
The Supreme Court in 1993 also ruled that plaintiffs who
allege that legislative districting had diluted minority race vot-
ing power through the packing of minority race voters into spe-
cific districts must meet the three Gingles conditions to prove a
violation of the Voting Rights Act.'47 One method of engaging
in racial gerrymandering is to pack minority race voters into dis-
tricts that will provide them with the power to control a district
election but that will keep those voters from influencing the
outcome of elections in more than one district. For example, if
two previous legislative districts each had fifty-five percent mi-
nority voters, a legislature intending to engage in racial gerry-
mandering might reshape the districts so that minorities consti-
tuted 100 percent of the voters in one district and ten percent in
the second district. The minority race voters would thus be able
to elect only one representative to the legislature. Minority vot-
143. Id. at 51.
144. Id. Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun would have given more defer-
ence to the lower court determination that the facts in this case demonstrated a
violation of § 2. Id. at 106 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.).
145. Karpiak, supra note 140, at 627.
146. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993).
147. Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 1157 (1993). In Voinovich, the Court
held that the district court erred by not applying the Gingles factors to determine
the validity of a single-member district apportionment scheme. Id.
1995] 381
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ers now must meet all the Gingles conditions to prove that this
legislative practice violated the Voting Rights Act.14
In Shaw v. Reno4 1 the Supreme Court, in an apparent effort
to protect the power of white voters, disregarded its prior cases
concerning the need to prove racially discriminatory purpose
when challenging legislative districts under the Fourteenth
Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, and the Voting Rights
Act. 5 ' In a later section of this Article, I will examine the
Shaw decision in terms of how it reflects the Justices' views of
equal protection principles.' 5 ' Here we should note that the
Court's ruling in Shaw shows that a majority of the Justices
were not willing to give any deference to legislative or executive
branch attempts to help minority voters.'52
North Carolina, which is subject to the preclearance require-
ments of the Voting Rights Act, received an additional congres-
sional seat following the 1990 census.'53 The Justice Depart-
ment rejected the North Carolina legislature's first congressional
redistricting plan because the Attorney General believed the
state's initial drawing of district lines would have resulted in the
dilution of minority race voting power.' The state did not cha-
llenge the Attorney General.'55 Instead, it enacted a congres-
sional redistricting plan designed to allow racial minorities to
control the outcome in two of its congressional districts. 5 ' In
Shaw, the Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, ruled that the
final North Carolina plan, on its face, involved a racial classifi-
cation.5 7 The State's attempt to aid minority race voters was
subject to the compelling interest test, even though the State
had drawn these congressional districts in response to Justice
Department objections raised under section 5 of the Voting
148. See id. at 1157-58.
149. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
150. See id. at 2828-32.
151. See infra notes 346-73, 490-504 and accompanying text.
152. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819-32.
153. Id. at 2819.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. See id. at 2819-20.
157. Id. at 2819, 2824.
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Rights Act.15 The majority remanded the case to the lower
court for a determination of whether the action taken by the
State was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.'59 Justice
O'Connor's opinion gave no indication that the Supreme Court
would ever uphold these districts.'
Justice O'Connor, writing for the five-member majority in
Shaw, ruled that the law creating the final congressional dis-
tricts constituted racial discrimination on the face of the statute
even though racial terms were not used in the statute itself.16'
The Shaw majority freed the plaintiffs from having to meet the
conditions. 62 The plaintiffs did not have to prove a racially dis-
criminatory purpose or the dilution of the voting strength of
minority race voters in order to have the law subjected to the
compelling interest test." The plaintiffs in Shaw could not
have met such a burden. After the final congressional districts
were drawn, white voters in North Carolina controlled over
eighty percent of the state's congressional seats even though
white voters constituted less than eighty percent of the voting
population."M
Justices Blackmun, White, Stevens, and Souter dissented in
Shaw." They believed that the case was factually and legally
indistinguishable from UJO.'66 Unlike 1977, only a minority of
Justices in 1993 would vote to use the Voting Rights Act to help
158. Id. at 2832.
159. Id.
160. These portions of Justice O'Connor's opinion are discussed at infra notes 358-
73 and accompanying text.
161. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2819, 2828.
162. Id. at 2831. The Court remanded to the district court the issue concerning the
application of the three Gingles threshold conditions and their impact on the consti-
tutionality of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
163. Id. at 2831-32.
164. Id. at 2838. The difference between the statistical representation of racial
minorities in the voting population and their representation in the North Carolina
congressional district led the Attorney General to object to the first North Carolina
districting plan. See id. at 2837.
165. See id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.);
id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at
2845 (Souter, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 2834, 2837 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.);
see id. at 2845-49 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey,
430 U.S. 144 (1977)).
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racial minorities.
The Presley and Shaw decisions seem to turn the Voting
Rights Act inside out. The Voting Rights Act, at least as it was
interpreted by the Court in the 1960s and early 1970s, was
meant to give the federal government the ability to strengthen
the voting power of racial minorities. In Presley, the Court decid-
ed that it would not defer to the Attorney General in finding
that government actions constituted the type of changes to vot-
ing laws that would endanger the voting power of minorities.
16 7
In Shaw, the Court found that the North Carolina congressional
districts constituted racial discrimination even though there was
no claim that the voting power of the majority had been diluted
by the attempt to maintain the voting power of minority race
voters.'68 Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw casts doubt on
the ability of the other branches of government to protect minor-
ity voting power.
During" the current Term the Supreme Court will decide
several cases concerning the burdens that plaintiffs must meet
to show that a state or local apportionment plan violates section
2 of the Voting Rights Act. If the Court places further barriers
in the path of plaintiffs attempting to prove that legislative dis-
tricts illegally dilute minority voting strength, the Republican
Justices may be able to turn the clock back to the time before
the Voting Rights Act existed.'69
167. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 831 (1992).
168. See Shaw 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
169. On June 30, 1994, six weeks after the conference for which this Article was
written, the Supreme Court decided two cases that advanced the Republican
Justices' goal of undercutting the impact of the Voting Rights Act. The most impor-
tant of these cases is Holder v. Hall, 114 S. Ct. 2581 (1994), in which the Court,
without a majority opinion, ruled that the size of a governmental authority could not
be challenged under § 2 of the Voting Rights Act even if there was clear proof that
the size of the governmental entity would suppress the voting power of racial minor-
ities. Id. at 2588. In Holder, the Court immunized from a Voting Rights Act chal-
lenge a single commissioner form of government for a county in Georgia. Id. at
2584. The county had never elected a person of color to the commissioner position
and had a history of openly oppressing racial minority interests in a wide variety of
areas. Id. In 1985, the State of Georgia authorized the county to adopt a
multimember county commission by referendum. Id. In a 1986 referendum, however,
the voters in the county defeated the proposal for a multimember commission. Id.
Five Republican Justices ruled that the county's refusal to adopt the multimember
commission system and decision to keep the single commissioner system (which
[Vol. 36:345384
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would effectively guarantee that 51% of the population would receive 100% of the
representation in the county government) was not subject to challenge under § 2 of
the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 2588. Justice Kennedy announced the judgment of the
Court in an opinion that was joined in its entirety only by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
They believed that the size of the membership of a political subdivision of a govern-
mental entity was not a "standard, practice, or procedure" related to voting as those
words were used in § 2 of the Voting Rights Act, despite previous Supreme Court
rulings finding that a change in the size of a county commission was a voting "stan-
dard or practice" subject to § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 2585-88. Justice
O'Connor wrote an opinion concurring in part, and concurring in the judgment, in
which she found that prior Supreme Court cases required the determination that the
"standard, practice, or procedure" language of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act must
mean the same as the language in § 5 of the Act. Id. at 2588-89 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). However, she believed that the judiciary was incapable of determining
whether the refusal to change the size of a governmental entity diluted the voting
power of racial minorities within the jurisdiction. Id. at 2590-91. Justice O'Connor,
therefore, concurred "in the conclusion that respondents' dilution challenge to the
size of the Bleckley County Commission cannot be maintained under § 2 of the
Voting Rights Act." Id. at 2591.
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in Holder, which
was joined by Justice Scalia, that can only be described as a sweeping attack on the
Voting Rights Act. Id. at 2591 (Thomas, J., concurring, joined by Scalia, J.). Justices
Thomas and Scalia would overrule all prior Supreme Court cases that found that
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act made illegal administrative or legislative actions that
were designed to dilute the voting strength of racial minorities. Id. at 2618. They
argued that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act was meant to do nothing except prohibit
denying someone a ballot on the basis of their race, despite the fact that Congress
voted to continue, and strengthen, the language of § 2 following Supreme Court
rulings that invalidated city or state apportionment schemes under § 2 on the basis
that those city or state practices diluted the voting strength of racial minorities. Id.
at 2606.
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented in Holder. Id. at
2619 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ.). Justice
Blackmun's opinion demonstrates how the Court could have established standards for
determining whether a jurisdiction's selection of a particular size of governing au-
thority is an attempt to dilute the voting power of racial minorities. Id. at 2619-24.
Justice Stevens' opinion examines the Supreme Court's earlier rulings concerning the
scope of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the congressional responses thereto. See
id. at 2625-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Souter, and Ginsburg,
JJ.). The Stevens opinion reveals the unprincipled nature of Justices Thomas' and
Scalia's attack on § 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
In Holder, the Court remanded the case for a determination of whether the
plaintiffs could demonstrate that the county refused to adopt a multimember system
for the primary purpose of preventing racial minorities from being elected to office.
Id. at 2588. Only by showing racially discriminatory purpose under the standards
established by the Burger Court and Rehnquist Court would the plaintiffs be able to
show that the refusal to change the size of the governing authority violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and, perhaps, the Fifteenth
Amendment. Given the rulings of the Burger Court and Rehnquist Court concerning
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:345
V. THE SHIFTING ATTITUDE OF THE JUSTICES TOWARDS
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT LEGISLATION
The approach of the Supreme Court towards interpreting and
enforcing Thirteenth Amendment legislation changed dramati-
cally during the past quarter century. In 1968 and 1969, the
the nature of proof required to show discriminatory purpose as a basis for invalidat-
ing a facially neutral law, this county's commissioner system may survive constitu-
tional review despite the county's history of racial discrimination. I have discussed
the Court's rulings concerning discriminatory purpose elsewhere in this Article. See
supra notes 137-48 and accompanying text; infra notes 206-12 and accompanying
text.
In Johnson v. De Grandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994), the Supreme Court ruled on
three Florida cases that raised the question of whether legislative districts for the
Florida House of Representatives and Florida Senate violated § 2 of the Voting
Rights Act by diluting the voting strength of racial minorities. Id. at 2650. The
Supreme Court ruled that the lower courts should not have found a violation of § 2
of the Voting Rights Act unless they determined that the "totality of circumstances"
demonstrated that the apportionment system was designed to suppress minority race
voting strength. Id. at 2656. Justice Souter wrote for seven Justices and found that,
even if a plaintiff could meet all three requirements that had been established in
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), for making out a prima facie violation of
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act, the plaintiffs would not have established a basis for
finding illegal dilution of the voting power of minority race persons unless that con-
clusion was supported by the "totality of circumstances." Johnson, 114 S. Ct. at
2657. According to Justice Souter, the fact that racial minorities had achieved pro-
portional representation did not foreclose the possibility of showing illegal vote dilu-
tion, although proportional representation would make it difficult for minority plain-
tiffs to win a case under the totality of circumstances test. Id. at 2660-62. The ma-
jority opinion clearly stated that neither state legislatures nor courts were required
to maximize the voting strength of racial minorities. Id. at 2660.
In one sense, Johnson only continues the trend towards interpreting the § 2
requirements in a way that makes it difficult for plaintiffs to prove illegal vote dilu-
tion. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (describing this trend). This case
also stands in sharp contrast to Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), in which the
Court ruled that an attempt to strengthen and protect minority race voting power
constituted a racial classification that was subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.
Id. at 2832; see infra notes 346-73 and accompanying text (analyzing the decision in
Shaw). The message of the Rehnquist Court in Shaw and Johnson is that states
will not be required to protect minority race voting power while any state attempt
to strengthen minority race voting power may not survive judicial review.
The Shaw, Holder, and Johnson cases may demonstrate that at least five Re-
publican Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia,
and Thomas) want to return to the 1890s, when the Court impaired legislative at-
tempts to protect the interests of racial minorities and upheld a wide variety of
racially discriminatory practices that did not involve the open denial of specific
rights to racial minorities.
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Supreme Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1982 in a manner that
prohibited racial discrimination in private real estate contracts
or related transactions.' 0 In the early Burger Court years, it
appeared that the Court would continue to give a broad inter-
pretation to Thirteenth Amendment legislation.'
In 1976, the Court, in Runyon v. McCrary172 found that 42
U.S.C. § 1981, which gives all persons the same rights as "white
citizens" to make and enforce contracts,'73 outlawed the prac-
tices of a private school that denied admission to qualified appli-
cants solely because they were racial minorities. 4 The Burger
Court gave the same wide reading to Congress' powers under
the Thirteenth Amendment in Runyon as the Warren Court had
in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.'75
Despite the Court's ruling in Runyon, the opinions of the
Justices indicated that the Court might take a more narrow
approach towards the reading and enforcement of Thirteenth
Amendment statutes in the future. The Runyon case was decid-
ed by a seven to two vote of the Justices, but Justice Stewart
wrote for only five members of the Court in finding that the
Court should give a broad reading to section 1981 in order to
fulfill the intent of the Reconstruction Era Congress and the
promise of the Thirteenth Amendment. 176 Justices Powell and
Stevens, in separate concurrences, voted with the majority only
on the basis of stare decisis. 77 Justices White and Rehnquist
dissented iii Runyon;7 ' they would have restricted the scope of
sections 1981 and 1982.179
170. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
171. In 1973, the Court ruled that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibited racial discrimination
in the policies of an association of recreational property owners. See Tillman v.
Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
172. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
174. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 172-74.
175. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
176. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 179.
177. Id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 191-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 192 (White J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
179. Id. at 194-95. Another indication of the Court's changing attitude towards
racial minorities can be found in the Court's mid-1970s rulings allowing white em-
ployees to use Thirteenth Amendment statutes to challenge employment preferences
for minority race persons. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
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In the 1980s, the Supreme Court restricted the impact of
sections 1981 and 1982 by ruling that plaintiffs could not estab-
lish a violation of these statutory provisions merely by showing
that public or private sector activities had an adverse impact on
racial minorities. In Memphis v. Greene, s° the Court consid-
ered whether the closing of one end of a city street that went
through a white residential community and that was used by
persons travelling to a neighborhood that had primarily minority
race residents violated section 1982 or the Thirteenth Amend-
ment."8 ' The Court found that this action did not violate sec-
tion 1982 or the Thirteenth Amendment because the plaintiffs
who challenged the closing of the city street had failed to show
that the city action was taken for a racially discriminatory pur-
pose. 18
2
The next year, the Supreme Court required persons alleging
private racial employment discrimination to prove that the chal-
lenged employment policies had not only a racially disparate
impact, but that the policies also were undertaken a with racial-
ly discriminatory purpose." Requiring plaintiffs to prove dis-
criminatory purpose was a way in which the Supreme Court
could limit both Thirteenth Amendment statutes as well as the
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
Clause."8
The Supreme Court in 1989 dealt a devastating blow to the
impact of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Un-
U.S. 273 (1976). In one sense such rulings broaden the scope of these Thirteenth
Amendment statutes, but they also provided a statutory vehicle for whites to chal-
lenge voluntary affirmative action in the private sector. The Court's rulings in the
1980s allowing a variety of ethnic groups to use Thirteenth Amendment statutes
such as §§ 1981 and 1982 to challenge racial discrimination against them is an
indication that the Court was still concerned with the use of Thirteenth Amendment
statutes to stop racial discrimination against minority ethnic groups. See Saint Fran-
cis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,
481 U.S. 615 (1987).
180. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
181. Id. at 102.
182. Id. at 126-29.
183. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
184. See infra notes 205-12 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's rulings
requiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory purpose in equal protection cases).
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ion... the Court ruled that section 1981 did not prohibit racial-
ly discriminatory actions that were unrelated to contract forma-
tion, such as racial harassment of employees or racially discrimi-
natory conditions of employment."'6  The Patterson ruling
meant that section 1981 would be of little real help to minority
race persons who suffered discriminatory treatment in private
business settings. In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
amended section. 1981 by adding new provisions that prohibited
racial discrimination in the "making, performance, modification,
and termination of contracts and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relation-
ship."1 87 The fact that Congress, during the Bush Administra-
tion, had to revise a Reconstruction Era statute due to a Su-
preme Court ruling is clear evidence that the Supreme Court
was the branch of the federal government least sympathetic to
racial minorities."c
185. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
186. Id. at 176.
187. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
188. The Rehnquist Court, however, has not significantly undercut the expansive
reading the Burger Court gave to another Thirteenth Amendment statute, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(3). In 1971, the Court held in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971),
that this statute provided for civil actions against governmental or private persons
who conspired to deny individuals of their rights because those individuals were
members of racial minorities or because they were exercising certain fundamental
constitutional rights. Id. at 96-98. In later cases the Supreme Court found that, in
order to state a cause of action under § 1985(3), an individual who claimed that
there was a conspiracy to violate her rights would have to show that the state was
involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy was to influence the
activity of the state as well as some type of "class-based animus." E.g., United Bhd.
of Carpenters & 'Joiners of Am., Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 830-37 (1983).
Thus, persons who wished to invoke § 1985(3) to stop an interference with their
ability to engage in speech unconnected to a racial dispute had to show that the
conspiracy involved some type of government or state action or some attempt at
influencing state action. Id. at 832-33.
In 1993, the Supreme Court held that women who sought abortions could not
maintain an action under § 1985(3) against persons who interfered with their ability
to have access to abortion clinics or the operation of abortion clinics because the
Supreme Court found that their attitudes towards abortion did not constitute the
type of "class-based animus" that was the basis of a § 1985(3) claim. Bray v. Alex-
andria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753, 759-62 (1993). The Court later ruled
that the criminal activities of persons who sought to interfere with the operation of
abortion facilities might be subject to prosecution under the Racketeer Influenced
Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). NOW v. Scheidler, 114 S.
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VI. THE SHIFTING ATTITUDES OF THE JUSTICES
TOWARD TITLE VII
The Supreme Court's rulings concerning Title VII prohibitions
of employment discrimination also reflect its shift away from the
protection of racial minorities. I do not mean to imply that the
Supreme Court in the last quarter century has been restricting
all aspects of Title VII. Since Congress reversed the Supreme
Court's initial position, and expressly made discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy a form of sex discrimination, the Su-
preme Court has invalidated employer policies that disadvan-
tage pregnant women."9 And the Court has upheld applying
Title VII in a wide variety of work environments, including law
firms and other types of professional associations.19 The
Court, in the fall of 1993, found that the creation of a hostile
environment for women workers was a violation of Title VII.191
Focusing on the Title VII decisions that are of vital importance
to racial minority and female employees reveals that the Court
has engaged in a consistent retrenchment in its willingness to
Ct. 798, 803-06 (1994).
189. The Supreme Court established its initial position in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974), in which the Court refused to find that a pregnancy classification
relating to state disability benefits constituted a sex classification and therefore re-
fused to test the state's decision not to fund pregnancy benefits under a meaningful
form of judicial review. Id. at 494-97. Furthermore, in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976), the Court found that the Title VII prohibition of sex discrimi-
nation did not outlaw employer actions related to pregnancy that might be consid-
ered discrimination against pregnant women. Id. at 136-40.
The Court seemed to change this position in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136, 142-43 (1977), in which it found that an employer's policy of denying em-
ployees returning from pregnancy accumulated seniority violated Title VII. Neverthe-
less, because of the Court's past failures to protect female workers, Congress amend-
ed Title VII in 1978 so that distinctions based on pregnancy or child birth would be
a form of sex discrimination. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). Cases in
which the Court has enforced this statute include Newport News Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983) (finding that discrimination regarding
pregnancy benefits for employee spouses violated the statute), and International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 119.6 (1991) (finding that an
employer's policy of excluding women who were not medically documented as being
infertile from jobs that involved potential exposure to lead was facially discrimina-
tory against women and that the employer failed to establish that sex was a bona
fide occupational qualification for those jobs).
190. See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
191. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1994).
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enforce Title VII prohibitions against racial discrimination.
I would not claim to be the first person who has noticed that
the appointees of President Reagan to the Supreme Court have
helped to form a majority that has changed the judicial approach
towards Title VII. For example, G. Nelson Smith and Rodney
Ruffin analyzed the Rehnquist Court rulings that were unfavor-
able to Title VII plaintiffs. 92
Congress amended parts of Title VII, in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, in order to reverse some of the Rehnquist Court's deci-
sions. 9 ' I would like to point out how the Court's rulings in
192. G. Nelson Smith, II & Rodney P. Ruffin, Title VII Litigation Before the
Rehnquist Court: Attempting to Change a Judicial Leopard's Spots, 2 GEO. MASON U.
Civ. RTs. L.J. 45, 51-60 (1991); see also Robin 0. Bell, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy:
Will His Appointment to the United States Supreme Court Have an Impact on Em-
ployment Discrimination?, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1037 (1989); Alfred W. Blumrosen,
Society in Transition III: Justice O'Connor and the Destabilization of the Griggs
Principle of Employment Discrimination, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 53 (1991); Kurt R.
Mattson, The Demise of Disparate Impact Employment Discrimination in the
Rehnquist Court, 67 N.D. L. REV. 39 (1991); Barbara Palmer, Note, Feminist or Foe?
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Title VII Sex-Discrimination, and Support for Women's
Rights, 13 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 159 (1991).
193. During the October, 1993 Term, the Supreme Court heard arguments in two
cases concerning the retroactivity of the 1991 Civil Rights Act amendment to Title
VII provisions allowing compensatory and punitive damages and the amendment of §
1981 regarding race discrimination by employers. President Bush vetoed legislation
that the House of Representatives and Senate had approved and that amended Title
VII and 42 U.S.C § 1981 to expressly make those statutory revisions retroactive.
Congress did not override the President's veto. Instead, Congress passed, and Presi-
dent Bush signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which included substantive revisions
to Title VII and § 1981 that were substantially similar to the 1990 draft legislation.
However, the text of the 1991 Civil Rights Act was silent as to the retroactivity of
its substantive provisions.
After this Article was written, but before the date of the conference, the Su-
preme Court ruled in two cases that key provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
were not retroactive. In Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), the
Court ruled that the revisions of Title VII adopted in § 102 of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 were not retroactive and did not apply to cases that were on appeal when
the statute was enacted. Id. at 1508. Section 102 added compensatory and punitive
damages to the remedies that could be awarded to successful Title VII plaintiffs and
provided a right to a jury trial for cases in which such damages were requested. See
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in
which he found that the difference in the language of the 1990 draft legislation,
which was vetoed by President Bush, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 meant that
the language of the 1991 Act could not be read to require retroactive application of
§ 102. Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1491-92. Justice Stevens stated that a retroactive
application of the statutory provisions creating punitive or exemplary damages would
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require the Court to address the question of whether the 1991 statute violated the
Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, § 9. Id. at 1505. The majority also found that the
provision of the statute that granted only a right to compensatory damages was also
subject to a presumption against retroactive application of statutes, id. at 1506,
although Justice Stevens' opinion was less clear on the reasons for applying the
presumption to this portion of the statute. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Kennedy
and Thomas, concurred only in the judgment of the Court. The three concurring Jus-
tices believed that Justice Stevens' majority opinion was unnecessarily complex and
that there simply could be no retroactive application of a federal statute absent a
clear congressional statement requiring retroactivity. Id. at 1522-23 (Scalia, J., con-
curring in judgment, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, JJ.). Justice Blackmun, in
dissent, noted that Justice Stevens' analysis of the retroactivity question seemed to
erroneously focus on a presumption against disturbing "vested rights" through retro-
active application of new legislation. Id. at 1509 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Jus-
tice Blackmun pointed out, sex discrimination and racial discrimination had long
been illegal; a retroactive application of the new statute would not make unlawful
any prior action of an employer that might arguably be described as a statutory
right or vested common law right. Id.
In Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994), the Court held that
§ 101 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981, was not
retroactive and could not be applied to cases on appeal. Rivers, 114 S. Ct. at 1514-
15. Once again, Justice Stevens wrote a majority opinion that relied on the differ-
ence between the language in the vetoed 1990 congressional action and the wording
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id. at 1517. The majority opinion also relied on the
presumption against retroactive application of statutes, despite the fact that the stat-
ute was enacted to reverse a 1989 Supreme Court interpretation of a Reconstruction
Era statute. Id. When the plaintiff in Rivers had filed her case, it was at least ar-
guable that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 made it illegal for an employer to discriminate against
one of his employees on the basis of her race. In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibited employers
from refusing to hire someone because of her race, but it did not prohibit racial
discrimination by the employer following the initial contract formation. Id. at 179. It
was on the basis of Patterson that the plaintiff in Rivers lost her case. Rivers, 114
S. Ct. at 1519. Before the Supreme Court, the plaintiff in Rivers argued that § 101
of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 merely restored the original meaning of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and that the presumption against retroactivity was not applicable to this
type of restorative statute. Id. at 1515. Justice Stevens wrote for five Justices in
rejecting the plaintiffs argument. The Stevens opinion appeared to place great
weight on the 1991 statute's prohibition of racial discrimination outside of employ-
ment in deciding that the statute was not merely restoring the original meaning of
§ 1981. Id. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas used the exact same concurrence
for Rivers as they had for Landgraf, and joined only in the judgment of the Court.
Landgraf, 114 S. Ct. at 1522 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment, joined by Kennedy
and Thomas, JJ.). They believed that, in both Rivers and Landgraf, Justice Stevens'
analysis was unnecessarily complex and that the absence of a clear congressional
statement requiring retroactive application of a statute required only prospective
application of the statute. Id. at 1522-23. Once again, Justice Blackmun dissented.
Id. at 1520 (Blackmun J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun emphasized that the retro-
active application of § 101 could not have disrupted any vested rights in that it only
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the last twenty years concerning Title VII issues mirrored the
changing attitude of the Court toward the Voting Rights Act and
Thirteenth Amendment statutes.
We can analyze the Justices' approach towards Title VII more
easily if we divide the Court's rulings into two general catego-
ries: (1) the cases defining a plaintiffs burden in proving racial
discrimination; and (2) the scope of Title VII remedies for illegal
discrimination.
In reviewing the Court's approach to defining the plaintiffs
burden in Title VII cases, I believe we can combine the cases
analyzing how a plaintiff can establish a prima facie demonstra-
tion of a Title VII violation-by demonstrating either illegally
motivated decisionmaking or the employer's use of employment
practices that have an adverse impact on racial minorities-and
cases regarding how an employer can successfully rebut such
claims. An expert in the area of employment discrimination
would object to lumping these cases together because each
strand of these cases relates to distinct types of employment
practices and problems under Title VII.194 Putting these cases
together, however, makes sense in determining the Supreme
restored a plausible meaning to a civil rights statute that had been enacted follow-
ing the Civil War. Id. at 1521. The employer in Rivers could not have believed it
was entitled to engage in racial discrimination against employees.
In the spring of 1994, Justice Blackmun was the only Justice interested in
enforcing civil rights statutes in a manner similar to that which had been used by
the Supreme Court in the 1960s and early 1970s, when a majority of the Justices
favored interpreting civil rights statutes as broadly as possible in order to protect
persons suffering racial discrimination. Since 1988, a majority of the Court has inter-
preted civil rights statutes in ways that protect persons who engage in such discrim-
ination.
194. For an overview of employment discrimination law issues that subdivide these
different types of problem areas and fully analyze the Supreme Court cases regard-
ing each area, see MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1988) (there
is both a "practitioners edition" and a "student edition" of this treatise). For excel-
lent, contemporary examinations of the Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and
early 1980s that dealt with problems of statistical proof in Title VII employment
cases, see Elaine W. Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in- Employment Testing:
Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REV. 793 (1978); Elaine W. Shoben,
Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate
Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1977); Elaine W. Shoben, The
Use of Statistics to Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1983, at 221.
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Court's attitude toward easing, or making more difficult, the
burden of a minority member who has been denied employment
or a promotion in demonstrating that her employer violated
Title VII. These cases also may reflect the Justices' attitudes
toward female workers, but I will not discuss the Justices' fail-
ure to take a strong stand against sex discrimination in this
Article.1
95
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court established a
framework by which an individual claiming racial or sex dis-
crimination could use statistical proof to make out a prima facie
case. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 98 the Court found that a
plaintiff established a prima facie case of employment discrimi-
nation by showing the adverse impact of employment practices
such as tests on minority groups. 97 Two years later, in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,'98 the Court, in a disparate-
treatment case, established a framework for determining wheth-
er a plaintiff had produced evidence from which unlawful moti-
vation could be inferred. Once the plaintiff produced such evi-
dence, the defendant was required to present a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the practice that caused the adverse
impact.'99 In the 1980s, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework."'
The Supreme Court's approach to the use of statistics to show
that employment practices, devices, or standards involve sex or
race discrimination was not uniformly favorable to plaintiffs
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Occasionally, the Court found
the plaintiffs statistical proof did not present a prima facie case
of racial discrimination.2"' Nevertheless, the Court consistently
held that statistical evidence of the adverse impact of employ-
ment practices on minorities or women was relevant evidence of
195. For an overview of the Supreme Court's rulings concerning sex discrimination
and the Equal Protection Clause, see 3 ROTUNDA & NOVAK, supra note 3, § 18.20-
18.24.
196. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
197. Id. at 431-32.
198. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
199. Id. at 802.
200. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981);
United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
201. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 583-87 (1979).
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illegal discrimination. Thus, the Supreme Court required lower
courts to give careful consideration to statistical evidence in
Title VII claims and close scrutiny to an employer's explanation
of why a challenged employment practice was, in fact, legitimate
despite its disparate impact on racial minorities."2
As late as 1988, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, °3
the Supreme Court appeared to favor strict enforcement of Title
VII. The Supreme Court in Watson found that an African Ameri-
can woman who had been denied promotions by her employer
could win a Title VII suit if she could demonstrate that the
ultimate impact of the subjective system for the promotion of
employees had an adverse impact on minority applicants and if
the employer was unable to make some demonstration regarding
the "legitimacy" of its selection process for promotions.0 4 But
Watson was not a clear cut victory for Title VII plaintiffs. Jus-
tice O'Connor wrote an opinion in Watson that was, in part, a
majority opinion and, in part, a plurality opinion. In the part of
her opinion that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia, Justice O'Connor's language seemed
to make it more difficult to demonstrate that subjective employ-
ment criteria were being used in a racially discriminatory man-
ner.
205
The next year, Justice Kennedy would provide the deciding
vote in cases that would constitute significant setbacks for Title
VII plaintiffs. In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,"' the Su-
preme Coirt, by a five to four vote, held that the demonstration
of a statistical disparity between the high representation of
racial minorities in low paying jobs and the low representation
of racial minorities in higher paying jobs did not establish a
202. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 450-51 (1982); Bazemore v. Friday, 478
U.S. 385, 387 (1986).
203. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
204. Id. at 985-91.
205. Parts II-C and II-D of Justice O'Connor's opinion were written for four Justic-
es. Id. at 991-1000 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Scalia, JJ.).
Justice Kennedy did not participate in the case. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Mar-
shall and Stevens concurred in the decision. Id. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan and Marshall,% JJ.); id. at
1011 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
206. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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violation of Title VII.2 7 Instead of the internal representations,
the complainant should have compared the low minority repre-
sentation in high paying jobs with minority representation in
the population from which the company's labor was supplied."8
Justice White wrote the Wards Cove opinion that was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy. The majority ruled that the employer could rebut proof
of the adverse impact of its policies on racial minorities with any
justification that was not totally insubstantial.2 9 Justice White
specifically found that there was "no requirement that the chal-
lenged practice [which had a clearly adverse effect on minority
employees] be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employer's
business."210 In response to this decision, Congress amended
Title VII as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.211
The provisions of Title VII do not proscribe bona fide seniority
systems that have the effect of disadvantaging female workers
or minority race workers merely because those workers were the
most recently hired members of an employer's work force. Re-
gardless of whether a seniority system was adopted before or
after the passage of Title VII, a seniority system will not be
found to be a violation of Title VII unless the plaintiffs could
demonstrate that the seniority system had been adopted, imple-
mented, or used for a discriminatory purpose.212
In the spring of 1989, the Supreme Court made it more diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to challenge the use of seniority systems to
mask race and sex discrimination. In Lorance v. AT&T Technol-
ogies, Inc.,23 female workers alleged that a seniority system,
which had been adopted in 1979, was used in 1982 to discrimi-
nate against women who were being demoted through the imple-
mentation of the seniority system.2 4 The Supreme Court, by a
207. Id. at 651-55.
208. Id. at 650-51.
209. Id. at 659.
210. Id.
211. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071-74 (1991).
212. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69 (1982). By a five to four
vote, the Justices held that seniority systems adopted after the passage of Title VII
came under the statutory exception for bona fide seniority systems. Id. at 75-76.
213. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
214. Id. at 902.
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five to three vote, found that the claim of the women employees
was barred by the time limitation for challenging a seniority sys-
tem. 15 The Lorance majority ruled that the time limitation
was measured from the date when the seniority system was
adopted by the employer, rather than from the time when the
women workers suffered the adverse consequences of the
employer's use of the seniority system.216 Justice Kennedy pro-
vided the fifth vote in the five to three decision. Justices Mar-
shall, Brennan, and Blackmun dissented;21 7 Justice O'Connor
did not participate in the decision. The Lorance decision was
also reversed by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.218
Employees can now challenge the good faith of a seniority sys-
tem under a time limit that begins at the time when the indi-
vidual becomes subject to the system, the time at which the
system was adopted, or the time at which the system was used
in a way that injured the employee.1 9
In 1994, the Reagan appointees were joined by Justice Thom-
as in a decision that will provide assistance to employers who
are trying to hide racial or sex discrimination in their employ-
ment practices. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,"' the Su-
preme Court held that a plaintiff was not necessarily entitled to
a judgment in her favor after demonstrating that an adverse
employment decision appeared to be made on the basis of inten-
tional racial discrimination and proving that the employer's
initial explanation for the employment decision was clearly
pretextual.221 Justice Scalia, in a majority opinion that was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas, ruled that the plaintiffs initial demonstra-
tion of the racially discriminatory impact of the employer's deci-
sions and the pretextual nature of the employer's statements
215. Id. at 906.
216. Id. at 909-12.
217. Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
218. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 112, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079
(1991).
219. Id.
220. 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
221. Id. at 2747-54.
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was insufficient to win a Title VII case.222
Justice Souter wrote a dissent in St. Mary's Honor Center that
was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens." Per-
haps Justice Souter's vote provides some hope that the Reagan
appointees will not be able to control the interpretation of Title
VII for many more years. But, even if we assume that Clinton
appointees will take a position equivalent to that of Justices
White and Blackmun in this type of case, there are five Justices
on the Supreme Court today who have demonstrated little or no
sympathy for Title VII plaintiffs in race discrimination cases.
Later in this Article, I will examine the Supreme Court's rul-
ing concerning the constitutionality of racial classifications used
by governmental entities to advance the interests of racial mi-
norities. This discussion demonstrates the Court's increasing
hostility to racial affirmative action during the 1970s and 1980s.
I will conclude my examination of the Court's rulings concerning
federal civil rights statutes by examining the Court's statutory
rulings on "affirmative action" and Title VII remedies. These
cases indicate that a majority of the current Supreme Court
Justices may be ready to limit, or reverse, earlier decisions up-
holding voluntary racial affirmative action plans by private
employers or to cut back the scope of lower court remedial pow-
ers under Title VII.
In 1979, by a five to two vote, the Supreme Court in United
Steelworkers of America v. Weber224 ruled that Title VII did not
prohibit employers or unions from seeking to remedy racial
imbalances in job categories that in fact had low numbers of
women or minority race persons. 5 The Court did not make
any constitutional ruling in Weber, but it allowed employers,
after bargaining with employees and unions, to adopt employ-
ment and promotion practices that would advance the interests
of racial minorities and women.226 In 1987, the Supreme Court
222. Id.
223. Id. at 2756 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by White, Blackmun, and Stevens,
JJ.).
224. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
225. Id. at 208-09.
226. Id. at 209. The Supreme Court has ruled that Title VII does not require an
employer to hire a female or minority race job applicant or to promote female or
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reaffirmed this position in Johnson v. Transportation Agen-
cy."' Justice Brennan, writing for five Justices in Johnson,
ruled that Title VII did not prohibit a county transportation
agency from adopting a plan that gave a preference in hiring to
women and members of racial minorities."' Although the em-
ployer in Johnson was a government agency, the case did not
present any constitutional issues because those issues had not
been raised in the lower court litigation. 9
Justice O'Connor concurred only in the judgment of the Court
in JohnsonY She wrote separately to explain that she be-
lieved that Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause allowed
only a very limited amount of discretion to employers in estab-
lishing hiring goals for women and minorities." Justices
White and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented in
Johnson. 2 They believed that Title VII did not allow employ-
ers to adopt affirmative action programs that gave preferences to
women or racial minorities.
The Supreme Court, in 1989, found that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited state or local governments from using benign
racial classifications to aid racial minorities.' The Court, as it
is composed in 1994, might take a similarly strict approach
towards affirmative action programs under Title "VII by revers-
ing Weber and Johnson. Even if we assume that Justice
Ginsburg will vote to uphold Weber and Johnson, whether those
decisions will be limited or reversed is anyone's guess. The out-
come depends on whether Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thom-
minority race employees whenever their qualifications are equal to those of white
male applicants or employees. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981).
227. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
228. Id. at 641-42.
229. Id. at 620 n.2.
230. Id. at 647 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
231. Id. at 648.
232. Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 657 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and, in part, by White, J.).
233. Id. at 657 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.,* and, in part, by White, J.).
234. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). The Court's rulings con-
cerning constitutional issues involving government programs that aid racial minori-
ties are discussed infra notes 386-504 and accompanying text.
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as join the Johnson dissenters and vote to use Title VII to re-
strict affirmative action programs.
The Supreme Court has never allowed lower courts to impose
orders on private sector or public sector employers merely to
insure statistical integration of the employers' workforce. If a
lower court finds that an employer violated Title VII, the court
must issue a remedial order. During the mid-1980s, the Su-
preme Court endorsed wide remedial powers for lower courts in
Title VII cases.23
In 1986, a majority of the Supreme Court found that federal
courts were empowered to enter consent decrees, or remedial
orders, that established hiring and promotion goals to benefit
members of racial minorities who had not themselves been the
individual victims of the prior illegal discrimination.23 The
Court in Local Number 93, International Association of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland,"7 ruled that Title VII did not
prohibit a federal court from entering a consent decree, agreed
to by an employer and plaintiffs who had challenged the
employer's practices as being racially discriminatory, that re-
quired the employer to promote minority race employees in or-
der to meet certain integration standards.s In this case the
city had agreed to a consent decree with an organization of Afri-
can American and .Hispanic American firefighters; the decree
required the fire department to divide new promotions between
235. Courts can issue a remedial order in a Title VII case only after finding that
the employer had engaged in a specific act of illegal discrimination. Thus, in
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 469 U.S. 561, 577 (1984), the Supreme
Court overturned lower court orders that had required a city to lay off white work-
ers during a budgetary restriction before laying off more recently hired minority race
workers. The Court held that Title VII allowed employers to use a seniority system
that had an adverse impact on the employment of racial minorities absent proof that
the system was designed or used for a discriminatory purpose. Id. at 577. The Su-
preme Court during the 1980s also ruled that the government would violate the
Equal Protection Clause if, during layoffs due to a budgetary restriction, it laid off
white teachers with more seniority than minority teachers for the purpose of main-
taining racial balance in the faculty of the district schools. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-78 (1986); see infra notes 408-29 and accompanying text.
236. Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S 501, 515-
30 (1986).
237. Id. at 501.
238. Id. at 515-30.
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minority and nonminority employees. 9 Although the employer
was a government agency, the lower court litigation did not
involve constitutional issues and no constitutional issues were
addressed by the Supreme Court.240
In a second 1986 decision, the Court considered the scope of
federal court remedies for illegal racial discrimination in a case
involving both statutory and constitutional issues. In Local 28 of
the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v.. EEOC,24 1
the Supreme Court upheld an order of a federal district court
that required a union to remedy proven racial discrimination
against nonwhite persons who had applied for union member-
ship. 2 Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court
in an opinion that was, in part, a majority opinion, and, in part,
a plurality opinion. 43 In a portion of his opinion supported by
a majority, Justice Brennan ruled that the lower courts had
properly decided that (1) the union had engaged in racial dis-
crimination and had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
(2) a fine against the union was a proper remedy in the case,
and (3) money produced by a contempt fine could be used to
establish a fund to increase nonwhite membership in the union's
apprenticeship program.2"- Five Justices in the case also voted
to uphold a portion of the district court's order that established
a twenty-nine percent nonwhite membership goal for the union,
although no majority opinion determined the legality or constitu-
tionality of this portion of the lower court's order.245 Justice
Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens in finding that a remedial order, designed to remedy
239. Id. at 510.
240. Id. at 513 n.5. Justice Brennan wrote for six members of the Court in finding
that a provision of Title VII, which might appear to place limits on the remedial
authority of federal courts in employment discrimination cases, did not bar a court
from entering this type of consent decree. Id. at 521-22. The statute at issue was §
706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g). The case did not resolve the question of what limits were placed on the author-
ity of courts by this statutory provision. Local No. 93, 478 U.S. at 515 n.7.
241. 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
242. Id. at 442-44.
243. The rulings of the Court, and the votes of the Justices, are summarized at the
end of Justice Brennan's opinion. Id. at 482-83.
244. Id. at 442-44.
245. Id. at 441.
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past.discrimination through the use of integration standards, did
not violate either Title VII or the Constitution." s Justice
Powell wrote a separate concurring opinion; he believed that, in
very limited circumstances, the judiciary could require preferen-
tial hiring goals to correct proven illegal discrimination by an
employer. 7 The union charged with racial discrimination in
this case had been the subject of federal and state attempts to
remedy its racially discriminatory practices since the 1960s.
Justice Powell found that this case presented an egregious viola-
tion of Title VII that justified a remedial order that employed a
numerical goal for the integration of the union." s
The next year, in United States v. Paradise,"s the Supreme
Court upheld a district order that set numerical goals for the
promotion of minority police officers in a state police depart-
ment." ° Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Court
in an opinion that was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Powell. These Justices found that the lower court order that
established numerical goals for the integration of the police force
and the promotion of troopers within the police force was justi-
fied by the fact that the first district court order that found
intentional racial discrimination within this law enforcement
department had been issued in 1972."' It was only after many
years of failed attempts to force the state police to remedy its
prior illegal segregation that the lower court had issued the
remedial order that involved. numerical goals."' Justice
Stevens concurred only in the judgment in Paradise; he found
that the Supreme Court's school desegregation cases established
246. Id. at 481 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
247. Id. at 485-89 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
248. Id. Justices O'Connor and White believed that the membership goal or quota
was not a remedy authorized by Congress for Title VII violations although they dif-
fered in their views regarding the scope of permissible Title VII relief. Compare id.
at 489 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) with id. at 499
(White, J., dissenting).
249. 480 U.S. 149 (1987).
250. Id. at 185.
251. Id. at 172-77.
252. Id. at 186. Although he joined Justice Brennan's plurality opinion, Justice
Powell wrote separately to explain why he believed that the history of this case
justified the remedy. Id. at 186 (Powell, J., concurring).
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the principle that lower courts should be given a reasonable
degree of flexibility in fashioning remedies for proven racial
discrimination by governmental entities.
2 5 3
Four Justices dissented in Paradise. Justice O'Connor, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, wrote a dissent
that did not totally exclude the possibility that lower courts
might use some type of statistical analysis in fashioning a reme-
dy for proven illegal discrimination. 4 However, the O'Connor
dissent found that any such order must be very narrowly tai-
lored to correct specific acts of illegal discrimination; she did not
believe the lower court's two decades of efforts were narrowly
tailored to correct the racial discrimination. 5 Justice White,
in a separate dissent, simply indicated that he agreed with
"much of what Justice O'Connor has written" and that he found
that "the District Court exceeded its equitable powers in devis-
ing a remedy in this case." 6
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to reconsider the
scope of lower court remedial powers and authority to enter
consent decrees in Title VII race discrimination cases after the
appointment of Justice Kennedy. However, a recent Supreme
Court decision concerning the standing of individuals to chal-
lenge consent decrees indicates that there may be a shift in the
Supreme Court's approach to lower court authority to resolve
litigation in which employers are charged with racial discrimina-
tion.
In 1989, by a five to four vote, the Court in Martin v.
Wilks 257 held that white firefighters had the ability to chal-
lenge employment decisions taken pursuant to consent decrees
that had been entered in an earlier case by the fire department
and persons who alleged racial discrimination in the
department's employment practices." Even though the white
firefighters had failed to intervene in the proceedings in which
the consent decree had been entered, the Court in 1989 was
253. Id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
254. Id. at 197 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J.).
255. Id. at 197-201.
256. Id. at 196 (White, J., dissenting).
257. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
258. Id. at 768.
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ready to allow them to challenge the legality and constitutional-
ity of promotions and hiring of racial minorities that were un-
dertaken pursuant to the litigation settlement.5 9 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in Martin, which was
joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Justice
Stevens filed the dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.26 °
The Clinton appointees to the Supreme Court will not have to
consider whether to reverse Martin. That result was achieved by
Congress. The 1991 Civil Rights Act limits the ability of persons
to challenge consent decrees in employment discrimination cas-
es. 261' Four members of the Martin majority remain on the
Court. Their ability to restrict the scope of Title VII remedies
may depend on the Bush appointees, Justices Souter and Thom-
as.
It is not possible to predict the future of the Supreme Court's
positions concerning the extent of congressional power to protect
racial minorities under the statutes that I have mentioned in
this section of the Article or other federal civil rights statutes.
However, it is clear that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were
less sympathetic to minority race plaintiffs seeking to invoke the
protection of federal civil rights statutes than was the Warren
Court or even the Burger Court of the early 1970s. The Court's
rulings since the appointment of Justice Kennedy make it seem
unlikely that the Supreme Court will return to the position it
held in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when it gave an expan-
sive reading to federal civil rights statutes. In the next sections
of this Article, I will examine the Supreme Court's rulings con-
cerning the constitutionality of laws that harm racial minorities.
It should be no surprise to learn that we will find that the Su-
preme Court's commitment to using constitutional principles to
protect racial minorities declined in the 1980s and 1990s, at the
same time that the Court restricted federal civil rights statutes.
259. Id. at 762-63.
260. Id. at 769 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackm-
un, JJ.).
261. See Grover, supra note 21, at 44-45.
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VII. THE SUPREME COURT'S TOLERANCE OF "OPEN" AND
"SLIGHTLY HIDDEN" RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
The Supreme Court for the past forty years has been unwa-
vering in its condemnation of the governmental use of racial
classifications that harm racial minorities. In the past quarter
century, however, the Court has moved away from the Warren
Court's commitment to protecting the interests of racial minori-
ties from oppression in our society. The Burger and Rehnquist
Courts have shown a greater toleration than did the Warren
Court for seemingly race-neutral laws that harm racial minori-
ties. Before we examine the decline in the Supreme Court's use
of the Equal Protection Clause to protect racial minorities, we
should take a few moments, and paragraphs, to reflect upon the
Supreme Court's rulings prior to the 1960s. We need not make a
detailed analysis of the Supreme Court's pre-Brown rulings, as
Professor Tushnet and others have chronicled the Supreme
Court rulings and lower court litigation that led to Brown and to
the end of court-approved segregation.262 Instead, a brief re-
view of some of the key decisions of the Supreme Court concern-
ing racial discrimination between the Civil War and the Warren
Court will give us a basis for evaluating the question of whether
the Rehnquist Court may have more in common with the pre-
Brown Supreme Court than with the Warren Court of the 1960s.
A review of the Supreme Court's rulings prior to Brown serves
as a reminder that the Court can easily claim to be opposed to
the use of racial classifications and racial discrimination while
in fact it aids in the oppression of racial minorities. The Su-
preme Court's rulings between the 1870s and 1930s concerning
racial classifications can be described as duplicitous. The Court
took the position that racial discrimination was not to be tolerat-
ed and did, in fact, invalidate racial classifications that were
openly used to deprive members of a racial minority of an identi-
fiable legal right.2" However, the Court simultaneously upheld
262. See supra note 2.
263. A defender of the Supreme Court might claim that its decision in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), should be read as an effort to expose a subtle form of
race discrimination. In Yick Wo, the Court considered a city ordinance that delegated
to the board of supervisors discretion to decide whether to allow the use of wooden
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laws that harmed racial minorities whenever the Justices could
describe those laws as somehow being race neutral.2" I will
offer my readers just a few examples of how the Supreme Court
seemingly gave constitutional protection to racial minorities
with one hand while taking away such protection with the other.
The Supreme Court's toleration for laws that had an adverse
impact on, or stigmatized, racial minorities is evident in its
approval of an Alabama statute that provided more severe pen-
alties for adultery and fornication if the people who engaged in
the activity were of different races.216 The Court tacitly ap-
proved laws that prohibited interracial marriage; it did not over-
rule its approval of laws against interracial sexual activity or
marriage until the 1960s.266
The Justices who approved the "separate but equal" doctrine
in Plessy v. Ferguson '7 did little to hide their hypocrisy. When
the Court applied that doctrine in the educational setting, the
Justices approved the separate and unequal treatment of minor-
ity race students. The Court allowed a local school board to tem-
buildings as laundries. The board had turned down all of the approximately 200
Chinese applicants who had sought its approval but had approved the applications of
all but one of the approximately 80 non-Chinese applicants. The Court ruled that
this discrimination violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution. Id. at 374. The Court would not have invalidated the law on the day after
its passage merely because of its impact on racial minorities.
264. When states were more subtle in discriminating against Asians, the Supreme
Court upheld the discrimination. See, e.g., Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923)
(upholding a Washington law that prohibited land ownership by noncitizens at a
time Chinese and Japanese persons who immigrated to the United States could not
be naturalized under federal law). See generally 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3,
§ 18.12 (discussing classifications based on alienage).
265. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
266. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964); Harvey M. Applebaum, Miscegenation Statutes: A Constitutional and Social
Problem, 53 GEO. L.J. 49 (1964) (arguing for a reversal of the Supreme Court's nor-
mal legislative presumption in favor of miscegenation statutes in cases involving
classification by race); see also BELL, supra note 2, § 2.2.2.
267. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For an examination of the philosophy of Justice Brown,
who wrote the opinion, and social theories that were evidenced in the opinion, see
Robert J. Glennon, Jr., Justice Henry Billings Brown: Values in Tension, 44 U.
COLO. L. REV. 553 (1973). For an analysis of the error committed by persons who
read Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy as advocating a "colorblind" approach to equal
protection analysis, see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Re-Reading Justice Harlan's Dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson: Freedom, Antiracism, and Citzenship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV.
961.
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porarily suspend, for economic reasons, a high school for African
American children while maintaining a high school for- white
children;26 it upheld a state statute requiring separate but
equal accommodations on railroads;6 9 and it upheld a state
statute that prohibited private colleges from educating "both the
white and negro races."270 As late as 1927, the Court upheld
the classification of a Chinese American child as a racial minor-
ity who must attend a minority race school under the "separate
but equal" doctrine."'
During this era, the Supreme Court invalidated statutes and
administrative rulings that excluded racial minorities from ser-
vice on juries,2 72 but the Court did not reverse the conviction of
an African American defendant who had been tried before an
all-white jury.7 3 The Court in the early twentieth century in-
validated laws prohibiting the sale of property to a member of a
racial minority,2 74 but invalidated congressional attempts to
protect racial minorities from discrimination in property or busi-
ness matters.275
Even prior to the New Deal, the Supreme Court invalidated
open legal prohibitions against members of racial minorities
voting in general or primary elections. 6 Similarly, the Court
268. See Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
269. See McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914) (holding that the
railway company must provide a dining car for minority passengers even if the com-
pany would lose money by operating the separate, minority dining car).
270. See Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
271. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). There was no real challenge to the
"separate but equal" doctrine in education in this case; the Court ruled that the
Chinese American child should be classified as "colored," not as "caucasian," for
purposes of school assignment.
272. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
273. See, e.g., Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879) (upholding state court's denial
of defendants' motion to change the all-white jury to include one-third black males).
See generally Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and Race Discrimination:
The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1401 (1983) (discuss-
ing the problem of racial discrimination in the makeup of juries).
274. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (overturning city ordinance which
forbade African Americans from occupying houses in blocks where the greater num-
ber of houses were occupied by whites).
275. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also BELL, supra note 2,
§ 4.4 (discussing the Supreme Court's normal process of invalidating disenfranchise-
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struck down the use of so-called "grandfather clauses" that
states used to maintain a suffrage standard that existed prior to
the Fifteenth Amendment. Such clauses allowed illiterate whites
to vote while denying the right to African Americans who could
not meet state literacy requirements.277 The Court did not,
however, invalidate other state acts that impaired the ability of
racial minorities to vote. The use of poll taxes that deterred
members of racial minorities from voting in state elections con-
tinued without opposition from the Court until the 1960s27' -
after the ratification of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment which
prohibited the use of poll taxes in federal elections. 9 The
Court allowed the use of literacy tests as a condition for voting
absent clear proof that the test was used to exclude only racial
minorities from voting."'
Evidence of the Court's movement toward protecting racial
minorities in the 1938-1954 period came both in cases interpret-
ing the Equal Protection Clause and cases interpreting federal
statutes. In 1938, the Supreme Court for the first time deviated
from the Plessy doctrine by invalidating a state's refusal to ad-
mit an African American to the state's law school."' In the
1940s and 1950s, the Court began to expand the impact of feder-
al civil rights legislation. In 1941 and 1945, the Supreme Court
upheld convictions under federal civil rights statutes of persons
who engaged in acts of racial harassment and the murder of
persons due to their race."2 In the mid 1940s, however, the
Court was not ready to challenge federal racial discrimination.
ment provisions).
277. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S.
368 (1915).
278. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). For an analysis
of some of the means used to suppress minority race voters, see BELL, supra note 2,
§ 4.1-4.17.
279. U.S. CONsT. amend. XXIV (prohibiting state and federal governments from
denying any citizen the right to vote because of failure to pay tax).
280. See, e.g., Lassiter v. North Hampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (up-
holding a state literacy requirement that applied to all voters irrespective of their
race or color). Congress eliminated the use of literacy tests in the Voting Rights Act
and the Supreme Court upheld those provisions. See supra notes 76-83 and accompa-
nying text.
281. See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
282. See supra notes 49, 51 and accompanying text.
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The Justices upheld the World War II exclusion and internment
of Japanese Americans in the western United States.8 3
The Vinson Court began to repudiate racial discrimination in
several areas. In 1948, the Court limited the states' ability to
discriminate against Asian immigrants and Asian Americans by
restricting state authority to give preferential treatment to per-
sons on the basis of United States citizenship.2s4 In the same
year, the Court found that the Equal Protection Clause prohibit-
ed state courts from enforcing racially discriminatory covenants
in real estate contracts.285 In 1950, the Court ruled that a
state-supported law school's refusal to admit an African Ameri-
can citizen on the basis of his race violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6 In 1953, the last Term of the Vinson Court, the
Justices refused to allow a county to delegate the operation of a
primary election to a political organization that had prohibited
minority race voters from participating in the candidate selec-
tion process."'
Not until the 1960s, did the Court become an active champion
of civil rights and the protection of racial minorities from seem-
ingly race-neutral laws used to suppress them in our society.
The 1950s' Warren Court made a few landmark rulings. on racial
equality but did little to implement those rulings. Throughout
the 1950s, the Court vacillated between brave statements and
weak rulings on racial issues. In 1954, the Court, without explic-
itly overruling Plessy, repudiated its "separate but equal" doc-
trine in Brown v. Board of Education,28 which is celebrated in
283. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Harabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). In Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944), the Supreme
Court found that President Roosevelt's executive order relating to the internment of
Japanese persons did not authorize the continued detention of Japanese persons who
were found to be loyal and law-abiding citizens of the United States. The Endo
decision was based on an interpretation of the President's order rather than consti-
tutional principles. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, § 18.8(d).
284. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (overturning a
state statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to non-citizens); Oyama
v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ruling that a land-conveyancing law placed an
excessive burden on non-citizens' ability to convey land); see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK,
supra note 3, § 18.12.
285. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see supra notes 55-58.
286. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
287. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); see supra note 75.
288. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). On the same day as the Brown I ruling, the Court ruled
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this Symposium. However, in 1955, the Court in Brown II avoid-
ed confrontation with local school authorities by creating the "all
deliberate speed" standard."9
The "brave" Warren Court issued per curiam rulings requiring
the immediate desegregation of public facilities.9 ° On the oth-
er hand, the "timid" Warren Court in the 1950s refused to over-
turn state laws that prohibited interracial sexual relationships
or interracial marriages.291 In 1958, the Court ruled that lower
federal courts should not allow local political opposition to pre-
vent desegregation of public schools. 2 The Supreme Court did
not, however, review cases in which it had to consider the validi-
ty of lower court desegregation plans until the 1960s.293 In the
1960s, the Warren Court actively supported the lower federal
courts in issuing desegregation orders. During this era, the
in Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), that the segregation of public schools in
the District of Columbia violated the implied equal protection guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause.
289. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
290. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (segregation of buses); Mayor
of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (segregation of public beaches and bath
houses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (segregation of municipal golf cours-
es). For further citations to such cases see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, §
18.8.
291. The Court avoided ruling in such cases, although its rulings were arguably
based on procedural grounds. See, e.g., Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.), vacated,
350 U.S. 891 (1955) (per curiam). For a sample of the contemporary academic debate
concerning these rulings, compare Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1959) (arguing that there was no basis
for dismissal on procedural grounds) with Louis H. Pollack, The Supreme Court and
the States: Reflections on Boynton v. Virginia, 49 CAL. L. REV. 15, 45 n.79 (1961)
(arguing that Wechsler's appraisal is too harsh).,
292. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). For an analysis of the voting patterns
of the Justices throughout the development of the constitutional principles that
formed a basis for this ruling, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegrega-
tion: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979). See
generally Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court and the Rule of Law: Cooper v.
Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387.
293. See BELL, supra note 2, § 7.3.2; Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and
Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 244-45 (1968). Some states had delayed the
implementation of remedies for segregated school systems by requiring persons who
objected to those systems to use administrative remedies. It was not until 1963 that
the Court ruled that the exhaustion of administrative remedies concept could not be
used to delay federal court school desegregation cases. McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668 (1963).
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Court found that racial classifications that harmed racial mi-
norities should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny and should
be upheld only if found to be necessary to a compelling state
interest.294 In 1964 and 1967, the Supreme Court invalidated
statutes that prohibited interracial sexual activity or interracial
marriage."' No racial classification that the Supreme Court
has found to harm members of a racial minority has been up-
held since the Warren Court established this principle.
The Warren Court of the 1960s went beyond the mere prohibi-
tion of racial classifications that harmed racial minorities. The
Court also invalidated state laws that did not mention race
when those laws had the inevitable effect of denying a legal
right or benefit to racial minorities. In 1960, in Gomillion v.
Lightfoot,297 the Court held that the alteration of a city's
boundaries constituted a racial classification, though the Court
did not require specific proof that the change was made for a
racially discriminatory purpose. The law restructured the town
in a manner that gave it twenty-eight sides and resulted in the
virtual elimination of the ability of minority persons to vote in
city elections. In 1964, the Supreme Court invalidated a state re-
quirement that the race of candidates be identified on the ballot,
holding that the law could be explained only as a way of helping
voters engage in racial bloc voting in a way that would harm the
candidacy of a racial minority. 8 The Warren Court, in these
cases, did not demand evidence of improper legislative purpose.
The Court recognized that the effect of these laws would harm
racial minorities and, on that basis, ruled that these laws violat-
ed the Equal Protection Clause.
In 1967, in Reitman v. Mulkey,299 the Supreme Court invali-
dated an amendment to the California Constitution that would
have repealed statutes forbidding racial discrimination in real
294. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964).
295. See cases cited supra note 294.
296. For an examination of the cases, see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, §
18.8.
297. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
298. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
299. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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estate transactions and restricted the legislature's ability to
enact new anti-discrimination statutes. The majority opinion in
Reitman affirmed the lower court finding that the amendment
would unconstitutionally involve the state in private racial dis-
crimination.300 -The key vice of the state constitutional amend-
ment was that it denied racial minorities access to the state
legislature for aid in regulating property transactions but al-
lowed access to state and local legislatures by proponents of
measures designed to regulate property transactions in virtually
any other way that limited the economic or personal choices of
property owners.0 1
Two years after Reitman, the Burger Court invalidated an
amendment to a city charter that provided that no ordinance
dealing with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination in
housing could be implemented without the approval of the elec-
torate.02 Once again, the Court found that the statute's vice
was the denial to proponents of racial integration and desegrega-
tion-clearly a group primarily composed of racial minorities-of
the ability to go directly to the legislative body for a remedy to
their problems.0 3 Instead, racial minorities had to submit the
proposed legislative solution to a new referendum.0 4
As we turn to the examination of the Equal Protection Clause
rulings of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, we should ask our-
selves whether the Court can be said to be returning to the pre-
Brown era. In that era, the Court invalidated the open use of
racial classifications, but it upheld laws written in race neutral
terms that harmed racial minorities. The Burger Court and
Rehnquist Court have not deviated from the principle that laws
that discriminate on their face against racial minorities will be
subject to the strict scrutiny test and invalidated. In 1984, in
300. See id. at 375-76.
301. For an excellent contemporary analysis of the decision, and the way in which
the state law worked to exclude minorities from the political process, see Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protec-
tion, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967).
302. See Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
303. Id. at 390-91.
304. Id.
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Palmore v. Sidoti,"5 the Court ruled that a state could not use
a best interest of the child concept to remove a child from a
mother's custody merely on the basis that the mother had mar-
ried a person of a different race. In Hunter v. Underwood, °6
the Court invalidated a provision of a state constitution that
denied the right to vote to persons who had been convicted of
specific crimes. Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Court
in Underwood that there was clear proof that the state constitu-
tional provision had been designed by the 1901 state constitu-
tional convention for the purpose of disenfranchising African
Americans. °
The Burger Court reaffirmed the century-old principle that
exclusion of members of racial minorities from juries violated
equal protection."' Indeed, the Burger Court and Rehnquist
Court Justices have evidenced a greater concern for racial equal-
ity in jury selection than did the Warren Court. In 1965, the
Warren Court refused to find that a plaintiff could establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination in the selection of jurors
by analyzing a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a
single case.309 The Burger Court in Batson v. Kentucky 1'
found that proof of purposeful racial discrimination in the selec-
tion of even a single juror would constitute a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 1' Similarly, Rehnquist Court rulings
found that racially motivated peremptory challenges by attor-
neys for defendants in criminal cases, 12 or by attorneys for ei-
ther side in civil cases,313 constituted the type of state action
305. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
306. 471 U.S. 222 (1985). Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Court of eight
Justices; Justice Powell did not participate in the decision.
307. Id. at 228-33.
308. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U.S. 320 (1970); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
309. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
310. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
311. Id.
312. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (holding that use of preemp-
tory jury challenges by a defendant in a criminal case to exclude persons from jury
service because of their race violates equal protection).
313. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (holding that use
of peremptory jury challenges in a civil case to exclude persons from the jury be-
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that would violate the Equal Protection Clause. It is interesting
that in both the 1870s and 1990s the Supreme Court found it
important to avoid racial discrimination in jury selection sys-
tems, while the, Court was simultaneously restricting the ability
of Congress to protect racial minorities in other areas.
The Burger Court's movement away from protecting the inter-
ests of racial minorities was apparent in its rulings upholding
government acts that had a disparate, harmful impact on racial
minorities. The Court's position regarding the need to prove
"discriminatory purpose" beyond the adverse impact of the law
on racial minorities was established by a series of decisions in
the 1970s. 3" Unless the law used racial terms or could only be
rationally described as the total denial of a right to a group
composed of members of a racial minority, the Burger Court
would not invalidate a law on the basis of its adverse impact on
racial minorities.315
In 1971, the Supreme Court allowed a city that had operated
public swimming pools in a racially discriminatory manner to
close all of its pools after a desegregation order, despite proof
that the private pools in the town would serve only whites.316
In the same year, the Court upheld a law that required a refer-
endum before allowing low income housing into an area, despite
the fact that preventing the establishment of low income hous-
ing would undoubtedly lead to a low representation of racial
minorities in the town.3" In 1972, the Court upheld a state's
decision to use methods for determining an individual's mone-
tary need under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
program that different from those it used for determining need
under Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled program, despite the
clear statistical proof that these formulae benefitted a predomi-
nately white group of welfare recipients.318
In the mid-1970s, the Court strengthened the discriminatory
purpose requirement in cases involving constitutional challenges
cause of their race violates equal protection).
314. See infra notes 316-22 and accompanying text.
315. Id.
316. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
317. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
318. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
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to government employment practices and housing policies. In
Washington v. Davis,319 the Court found that the District of Co-
lumbia did not violate the implied equal protection guarantee of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by using a standard-
ized test for prospective police officers, even though the statisti-
cal evidence clearly demonstrated that the test eliminated a
disproportionately high percentage of minority race candi-
dates."' The next year, in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corp.,32 the Supreme Court upheld a
rezoning denial for a low and moderate income housing develop-
ment that would have dramatically increased the percentage of
minority residents in the city. The Court ruled that there was no
proof that the purpose of the rezoning denial was to prohibit
racial integration of the city.322 These decisions make it clear
that we must look to Congress to prevent those employment and
housing practices that have an adverse impact on racial minori-
ties in situations where the government and private entities tak-
ing those actions leave no clear proof of a racially discriminatory
purpose.3"
By the end of the 1970s, the Court established the "discrimi-
natory purpose" principle as a barrier that protected government
acts that had an undeniable, foreseeable adverse impact on
racial minorities or women. In the 1980s, the Supreme Court
319. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
320. Because Title VII did not apply to the District of Columbia at that time, the
plaintiffs could not make use of the statistical analysis cases referred to in supra
notes 196-200.
321. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
322. Id. at 269-71.
323. Following the remand of the decision in Arlington Heights, the court of ap-
peals found that the racially disparate impact of the city's actions might constitute a
violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (1988); the Supreme
Court declined to review this decision. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of
Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether all forms of housing laws or practices
that have a racially disparate impact on racial minorities violate Title VIII. The
Supreme Court has upheld a court of appeals ruling that Title VIII was violated by
a city that restricted multifamily housing projects to an area that was primarily
inhabited by racial minorities, but the Court did not rule on the question of whether
a disparate impact test was the appropriate means for determining violations of
Title VIII. Town of Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988)
(per curiam).
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ruled that the State of Georgia did not maintain or use its death
penalty in a racially discriminatory manner, despite statistical
proof that defendants whose victims were white were much
more likely to receive the death penalty than were defendants
whose victims were minority members." The only government
acts that plaintiffs could realistically challenge as racially dis-
criminatory, other than statutes or regulations that used racial
criteria on their face, were actions of governmental entities fool-
ish enough to leave a "smoking gun" establishing that they had
enacted a law with race-neutral language to harm racial minori-
ties.
The Supreme Court's rulings concerning the Voting Rights
Act, which we examined previously, mirrored its approach to
interpreting the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The
Burger Court did not reverse prior Supreme Court cases that
invalidated laws that openly prohibited minority race persons
from voting in primary or general elections. The Burger Court
did not, however, invalidate a voting regulation unless evidence
established that the law was created or maintained for the spe-
cific purpose of diluting the voting power of minority race citi-
zens. Statistical proof that the legislative districts within a city,
county, or state had a disproportionate effect on racial minori-
ties, by resulting in a disproportionately low percentage of racial
minority participation or election, would not be sufficient to
invalidate a districting plan.325
We need to reexamine two of the Voting Rights Act decisions
that also involve Equal Protection Clause issues to understand
the fundamental change that took place in the Supreme Court's
approach to the constitutional principle of equal protection be-
tween the 1970s and the 1990s. Any consideration of the
Justices' views regarding the meaning of the Equal Protection
324. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The defendant in McCleskey sub-
mitted a statistical study of the death penalty in Georgia that took into account
over 200 variables. The Supreme Court, by a five to four vote, refused to invalidate
the death penalty for the defendant, and the state's death penalty system, despite
the findings of the statistical study that showed that a black defendant convicted of
killing a white person was far more likely to receive the death penalty than was a
white person convicted of killing a black person. See id. at 286-87.
325. See supra notes 129-47 and accompanying text.
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Clause must include a comparison of the Supreme Court's 1977
decision in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey2 (the UJO
case) and its 1993 decision in Shaw v. Reno.327 In 1977, the
Court had a majority of Justices who would not stand in the way
of congressional protection of racial minorities. The Supreme
Court in 1993 had a majority of Justices who would disregard
earlier rulings concerning the nature of proof needed to establish
the existence of a racial classification in order to strike legisla-
tive actions that helped minority race voters.
In both the UJO and Shaw decisions, the Court was confront-
ed with a situation in which a state had used racial criteria to
redraft legislative districts in order to secure the approval of the
Attorney General under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.328
In the UJO case, the Justices, by a seven to one vote, ruled that
the legislative redistricting that aided minority race members in
New York complied with the Voting Rights Act, the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Fifteenth Amendment." 9 In Shaw the
Court, by a five to four vote, deemed a similar action in North
Carolina a racial classification on its face and subject to strict
judicial scrutiny.33 ° The Shaw Court remanded the case for a
determination of whether the creation of legislative districts
maintaining or increasing minority race voting power was nar-
rowly tailored to promote a compelling interest of govern-
326. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
327. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
328. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). The
preclearance requirements of § 5 were examined in supra notes 92-127 and accompa-
nying text.
329. UJO, 430 U.S. at 144. Only eight Justices participated in this case; Justice
Marshall took no part in the -decision. Justice White announced the judgment of the
Court and filed an opinion that was joined in its entirety by Justice Stevens. Parts
I, II, and III of the opinion were also joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun;
parts I and IV of the opinion were joined by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Brennan
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 168 (Brennan, J., concurring in part);
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist did not write separate opinions in this case. Jus-
tice Stewart and Justice Powell concurred only in the judgment of the Court. Id. at
179 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Powell, J.). Only Chief Jus-
tice Burger dissented. Id. at 180 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
330. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Souter dissented. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting, joined 'by Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ.); id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2843 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ment 1 The Shaw decision placed into question the districting
practices that had been approved in UJO.
In UJO, the Court examined the redistricting of New York
state senate and state assembly districts insofar as the redis-
tricting involved counties in New York that were subject to the
Voting Rights Act preclearance requirements. 32 In 1974, provi-
sions of a new state statute relating to congressional, state sen-
ate, and state assembly districts were submitted to the Attorney
General of the United States for preclearance.33 The Attorney
General concluded that as to certain districts, the state had not
met its burden of proof in demonstrating that redistricting had
neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote
by reasons of race or color. 34 New York did not challenge the
Attorney General's objections.3" Instead the state revised its
districting plan in a way that created more substantial "non-
white minorities" in two state assembly districts and two state
senate districts.
Although the Court did not issue a majority opinion in UJO,
the Supreme Court upheld the redistricting plan by a seven to
one vote of the Justices.337 Justice Marshall did not participate
in the UJO decision. Only Chief Justice Burger dissented."8
Justice White announced the judgment of the Court; he was
joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens when he
stated that "luinless [the Supreme Court] adopted an unconsti-
tutional construction of § 5 [of the Voting Rights Act in earlier
decisions], a reapportionment cannot-violate the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State uses specific nu-
merical quotas in establishing a certain number of black majori-
ty districts."339 Justice Rehnquist joined the portion of Justice
White's opinion in UJO that found that the affirmative use of
331. Id. at 2832.
332. UJO, 430 U.S. at 144.
333. Id. at 149.
334. Id. at 149-50.
335. Id. at 150-51.
336. Id. at 151-52.
337. Id. at 144.
338. Id. at 180 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
339. Id. at 162.
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racial criteria in the redistricting did not violate the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendments, even if New York's actions were not
required by the Voting Rights Act.34
Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Powell, wrote an opinion
concurring only in the Court's judgment in the UJO case.34' Al-
though these two Justices recognized that the state had used
racial criteria in order to protect minority voters, they found no
indication of an intention to dilute the voting strength of whites
in general or any specific subgroup of whites.342 Justices Stew-
art and Powell reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
voting strength of the Hasidic Jewish community was adversely
affected by the final reapportionment plan.343 Justices Stewart
and Powell found that the cases regarding discriminatory pur-
pose dictated the outcome of this case.3" They concluded that:
Under the Fourteenth Amendment the question is whether
the reapportionment plan represents purposeful discrimina-
tion against white voters.... Disproportionate impact may
afford some evidence that an invidious purpose was pres-
ent.... But the record here does not support a finding that
the redistricting plan undervalued the political power of
white voters relative to their numbers in [the redistricted
county].... That the legislature was aware of race when it
drew the district lines might also suggeit a discriminatory
purpose. Such awareness is not, however, the equivalent of
discriminatory intent. The clear purpose with which the New
York Legislature acted-in response to the position of the
United States Department of Justice under the Voting Rights
Act-forecloses any finding that it acted with the invidious
purpose of discriminating against white voters.345
In Shaw v. Reno,3" the Supreme Court confronted a factual
situation almost identical to UJO, except that the case came
340. Id. at 165-68. This portion of Justice White's opinion was also joined by Jus-
tice Stevens.
341. Id. at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Powell, J.).
342. Id. at 179-80.
343. See id.
344. See id.
345. Id. (citations omitted).
346. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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from North Carolina rather than New York. Prior to the 1960s,
North Carolina had a long history of using a variety of devices
to reduce or eliminate the voting power of racial minorities.
Forty of the 100 counties in North Carolina were subject to the
preclearance requirements of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.347
The North Carolina .state legislature adopted a plan creating
congressional districts and submitted it to the United States
Attorney General pursuant to the administrative preclearance
procedures of the Act.3 4' The Attorney General objected to
North Carolina's initial plan for congressional districts because
only one of the twelve districts appeared to be one in which
minority race voters would control the election of a representa-
tive to Congress.349 Because twenty-two percent of the North
Carolina population was comprised of racial minorities, primari-
ly African Americans, the Attorney General believed that the
state had not met its burden of showing that its districting plan
would not have the effect of diluting the voting strength of racial
minorities. 50
North Carolina did not choose to challenge the Attorney
General's decision in the District Court for the District of
Columbia." 1 Instead, the North Carolina legislature adopted a
new districting plan that created two districts in which minority
voters would constitute a majority and, if they voted together,
control the election for the congressional representative.352 The
second North Carolina districting plan was challenged in the
United States District Court in North Carolina by persons who
claimed that the new plan involved unconstitutional racial dis-
crimination in favor of racial minorities. 53
By a five to four vote, the Justices in Shaw ruled that the
second congressional districting plan involved a racial classifica-
tion on its face. 54 Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion





352. See id. at 2820-21.
353. Id. at 2821.
354. Id. at 2832.
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in Shaw.355 She found that districts which had been created to
aid minority race voters involved a racial classification subject to
strict judicial scrutiny.356 The Supreme Court remanded the
case to the lower courts for an initial determination of whether
the districting plan was narrowly tailored to promote a compel-
ling governmental interest.357 Although her majority opinion
did not make a ruling concerning the ultimate constitutionality
of the North Carolina congressional districting plan, Justice
O'Connor stated that "a reapportionment plan that satisfies § 5
[of the Voting Rights Act] still may be enjoined as
unconstitutional." 58
In Shaw, a majority of the Court disregarded all previous
cases regarding the need to prove discriminatory purpose so that
the Court could rule against the interests of minority voters.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion found that the North Caroli-
na redistricting plan involved a racial classification "on its face,"
at least insofar as it related to one of the two congressional
districts that would be controlled by minority voters.359 North
Carolina congressional district twelve, one of the two districts
created after the Attorney General objected to the first reappor-
tionment plan, was 160 miles long, and according to the Su-
preme Court, "for much of its length no wider than the [Inter-
state] 85 corridor."36 Because Justice O'Connor found that this
district constituted racial discrimination on the face of the law,
those persons who attacked the plan did not have to make any
demonstration that the law was the product of a racially dis-
criminatory purpose."' She found that "no inquiry into legisla-
tive purpose is necessary when the racial classification appears
on the face of the statute ... [or in] those 'rare' statutes that,
although race neutral, are, on their face, 'unexplainable on
grounds other than race.' 362
355. Id. at 2819.
356. Id. at 2824-25.
357. Id. at 2832.
358. Id. at 2831.
359. Id. at 2825.
360. Id. at 2820-21.
361. Id. at 2824-25.
362. Id.
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The difficulty with Justice O'Connor's statements, as pointed
out by the dissenters in Shaw, is that the Supreme Court had
never found a law that did not use racial terms to constitute a
race classification "on its face" unless that law denied a racial
group some benefit.6 3 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,3" the redis-
tricting of the town's boundaries had denied racial minorities the
ability to vote in the city elections.365  In Reitman v.
Mulkey,366 the law had denied those interested in integration
the ability to get legislative relief without a change to the Cali-
fornia Constitution.67 No one was denied a right to vote by the
redistricting map in Shaw; no identifiable racial group (not even
the general category of "white persons") had their voting power
diluted by the final districting map. If Justice O'Connor's majori-
ty opinion had required proof of a racially discriminatory pur-
pose in order to show a violation of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendment, the majority would have had to uphold the North
Carolina plan. In the final redistricting plan, enacted following
the Attorney General's objection to the first map, white voters in
North Carolina controlled the outcome in over eighty percent of
the North Carolina congressional districts.368 Although over
twenty percent of the population of North Carolina was com-
posed of racial minorities, they would control less than twenty
percent of the North Carolina delegation." 9
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Shaw can be explained
only as result-driven. The majority recast prior Supreme Court
decisions in order to prevent the government from aiding minori-
363. The dissenters in Shaw focused on the fact that the redistricting plan that
was the subject of the strict scrutiny by the Supreme Court majority complied with
the one person, one vote principle and that there was no allegation that the districts
diluted the voting strength of white voters. In other words, in the view of the dis-
senters, the districting law simply did not cause any injury that constituted a cogni-
zable constitutional claim. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and
Stevens, JJ.); id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); id.
at 2846 (Souter, J., dissenting).
364. 364 U.S. 339 (1960); see supra text accompanying note 297.
365. See id.
366. 387 U.S. 369 (1967); see supra text accompanying notes 299-301.
367. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 370-75.
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ty voters. Justice O'Connor described the UJO case as one in
which the plaintiffs had failed to allege that the legislative dis-
tricts, on their face, could be understood only as an effort to
segregate voters by race.37 In other words, the O'Connor opin-
ion in Shaw indicates that the plaintiffs in the UJO case would
have won if they had only done a better job in the formal plead-
ing of their case. Justice O'Connor disregarded those portions of
Justice White's plurality opinion in UJO that expressly ap-
proved the affirmative use of racial criteria as the basis for cre-
ating districts that increase the voting strengths of minority race
groups. She also disregarded the portions of the UJO concurring
opinion of Justices Stewart and Powell in which they expressly
found that the use of racial criteria to strengthen the voting
power of minority race groups could not violate the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendments absent proof that the criteria were
used for the purpose of diluting the voting strength of some
racial group.
There is no way to explain the outcomes in UJO and Shaw
other than by the change in the Court's personnel and the atti-
tudes of today's Justices towards racial minorities. Justice
O'Connor has voted to invalidate almost all forms of benign
racial classifications that could be described as affirmative ac-
tion. Justice Scalia has opposed any form of government action
that consciously aids minority members unless those persons
could be shown to have been the specific victims of illegal past
discrimination. Justice Powell was replaced by Justice Kennedy,
who started voting to restrict civil rights statutes in his first
Term on the Supreme Court. Justice Rehnquist did not write in
Shaw or in UJO; he simply switched his vote. Justice Thomas
did not write in Shaw, but he provided the deciding vote.
The four dissenters in Shaw were Justice White (who had
written the plurality opinion in UJO), Justices Blackmun and
Stevens (who had joined part of Justice White's opinion in UJO),
and Justice Souter."7' A year earlier, Justice Souter voted
against using the Voting Rights Act to protect racial minori-
370. See id. at 2829.
371. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.); id. at
2845 (Souter, J., dissenting).
19951 423
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ties. 72 Perhaps Justice Souter will be true to statements in his
confirmation hearings in which he indicated support for the
Voting Rights Act and congressional authority to protect racial
minorities.373
In Shaw the majority left open the question of whether Con-
gress and the Attorney General could force a state to strengthen
minority race voting power. In the next section of this Article, I
will examine the Court's rulings concerning "affirmative action."
I will conclude that section by returning to the question of
whether the Supreme Court is poised to invalidate race con-
scious districting that aids minority voters.
VIII. THE BURGER COURT, THE REHNQUIST COURT, AND THE
BENIGN USE OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS
Laws that aid racial minorities are sometimes called "affirma-
tive action programs" or "benign racial classifications." I will use
those terms interchangeably. In this Symposium, Professor
Tushnet examines the jurisprudential debate concerning racial
affirmative action. 4 I will not attempt to engage in a detailed
analysis of the Supreme Court's affirmative action rulings in a
way that would help the reader use the cases to solve practical
problems that are currently being confronted by local, state, and
federal governmental entities. Such a task is best done in a
treatise format. 5 Instead, I will give my readers an overview
of these cases for the purpose of identifying the voting records of
the individual Justices who have served in the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. An examination of these voting patterns will
demonstrate that the Reagan appointees have prevented local
and state governments from taking affirmative steps to aid ra-
cial minorities. Those Justices will need the help of at least one
of the Bush appointees to reverse the earlier Supreme Court
372. See Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992); see supra notes
117-27 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 26.
374. See Mark A. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and Race Discrimination, 1967-1991:
The View from the Marshall Papers, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1995).
375. For a more systematic analysis of all aspects of the affirmative action rulings,
see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, § 18.10.
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decisions upholding the power of the federal government to cre-
ate racial affirmative action programs. For the past forty years,
the Supreme Court has allowed, and sometimes required, lower
courts and other governmental entities to create race-conscious
remedies for specific acts of racial discrimination that violate
federal statutes or the Equal Protection Clause. The affirmative
action cases that have divided the Justices involved the question
of whether a city, state, or federal government may go beyond
remedying identified illegal racial discrimination and voluntarily
aid racial minorities."6 Prior to the Burger Court era, the Su-
preme Court did not have to face the question of whether racial
criteria could be used affirmatively to advance the interests of
racial minorities by state or local governments. By the time
racial affirmative action programs were adopted and challenged
376. Before diagnosing the position of the Supreme Court concerning racial affirma-
tive action, we must first set aside four types of cases that are arguably affirmative
action cases but do not involve a governmental entity's voluntary use of racial classi-
fications to benefit racial minorities. First, my discussion of racial affirmative action
will not include federal laws that benefit persons on the basis of their membership
in a recognized Native American tribe or because they are Native Americans. The
government discrimination against persons because their ancestors were Native
Americans should be invalid under the compelling interest test. The Court, however,
has not used clear standards for determining the legitimacy of congressional regula-
tions of Native Americans who are members of recognized tribes and living on reser-
vation lands. The Supreme Court has allowed the government some leeway in the
hiring of Native Americans in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. See Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535 (1974). See generally 1 ROTUNDA & NOWAAK, supra note 3, § 4.2 (dis-
cussing regulation of Native Americans); id. § 18.10 (discussing affirmative action).
Second, I will not reexamine the cases in which the Supreme Court has inter-
preted federal civil rights statutes in a manner that allows private employers to use
voluntarily any established policies that benefit racial minorities in hiring and pro-
motions. In those statutory interpretation cases, the Court did not address the con-
stitutionality of the government's use of voluntary racial affirmative action. See su-
pra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
Third, we must ignore the question of whether state, local, or federal govern-
ments may make some use of racial criteria in creating legislative districts that will
enhance the voting power of minority racial groups. As we have seen, the Supreme
Court has left open the question of whether such actions might ever be compatible
with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. I will revisit that subject at the
end of this section of the Article.
Fourth, cases involving court-ordered remedies for specific acts of illegal racial
discrimination do not present affirmative action issues. In the next section of this
Article, I will examine some of the Court's rulings concerning the desegregation of
schools that require lower courts to take cognizance of race when issuing remedial
orders.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
in litigation that would find its way to the Supreme Court, the
Warren Court era had come and gone.
At one level, the Supreme Court decisions concerning racial
affirmative action are a highly theoretical debate concerning the
proper standard of review. 7 One set of Justices argues for the
use of "strict scrutiny" and the "compelling interest test" to judge
any racial classification, regardless of whether the classification
is designed to help or hurt members of a racial minority.378
Those Justices require the government to prove that the use of a
racial classification is necessary to promote a compelling
interest."9 Another group of Justices advocates the use of the
"intermediate test" to review a benign racial classification that
does not burden or stigmatize any racial group.380 This set of
Justices votes to uphold a benign racial classification (affirma-
tive action program) if they find that it has a substantial rela-
tionship to an important government interest, although they use
the compelling interest test to examine, and invalidate, classifi-
cations that burden or stigmatize a racial minority. 8 '
We can cut through the legal jargon, and understand the real
differences between the Justices in the affirmative action cases,
if we accept the following proposition as background for reading
those cases: "The correction of societal discrimination (which
means the correction of the imbalance in the distribution of
goods, wealth, and opportunity in our society that is not trace-
able to any specific illegal action) is an important, but not com-
pelling interest." That proposition is not adopted in any opinion
of the United States Supreme Court, but it explains the entirety
of the Justices' debate in the racial affirmative action cases.
The Justices who advocate the use of the intermediate stan-
dard of review find that the correction of societal discrimination
377. For an explanation of the standards that the Court has used in determining
whether a legislative or administrative use of a classification violates the equal pro-
tection guarantee, see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 3, § 18.3. For the purposes
of assessing the Court's rulings concerning voluntary government action designed to
promote the interest of racial minorities, we need only deal with three or, perhaps,
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against racial minority groups is a sufficient interest to justify
laws that are tailored to correct the effects of racial
discrimination.382 In other words, they believe that the equal
protection principle is not violated by some attempts to reallo-
cate wealth, economic opportunity, or voting power so as to cor-
rect past racial discrimination in our society and create a more
just balance in the distribution of those goods between persons
of all races.3"
The Justices who advocate the use of the compelling interest
test are Justices who find a racial classification can rarely, if
ever, be used unless it is part of a narrowly tailored remedy for
a specific, identified illegal or unconstitutional act of racial dis-
crimination.3" It is not clear whether any of the Justices who
advocate the use of the compelling interest test would go further
and allow the use of benign racial classifications to promote any
nonremedial goals, such as promoting diversity in education or
correcting the effects of racial discrimination in the voting pro-
cess in the early part of this century.
Since 1978, there have been five cases in which the Supreme
Court has examined the constitutionality of government actions
that were voluntarily undertaken to aid members of minority
racial groups.385 Three of these cases involved state or local af-
firmative action plans; two cases involved the federal govern-
ment. I will examine the cases in those groupings because the
Supreme Court has established different standards for state and
federal racial affirmative action programs.
In 1978, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke,386 five Justices, without a majority opinion, ruled that
the admissions program of the medical school of the University
of California at Davis violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.387 Justice Powell cast the decisive vote in Bakke and an-
382. See id.
383. See id. § 18.10.
384. See id. § 18.3.
385. The Supreme Court, for jurisdictional reasons, avoided ruling on the constitu-
tionality of a law school's racial affirmative action policy in DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
386. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
387. Id.
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nounced the judgment of the Court.3s However, none of Jus-
tice Powell's statements concerning the constitutionality of the
medical school's admissions program gained the support of even
one other Justice.389
Four of the Justices in Bakke refused to make any statements
concerning the constitutionality of the admissions program.3"
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and
Stevens found that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibited
any use of race to affirmatively or negatively influence the ad-
missions decisions in schools receiving federal money.39' Be-
cause they believed that the admissions program at issue in
Bakke violated Title VI, they made no statements concerning the
constitutional standards to be used when reviewing a benign
racial classification. 9' Later cases revealed that these four
Justices were not able to agree on a standard of review for racial
affirmative action cases.
Justice Powell agreed with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Mar-
shall, and White that Title VI, which prohibited racial discrim-
ination in federally funded educational programs, barred only
racial classifications that violated the Equal Protection Clause if
the challenged action involved state action. 33 These five Jus-
tices reached the constitutional issue in this case; four of the
Justices disagreed with Justice Powell.394
Justice Brennan, in an opinion that was joined by Justices
Marshall, White, and Blackmun, concurred in the judgment of
the Court only insofar as it left open the possibility that the use
of race to affirmatively help minority candidates in the admis-
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 408-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
391. Id. at 421.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 281-87; id. at 328-55 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). These five Justices
agreed on the principle that Title VI prohibited those activities that, if they involved
state action, would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. They did not agree, however, on the basis for this ruling or the meaning of
the constitutional standards. See id.
394. Id. at 355-79.
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sions process was not totally prohibited by either Title VI or the
Equal Protection Clause.95 These Justices dissented from the
ruling that found that the Davis medical school's use of statisti-
cal goals to ensure minority representation in- the student body
violated Title VI3 6 Justice Brennan's opinion took the position
that the Court should use the intermediate equal protection
standard for determining whether a racial classification that did
not stigmatize or harm any identifiable racial minority group
was constitutional.397 Justice Brennan found that the end of
ensuring racial diversity in the medical profession, which has a
statistically low percentage of members of racial minorities
when compared to the general population, was an interest that
would support a truly benign racial classification.39 The Jus-
tices who joined the Brennan opinion voted to uphold that ad-
missions policy under both Title VI and the Equal Protection
Clause because they found that the medical school's admissions
policy of using race affirmatively to help members of racial mi-
norities was substantially related to an important interest. 9
Justice Powell wrote only for himself as he found that racial
classifications had to be subject to the strict scrutiny standard of
review regardless of whether they helped or hurt racial minori-
ties."0 In his view, a racial classification could not be upheld
unless it was necessary to promote a compelling interest of gov-
ernment.4 ' Justice Powell found that the student diversity
was a compelling interest because the attainment of a diverse
student body was related to "academic freedom" and the enrich-
ment of the educational experience for both faculty and
students.0 2 On this basis, he voted to approve some of the
race-conscious admissions practices used by universities.4 3
Nevertheless, he did not find that a program that set numerical
395. Id. at 325. Each -of these Justices wrote an opinion, but all four of them
joined in the Brennan opinion.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 359.
398. Id. at 362.
399. Id. at 325.
400. Id. at 290-91 (Powell, J.).
401. Id. at 305.
402. Id. at 311.
403. Id. at 314.
1995] 429
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
admissions goals or guaranteed admission to a minimum num-
ber of minority students was narrowly tailored to that compel-
ling interest. °4 According to Justice Powell, a race-conscious
admissions policy would be narrowly tailored to achieving a di-
verse student body only if the admissions policy allowed for
consideration of race together with a wide variety of other fac-
tors in making admission decisions. °5
Justice Powell cast his vote with Justices Brennan, Marshall,
White, and Blackmun to the extent of reversing the California
Supreme Court ruling that totally precluded the use of race as a
factor in education admissions programs."0 6 Justice Powell vot-
ed with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist,
and Stevens to invalidate the use of numerical racial goals in
the admissions program under Title VI.4 7 In 1978, only Justice
Powell advocated the use of the compelling interest test, and
even he viewed the test as a flexible one.
In 1986, the Supreme Court again examined a governmental
racial affirmative action policy in a school setting. At that time,
there appeared to be growing support among the Justices for
using the compelling interest test in affirmative action cases,
even though the only change in the membership of the Court
between 1978 and 1986 was the replacement of Justice Stewart
by Justice O'Connor.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,"8 the Court held
404. Id. at 315.
405. Id. at 311-20. Justice Powell found that the state would have a compelling
interest in eliminating the effects of identified illegal or unconstitutional discrimina-
tion, but, in Bakke, the university did not claim that it had the ability to make, or
in fact had made, findings that in prior years it had discriminated against racial mi-
norities in its admissions programs. Id. at 307-10. Justice Powell avoided the ques-
tion of whether ensuring the provision of medical health services for impoverished
communities with high minority populations was a compelling interest because he
found that there was no proof that the special admissions program used by the Da-
vis medical school would increase the number of doctors or the quality of health
care for such communities. Id. at 311.
406. Id. at 320.
407. Id. at 315.
408. 476 U.S. 267 (1986). The events that led to the Wygant litigation had their
roots in community racial tensions concerning a variety of topics. Id. at 270. After
long negotiations, the local board of education and the local teachers union reached
a collective bargaining agreement that provided that any layoffs would occur on a
modified seniority basis whereby the school board would lay off minority and
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that a local school board violated the Equal Protection Clause
when, to maintain a racially integrated faculty at a time when it
had to reduce the number of faculty members, it laid off white
teachers before black teachers with less seniority.4"9 Once
again, no majority opinion issued from the Court; once again,
the case was decided by a five to four decision of the Justic-
es.410 Although four Justices endorsed the use of a compelling
interest test in Wygant, it appeared that a majority of the Court
might be ready to give the states some leeway to create affirma-
tive action programs.
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court in
Wygant; his opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist and, in part, by Justice O'Connor.4 ' The
plurality found that the decision to lay off nonminority teachers
solely because of their race, in order to maintain a racial balance
in the faculty, violated the Equal Protection Clause.4"2 As he
had in Bakke, Justice Powell found that a racial classification
must be subject to the compelling interest test, regardless of
whether the classification aided or burdened members of a mi-
nority race."' Although he did not exclude the possibility that
maintaining a racially diverse faculty might be a compelling
interest, Justice Powell's plurality opinion found that the layoff
plan was not necessary to achieving or maintaining racial diver-
sity in the school system.4 "
Justice O'Connor agreed with the portion of Justice Powell's
opinion that endorsed the use of a compelling interest test for
the review of all racial classifications.4"5 She wrote separately
in Wygant to note that the government's goal of having an inte-
grated faculty might be achieved in a way that would survive
nonminority teachers in the same proportions. Id. Minority race teachers were
underrepresented among the senior faculty. Id. at 271. The agreed upon layoff sys-
tem would not result in increasing the disparity between the percentages of minority
and nonminority faculty members in the public school system. Id. at 270.
409. Id. at 282-84.
410. Id. at 267-320.
411. Id. at 276-83.
412. Id. at 284.
413. Id. at 274.
414. Id. at 283.
415. Id. at 285 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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constitutional review if the government did not impose a dispro-
portionate harm on nonminority teachers.416 Justice O'Connor,
in her concurrence, indicated that a majority of the Justices
would uphold the decision of a public school system to take some
affirmative steps to ensure the creation of an integrated work
force through the consideration of race in hiring decisions.417
Her opinion did not specify whether she would endorse the im-
plementation of hiring goals in the absence of some proof of past
employment discrimination by the government.418
Justices White and Stevens each took an approach to deciding
the issues in Wygant that separated them from the other Justic-
es and each other. Justice White concurred in the judgment of
the Court in Wygant in an opinion that was not joined by any
other Justice.419 Justice White did not refer to any standard of
review.420 He simply asserted that "[whatever the legitimacy
of hiring goals or quotas may be," the discharge of some persons
from government employment in order to maintain a racial bal-
ance in the work force could not survive equal protection
review.
42 1
Justice Stevens dissented in an opinion that was not joined by
any other Justice.422 He believed that no formal standard of
review should be used in these types of equal protection cas-
es. 423 In Justice Stevens' view, there was no basis for the judi-
cial invalidation of the layoff system because it had been adopt-
ed by the school board and the teachers union through a fair
process.424 It was "a step toward that ultimate goal of eliminat-
ing entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant
factors as a human being's race."425
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion in Wygant that
416. Id. at 287.
417. Id. at 286.
418. Id. at 293.
419. Id. at 294 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
420. Id. at 294-95.
421. Id. at 295.
422. Id. at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
423. Id. at 313-20.
424. Id. at 318.
425. Id. at 320.
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was joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun.426 The dissent-
ing Justices voted to uphold the layoff policy under the interme-
diate standard of review.427 They found that the correction of
societal discrimination against racial minorities, which resulted
in a disproportionately low number of racial minority faculty at
the senior teaching ranks, was a sufficient end to justify a gov-
ernment program that maintained a racially integrated facul-
ty.428 Additionally, they believed that the case should have
been remanded to the lower courts for determination of whether
a basis existed for finding that the program was designed to
remedy past governmental discrimination within the school dis-
trict.4 2
9
After Wygant, the Court's position concerning the constitu-
tionality of racial affirmative action was not clear. Only three
Justices had endorsed the use of the intermediate standard to
allow government policies that corrected the effects of societal
discrimination. Justice O'Connor, one of the Justices who voted
to review benign racial classifications under the strict scrutiny
standard, did not appear to take the position that the govern-
ment was completely prohibited from acting to correct the effects
of societal discrimination. Justices Stevens and White seemed so
flexible in their approach to reviewing affirmative action pro-
grams that it was impossible to clearly identify the standard
they used in making their decisions.43
By 1989, the appointment of Justices Scalia and Kennedy, and
an apparent hardening in the position of Justice O'Connor to-
ward benign racial classifications, resulted in a Court that was
ready to put an end to voluntary affirmative action programs by
state or local governments. In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,43
the Supreme Court invalidated a city's plan for increasing the
426. Id. at 295-312 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
427. Id. at 301.
428. Id. at 312.
429. Id. at 296-98, 303, 312.
430. These two Justices would later vote to establish different standards of review
for federal affirmative action programs than for state affirmative action programs.
See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990). This case is discussed at
infra notes 476-88 and accompanying text.
431. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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number of minority owned businesses that were awarded city
construction contracts.4"2 The City of Richmond adopted a plan
for awarding city construction contracts that required contrac-
tors to subcontract at least thirty percent of the amount of a
contract to subcontractor businesses that were owned by mem-
bers of certain racial minority groups (identified as "Blacks,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts").4
A prime contractor was allowed a waiver from the thirty percent
requirement only in "exceptional circumstances."4
By a six to three vote, the Justices ruled that Richmond had
violated the Equal Protection Clause.435 In Croson, Justice
O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court in an opinion
that was, in part, a majority opinion and, in part, a plurality
opinion. 436 The O'Connor opinion, when combined with the con-
curring opinions, made it doubtful the Court would uphold any
government aid to racial minorities unless it was tailored to
remedy some identified past illegal or unconstitutional discrimi-
nation.4 7
Justice O'Connor, in a portion of her opinion that was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Kennedy,
found that all racial classifications had to be subject to the strict
scrutiny-compelling interest standard.4 8 Justices Kennedy and
Scalia wrote concurring opinions in which they found that even
the compelling interest test might not be a sufficiently strict
standard for reviewing racial affirmative action programs. 439
432. Id.
433. Id. at 477.
434. Id. at 478.
435. Id. at 469.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 475-511, 518 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Stevens con-
curred without endorsing the use of any formal test or standard of review. Id. at
514 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). The three
dissenting Justices recognized that the Supreme Court had, in fact, established a
ruling by a majority vote that would require the compelling interest test for. affirma-
tive action programs. Id. at 551 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "Today for the first time,
a majority of this court has adopted strict scrutiny as its standard of Equal Protec-
tion Clause review of race-conscious remedial measures." Id, (Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
438. Id. at 493-98, 509-11 (O'Connor, J.).
439. Id. at 518-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
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Apparently, Justices Kennedy and Scalia would not vote to up-
hold any benign use of a racial classification unless it was
clearly necessary to remedy specific acts of illegal and unconsti-
tutional racial discrimination."0 Justice Stevens concurred in
the invalidation of the city's affirmative action program without
referring to any standard of review."'
Justice O'Connor wrote for a majority of the Justices when
she ruled that the city's affirmative action plan could not be
justified under the compelling interest standard because the city
failed to demonstrate that its plan was narrowly tailored to
correct identifiable acts of illegal racial discrimination against
minority members of the construction industry within the City
of Richmond.42 In this portion of her opinion, Justice O'Connor
found that the city could not simply rely on the statistical
underrepresentation of racial minorities in local contractors'
associations or in the construction businesses in Richmond."3
If the city could show that prior city actions, or the actions of
private contractors within the city, had deterred the creation of
minority owned construction businesses, the city would have a
compelling interest in creating a program to correct the identi-
fied racial discrimination.' Because the city had not identified
prior illegal or unconstitutional discrimination within its bound-
aries, the majority found the affirmative action plan was not
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.445 Rich-
mond could not use proof that minority owned businesses in
other geographic areas within the state or nation had been the
subject of open discrimination."6
A majority of Justices in Croson held the effects of nationwide
judgment); id. at 519-21 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
440. Id.
441. Id. at 514-17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
442. Id. at 498-508 (O'Connor, J.).
443. Id. at 503.
444. Id. at 500.
445. Id. at 505. Justice O'Connor also found that een if Richmond had identified
past discrimination against minority owned construction businesses in the city, its
use of a 30% quota for subcontracts with only limited opportunities for a waiver
from the quota system was not narrowly tailored to the correction of prior discrimi-
nation. Id. at 507-08.
446. Id. at 500-01.
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discrimination against minority owned businesses in society
could not be used to justify Richmond's affirmative action pro-
gram.44' The only compelling interest available to the city was
the interest in correcting identified discrimination within its
borders. 44' After Croson, a city can justify a racial preference
that aids minority owned businesses only if it can demonstrate
prior acts of illegal or unconstitutional discrimination against
businesses owned by the particular minority group and within
the city's boundaries.449 Such a remedial program could not ex-
tend beyond racial discrimination remedies mandated by federal
statutes or the Equal Protection Clause.4 ° Thus, all truly vol-
untary governmental aid to racial minorities apparently may be
prohibited by the Croson majority.4"1
Justice Marshall wrote a dissent in Croson that was joined by
Justices Brennan and Blackmun. 452 These Justices believed
that benign racial classifications should be upheld if they were
substantially related to an important government interest.
453
The most significant point of difference between the majority
and the dissenting Justices was not the formal standard of re-
view they endorsed but, rather, their views concerning govern-
mental actions taken to correct societal discrimination. The
dissenting Justices would not have required the City of Rich-
mond to identify specific acts of the city government or local
contractors that had deterred the creation of minority-owned
construction or subcontractor businesses in the city.4' The his-
tory of discrimination against minority race persons in Virginia,
447. Id.
448. Id. at 505.
449. Id. at 505-06.
450. Id. at 509-11.
451. In a portion of her opinion that was a plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor
stated: "Nothing we say today precludes a state or local entity from taking action to
rectify the effects of identified racial discrimination within its jurisdiction." Id. at
509 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White and Kennedy, JJ.). But, accord-
ing to the plurality, to justify awarding a preference to minority owned businesses,
the city would have to be able to at least rely on an inference of discriminatory
exclusion that might be raised from statistical proof similar to that used in employ-
ment discrimination cases.
452. Id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
453. Id. at 535.
454. Id. at 540.
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dating back to the days of the Confederacy, was sufficient to
justify the benign use of racial classification in the view of the
dissenters. 455  That history left little doubt that the
disproportionately low percentage of racial minority owners of
construction businesses was not merely a matter of chance.456
The Croson decision demonstrated that Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Reagan appointees-Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Kennedy-were opposed to all forms of voluntary ra-
cial affirmative action and controlled the outcome of cases in-
volving state or local affirmative action programs. 457 At least
prior to the arrival of the Bush appointees, however, other views
would prevail in federal racial affirmative action cases. In 1980
and 1990 the Court held that a benign racial classification in a
federal law will comply with the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause so long as the classifi-
cation has a substantial relationship to an important inter-
est.
458
In 1980, in Fullilove v. Klutznick,459 the Supreme Court, by a
six to three vote and without a majority opinion, upheld the
constitutionality of the minority business enterprise of the Pub-
lic Works Employment Act. The federal law at issue in Fullilove
required that, absent a waiver, ten percent of the amount of
federal public works projects be given to businesses in which a
minority of the equity interest was owned by "citizens of the
United States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals,
Indians, Eskimos, [or] Aleuts."46
Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court in
Fullilove in an opinion that was joined by Justices White and
Powell.461' This plurality opinion did not identify a specific
standard of review for determining the constitutionality of feder-
al racial affirmative action. The Chief Justice merely found that
455. Id. at 544-46.
456. Id. at 546.
457. See id. at 469.
458. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
459. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
460. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1988); see Fulliloue, 448 U.S. at 454.
461. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 448 (Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, JJ.).
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the objectives of the legislation were within congressional power
and that this particular program involved a sufficiently limited
and flexible use of racial criteria so that the law was a permissi-
ble means for achieving the objectives of the statute.462 Justice
Powell, who joined the opinion of Chief Justice Burger, wrote
separately in order to "place greater emphasis than the Chief
Justice on the need to articulate judicial standards of review in
conventional terms . ..."463 Justice Powell continued to believe
that benign racial classifications should be subject to strict scru-
tiny,4" but he also found that Congress had special authority
under the Civil War Amendments to identify and remedy the
continuing effects of racially discriminatory practices throughout
the country.465 On that basis, Powell found that the provision
to the federal law that aided minority owned businesses was
narrowly tailored to promote compelling interests of the federal
government.466
Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion in Fullilove that
was joined by Justices Blackmun and Brennan.467 These Jus-
tices have consistently endorsed the use of an intermediate stan-
dard of review for examining benign racial classifications, re-
gardless of whether the classifications were used in state or fed-
eral legislation. In Fullilove, these Justices did not advocate
giving total deference to governmental entities who asserted
that a racial classification was being used for a benign purpose.
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Brennan indicated that an
allegedly benign racial classification should be reviewed to en-
sure that the classification was not a mask for discriminating
against or stigmatizing any racial or ethnic group.6 ' Once it
was determined that a racial classification was truly benign, the
concurring Justices asserted that "the proper inquiry is whether
racial classifications designed to further remedial purposes serve
462. Id.
463. Id. at 495-96 (Powell, J., concurring).
464. Id. at 496.
465. Id. at 500.
466. Id. at 496.
467. Id. at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Brennan and
Blackmun, JJ.).
468. Id. at 518.
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important governmental objectives and are substantially related
to achievement of those objectives." 69 Justice Marshall found
that the purpose of remedying the effects of past racial discrimi-
nation against minority owned businesses in our society was an
important interest and that the federal program was a reason-
able means of correcting the effects of past discrimination in the
contracting and construction businesses.7
In 1980, there were only three Justices--Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Stevens-who would limit the federal
government's use of benign racial classifications to the remedy-
ing of specific acts of illegal discrimination against racial minori-
ties."1 One of these three, Justice Stevens, would later demon-
strate a more flexible approach to the review of federal affirma-
tive action programs. 2 Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dis-
senting in Fullilove, advocated the use of a strict standard of
review that would preclude the use of racial criteria to aid mem-
bers of minority races unless the government needed to use
those criteria to correct identified acts of illegal discrimina-
tion.47 Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent in Fullilove;
he refused to commit to a specific standard for reviewing benign
racial classifications.4  Justice Stevens said that a racial clas-
sification should be upheld if it would "serve to define a group of
persons who have suffered a special wrong and who, therefore,
are entitled to special reparations."475
Ten years after Fullilove, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC,476 the Supreme Court upheld two FCC policies that were
designed to maintain and increase the number and percentages
of minority owned radio and television stations. Although these
two policies had initially been adopted by regulatory action,
469. Id. at 519 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359
(1978)).
470. Id. at 521.
471. Id. at 522, 532.
472. Id. at 532 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens would later join in estab-
lishing an intermediate standard of review for federal affirmative action programs.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring).
473. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.).
474. Id. at 532.
475. Id. at 537.
476. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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Congress, in appropriations legislation, had required the FCC to
retain these policies.4 7  The FCC policies gave preferential
treatment to members of racial minorities and minority owned
businesses who applied for a license to operate a radio or televi-
sion station or who sought to acquire a license from a current
station that was having its license challenged in FCC proceed-
ings.478 Justice Brennan wrote a majority opinion in Metro
Broadcasting that was joined by Justices Marshall, White,
Blackmun, and Stevens. 479 The majority expressly adopted the
intermediate standard of review for determining the compatibili-
ty of benign racial classifications with the implied equal protec-
tion guarantee of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.80
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in Croson, had used the compelling
interest test, to review state and local affirmative action pro-
grams. 481  That ruling was not overturned in Metro
Broadcasting.482 In 1990, Justice Brennan's opinion distin-
guished the Croson decision on the basis that Congress was less
susceptible than state or local legislatures to pressures to divide
government benefits among racial factions of society without any
regard to promoting specific constitutional goals, such as correct-
ing the effects of past discrimination.8 3
The majority in Metro Broadcasting ruled that the Court
would uphold a racial classification that benefitted members of a
minority race that was either part of a federal statute, or that
477. Id. at 560 n.9 (citing Continuing Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1988, Pub.
L. Nos. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329-31).
478. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 556-58.
479. Id. at 552.
480. Id. at 564-65.
481. Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
482. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565-66.
483. Justice Brennan's majority opinion justified using a less rigorous standard for
the review of benign racial classifications under the implied equal protection guaran-
tee of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment than that used for the re-
view of benign racial classifications under the Equal Protection Clause without ex-
pressly relying on the powers granted to Congress by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The majority found that the national legislature was less susceptible
to the type of pressures that would result in awarding benefits to racial factions. In
addition, Justice Brennan found that the Fullilove decision required the Court to use
the intermediate standard if the Court was not prepared to overrule the Fullilove
decision. Id. at 565-66.
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was part of a regulatory action mandated or approved by Con-
gress, so long as the classification had a substantial relationship
to an important interest within the power of Congress.41 Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by a majority of the Court, found that creat-
ing diversity in broadcasting was a sufficiently important inter-
est to support a racial classification and that the classification
did not stigmatize or punish any identifiable racial group.
48 5
Justice O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion in Metro Broad-
casting that was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Kennedy.485 She found no basis for using standards
of review under the implied equal protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause that differed from the
standards used under the Equal Protection Clause.487 Accord-
ing to Justice O'Connor: "Under the appropriate standard, strict
scrutiny, only a compelling interest may support the
Government's use of racial classifications. Modern equal protec-
tion doctrine has recognized only one such interest: remedying
the affects of racial discrimination."488
Will Metro Broadcasting be overruled? Only one of the five
484. Id. at 564-65.
485. Id. at 566. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion in Metro Broadcasting
in which he stated his belief that the majority opinion was consistent with the views
he had expressed in earlier cases regarding the benign use of racial classifications
by both the state and federal governments. Id. at 601-02 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens also joined the majority opinion by Justice Brennan, which explicitly
adopted the substantial relationship to an important interest standard. Id. at 564.
486. Id. at 602 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia and
Kennedy, JJ.).
487. Id. at 604.
488. Id. at 612. Justice O'Connor took the position that the Fullilove decision did
not have to be overruled because the program at issue in that case was a narrow
use of Congress' power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to correct identified
racial discrimination in the construction industry and to avoid the awarding of feder-
al government construction contracts in a way that would exacerbate prior acts of
illegal or unconstitutional discrimination against minority owned businesses. Id. at
606-07. The dissenting Justices found that the creation of diversity of ownership or
operation of radio and television stations was neither a compelling nor an important
interest. Id. at 612-13. The dissenters believed that the FCC policies constituted
racial stereotyping and should not be upheld under any standard of review, although
the four dissenting Justices were clear in advocating the use of a very strict stan-
dard. Id. at 603-04. Justice Kennedy also wrote a dissent in Metro Broadcasting that
mirrored his opinion in Croson. Id. at 631 (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia,
J.).
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Justices who voted in the majority in Metro Broadcasting re-
mains on the Supreme Court in the fall of 1994. Justice Stevens,
the remaining member of the Metro Broadcasting majority, has
a voting pattern in racial affirmative action cases that is not
easily explainable by anyone other than Justice Stevens himself.
Justice Blackmun had been committed to using the intermediate
standard in racial affirmative action cases and to allowing the
state or federal governments to correct societal discrimination
against racial minorities, but he retired from the Court in 1994.
All four of the Justices who dissented in Metro Broadcasting
remain on the Court.
In contrast with Metro Broadcasting, the Court's decision in
Croson seems to be in little or no danger of being overruled or
modified in the near future. Five of the six Justices who voted to
invalidate the affirmative action program in Croson remain on
the Court. Of those five, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy remain committed to the use of
the strict scrutiny test and the invalidation of such programs.
Whether they continue to have the majority view on the Su-
preme Court might depend on the positions taken in such cases
by the Bush and Clinton appointees-Justices Souter, Thomas,
Ginsburg, and Breyer-or on the case-by-case approach of Jus-
tice Stevens.
We do not know how the Clinton and Bush appointees will
approach racial affirmative action issues in the future. Although
then Judge Ginsburg issued an opinion in the court of appeals in
which she indicated some agreement with Justice Stevens' ad
hoc approach to racial affirmative action issues,489 she has not
had the opportunity to vote on such issues in the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, recently appointed Justice Breyer, who
replaced Justice Blackmun, is unlikely to be more supportive of
racial affirmative action than Justice Blackmun.
The Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Shaw v. Reno.. may
give us some indication as to how Justices Souter and Thomas
will approach the review of benign racial classifications. Al-
489. O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
490. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
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though the majority in Shaw did not reach the ultimate question
concerning the constitutionality of using race conscious redis-
tricting to help strengthen or protect the voting power of racial
minorities, the dissenters did reach that issue. Justice Souter
found that the affirmative use of race to enhance the position of
minority voters did not violate the Voting Rights Act, the Four-
teenth Amendment, or the Fifteenth Amendment.49' In some
statements during his confirmation hearings, Justice Souter
indicated agreement with the position that Congress had been
given special power to correct racial discrimination in our society
with the adoption of the Civil War Amendments. 492 Those
statements along with his vote in Shaw, may indicate that he
will follow in Justice White's footsteps and vote to uphold feder-
al racial affirmative action programs even if he believes that
state or local affirmative action programs should be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny.
Justice Thomas cast the deciding vote in Shaw, although he
did not write an opinion in that case. The fact that he joined
with the four strongest opponents of racial affirmative action on
the Supreme Court-Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-in finding that race conscious
districting had to be subject to strict judicial scrutiny, may not
mean that he will vote with those Justices to invalidate all
forms of racial affirmative action. However, the fact that he
joined Justice O'Connor's opinion seems to leave little hope that
he believes that the federal or state governments may use race-
conscious programs to correct societal discrimination against
members of racial minorities.49 Justice O'Connor's majority
491. Id. at 2845 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter wrote a separate dissent in
Shaw in which he found that the Court's prior cases had established an approach to
analyzing the use of race in electoral districting that was different from the Court's
approach to other equal protection problems. Id. Thus, Justice Souter's dissent in
this case may not indicate how he will vote in other types of affirmative action cas-
es.
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented in Shaw, arguing that the
case was indistinguishable from United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun and Stevens,
JJ.); cf id. at 2843 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 2843 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
492. See 16 HEARINGS AND REPORTS, 1916-1990 supra note 25.
493. Justice Thomas may not vote to totally foreclose the government from using
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opinion in Shaw formally held that the Court would not reach
the question of whether race-conscious districting could meet the
strict scrutiny test because the lower federal courts had not
considered whether the districts drawn by North Carolina to
protect minority race voting power were narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling interest.4" However, she discussed North
Carolina's arguments in favor of upholding its final districting
plan without a remand to the lower courts. Nothing in the
O'Connor opinion seemed to leave much hope that the Court
would uphold the districting plan if the lower courts found that
it served any purpose other than to correct proven racial dis-
crimination in the precise area of the state in which the new
minority race districts were created.495
North Carolina first claimed that it created the two new dis-
tricts in order to ensure that the voting power of racial minori-
ties would not be diminished by the creation of the new congres-
sional districts after the census. The State claimed to take this
action in order to comply with the "nonretrogression" principle
under the federal Voting Rights Act.496 Justice O'Connor re-
race conscious methods of assisting minorities. In United States v. Fordice, 112 S.
Ct. 2727 (1992), the Court found that the State of Mississippi had not integrated its
state university system, but it avoided ruling on whether the state could continue to
provide support for historically black state colleges. Justice Thomas wrote a concur-
ring opinion stating that, although he would require complete integration of the
state university system, he wanted to emphasize that the Court was not eliminating
the possibility that there might be some way to provide for aid to historically black
state institutions if these schools had race-neutral admissions policies and merely
provided some types of programs or maintained some types of traditions that might
appeal to minority students. Id. at 2744 (Thomas J., concurring). However, Justice
Thomas was not clear on how he might approach such a subject in the future or
whether he considered that case to involve any issues concerning the benign use of
a racial classification. Id. The Court's recent decisions concerning the desegregation
of schools, including the Fordice decision, are discussed in the next section of this
Article.
494. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2816.
495. There is already some indication that lower court judges outside of North
Carolina are taking the Shaw decision as an indication that they should invalidate
other redistricting plans that have created districts for the purpose of protecting or
increasing minority voting power. See Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188 (W.D.
La. 1993) (three-judge district court panel held that redistricting plan was not nar-
rowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest).
496. The cases concerning the power of the Attorney General under § 5 of the
Voting Rights Act and the standards for determining whether there has been illegal
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sponded by stating that a "reapportionment plan would not be
narrowly tailored to the goal of avoiding retrogression if the
State went beyond what was reasonably necessary to avoid ret-
rogression."4" Even if the districting plan was necessary to
meet the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act,
according to the majority, there was still the possibility that a
plan adopted to satisfy section 5 of the Act "may be enjoined as
unconstitutional. 498
The State also claimed that it needed to use racial criteria for
creating voting districts that would have a majority of minority
voters in order to avoid violating section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act, which prohibits the dilution of minority race voting pow-
er.499 Justice O'Connor noted that the lower court had not ex-
amined the question of whether the minority population in the
state was so geographically dispersed that the creation of voting
districts controlled by minority race voters could not possibly be
narrowly tailored to avoiding racial discrimination.500 She not-
ed further that the lower court had not considered the question
of whether "if § 2 [of the Voting Rights Act] did require adoption
of North Carolina's revised plan, § 2 is to that extent unconstitu-
tional. 5
01
Finally, North Carolina claimed that its law creating the mi-
nority race districts was "the most precise way-indeed the only
effective way-to overcome the effects of racially polarized vot-
ing" that had existed throughout North Carolina's history.5 2
Justice O'Connor stated that this argument "need not be decided
at this stage of the litigation. We note, however, that only three
Justices [in the UJO case] were prepared to say that states have
a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial
bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights
vote discrimination under § 2 of the Act were examined at supra notes 91-164 and
accompanying text.





502. Id. at 2832.
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Act.""0 3 In that response to the state's argument, Justice
O'Connor blatantly mischaracterized the UJO decision. A major-
ity of the Justices in UJO found that the use of racial criteria in
redistricting for the purpose of strengthening the ability of mi-
nority voters to control elections did not violate any constitution-
al standard established by the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Fifteenth Amendment, or the Voting Rights Act. 4
It may well be that the Shaw majority will prevent Congress
and the states from using racial criteria to help strengthen the
ability of minority voters to elect persons to legislative bodies.
We know from their votes in Croson and Metro Broadcasting
that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy are committed to eliminating the use of racial criteria
in government programs that are designed to assist minority
racial groups unless the government is using racial criteria to
correct a specific act of illegal or unconstitutional racial discrimi-
nation. In other words, these Justices will not allow any govern-
mental entity to use racial criteria to help minority groups ex-
cept in circumstances where the government entity was in fact
required to do so in order to remedy prior illegal actions. Justice
Thomas' vote in Shaw may mean that the Supreme Court cur-
rently has a majority of Justices that will invalidate all volun-
tary actions of government that are designed to assist minority
race persons.
IX. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND THE DESEGREGATION
OF SCHOOLS
In this section of the Article, I will examine the post-1960
Supreme Court cases regarding school desegregation. Once
again, I refer my readers and .audience to Mark Tushnet's
analysis of the Supreme Court decisions and lower court litiga-
tion that led to the 1954 Brown decision." 5 But I cannot resist
503. Id.
504. Three of the four Justices who voted in the majority in UJO, and who re-
mained on the Court for the Shaw decision, disagreed with Justice O'Connor's de-
scription of the UJO case. Id. at 2834 (White, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun
and Stevens, JJ.).
505. See supra note 2.
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the temptation to note that the changes in the Supreme Court's
rulings mirrored the Roosevelt and Truman changes in the
membership of the Court."6 After noting some of the Warren
and Burger Courts' desegregation decisions in the 1960s and
1970s, I will focus on decisions of the Supreme Court in recent
years that call into question the current Justices' commitment to
enforcement of Brown.
For most of the 1950s, the Supreme Court did little to enforce
506. See generally Cynthia Bums, The Fading of the Brown Objective: A Historical
Perspective of the Marshall Legacy in Education, 35 HOW. L.J. 95 (1991) (discussing
the Supreme Court's decisions after Brown); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1
(1979) (tracing the role of unanimity and the Court's internal decision-making pro-
cess in the 1950s); J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Supreme Court and Southern
School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485 (1978)
(examining the Court's policy on segregation as a series of stages).
In 1938, in Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), the Su-
preme Court, by a six to two vote of the Justices, found that a state violated the
Equal Protection Clause when it denied admission to the state law school to raciat
minorities, even though the state offered t pay the tuition of a minority law stu-
dent at an out-of-state law school. The six member majority in Gaines was composed
of three Democratic Justices and three Republican Justices. The three Democratic
appointees were Justice Brandeis (appointed by President Wilson) and Justices Black
and Reed (who were appointed by President Franklin Roosevelt). The three Republi-
cans were Chief Justice Hughes (who was the leader of the Court's "switch" in posi-
tions concerning the scope of federal power at the time of President Roosevelt's
Court Packing Plan), Justice Stone (who would later be appointed Chief Justice by
FDR) and Justice Owen Roberts (who in 1937 had completed his "about face" on
commerce clause, due process, and equal protection issues).
On June 5, 1950 a Supreme Court that consisted of nine Justices who had been
appointed by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman would begin to move away from the
separate but equal concept. On that date, Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opin-
ions for a unanimous Court in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Chief
Justice Vinson reserved the question of the continuing vitality of the separate but
equal doctrine in Sweatt as he held that the State of Texas violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause by denying Sweatt admission to the University of Texas Law School,
even if it offered him admission to a new state supported law school for minority
race students in Texas. The Justices were unanimous in ruling that there was no
real equality between the law school established for minority race students and the
long established state university law school. In McLaurin, the Chief Justice found
that the Equal Protection Clause was violated by a state university that admitted a
black graduate student to its program but provided him services only on a racially
segregated basis. Chief Justice Warren and eight Democratic appointees to the Court
issued the May 17, 1954 rulings in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
and Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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the desegregation principle it established in 1954. In Brown II,
the Supreme Court refused to grant any realistic relief to minor-
ity students who did not benefit from equal protection of the law
following the Brown I ruling."7 Instead, the Court required on-
ly a "prompt and reasonable start towards full compliance" with
the equal protection principle and the now infamous re-
quirement of "all deliberate speed.""8
By 1958, the Justices should have realized that there would
be little, if any, voluntary compliance with Brown L In that
year, in Cooper v. Aaron,"9 the Justices unanimously reaf-
firmed the holding of Brown and ruled that a school district
should not be allowed to delay the integration of its schools
based upon the public hostility to integration that had been
fostered by actions of the state governor and legislature.51
This ringing endorsement of the Brown principle seemed hollow,
however, as the Court did nothing more in the 1950s to desegre-
gate schools.51'
Numerous factors may have contributed to the 1960s emer-
gence of the Warren Court that championed civil rights. Per-
haps, as the late Professor Bickel remarked, the fact that the
Brown desegregation principle was endorsed by both major party
candidates in the 1960 presidential election influenced the Su-
preme Court.512 Perhaps the Supreme Court's dedication to de-
segregation in the 1960s was reinforced by the crude tactics
employed by some public school officials to deny education op-
portunity to minority students in the decade immediately follow-
ing Brown. In 1963 and 1968, the Court ruled that a school
district that had enforced racial segregation in its schools could
not claim to have integrated its schools by simply adopting "vol-
untary transfer" policies or so-called "freedom of choice" plans
because these policies would perpetually maintain racial segre-
gation. 13
507. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955) (Brown II).
508. Id. at 299-300.
509. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
510. Id.
511. See supra note 293.
512. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 93 (Yale
paperback ed. 1978).
513. In Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963), the Court held invalid a
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One of the most blatant attempts to disregard Brown came
from Prince Edward County, Virginia, which closed its public
schools rather than integrate those schools. But the government
continued to financially support private, racially discriminatory
schools in the county. In Griffin v. County School Board,14 the
Supreme Court upheld a district court order preventing the
government from providing support for the racially discrimina-
tory private schools. The Court endorsed the position that a
district court could order appropriate authorities to reopen and
financially support the public schools.515 In this 1964 decision,
the Court stated that "the time for mere 'deliberate speed' has
run out."
516
transfer policy that allowed students assigned to a school in which their race was in
a minority to transfer to a school in which their race was a majority because the
inevitable effect of this would be to maintain the racial segregation in the school
district that previously had de jure segregation. Five years later in Greene v. Coun-
ty Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), the Court found that a school board's adoption of a
so-called freedom of choice plan that allowed each student to choose his or her own
school would not result in compliance with the requirement that a segregated school
system eliminate the effects of the prior de jure segregation.
The 1990s may see an increase in racial segregation in the school systems
through the use of a new type of "school choice" programs. Unlike the schemes in
the 1950s or 1960s, the new plans may involve tax deductions or voucher programs.
Professor Marilyn V. Yarbrough has addressed the difficult problem of school
choice and resegregation in this Symposium. See Marilyn V. Yarbrough, Still Sepa-
rate and Still Unequal, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 685 (1995). As I normally agree
with Professor Yarbrough (including decisions we made as members of the NCAA
Committee on Infractions) I will probably agree with her conclusions in her article.
However, I cannot go on record in this Article as agreeing with Professor Yarbrough
because I have not yet read her article at the time that I am writing this Article.
In 1976, I went on record as believing that the use of tuition vouchers could be
structured in a way that did not violate the free exercise clause, a position which I
still hold. See John E. Nowak, The Supreme Court, the Religion Clauses, and the
Nationalization of Education, 70 Nw U. L. REV. 883 (1976). However, I would not
want that position to indicate that I believe that school choice programs are advis-
able in a society in which the growing separation of rich and poor has resulted in
greater segregation of the schools. On the general subject of the increasing separa-
tion of students by race due to the patterns of poverty in America see, GARY
ORFIELD, THE GROWTH OF SEGREGATION IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS: CHANGING PATTERNS
OF SEPARATION AND POVERTY SINCE 1968: A REPORT OF THE HARVARD PROJECT ON
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION TO THE NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS (1993).
514. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
515. Id. at 229-34.
516. Id. at 234.
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In Rogers v. Paul,51 the Supreme Court refused to allow a
segregated school system to claim compliance with the desegre-
gation principle through a "grade-a-year" plan, under which one
school grade was to be desegregated each year. Any school dis-
trict that had been operating a racially segregated educational
system had known of its duty to comply with th6 desegregation
principle since 1954. The Supreme Court of the mid 1960s would
not tolerate more delay in the implementation of the Brown
desegregation principle.
The 1970s were a time in which the Supreme Court sent con-
flicting signals regarding the dedication of the Justices to enforc-
ing Brown. Perhaps the lack of clarity regarding the position of
the Court in the 1970s was attributable to the fact that local
school districts that had operated racially segregated schools
were becoming more clever in their attempts to avoid desegrega-
tion. The 1970s cases involved more complex fact situations than
had been present in the 1960s desegregation cases.
In June 1971, the Justices strongly endorsed the Brown de-
segregation principle. The Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute prohibiting the assignment of any student to a school on
the basis of race for the purpose of creating racial balance in the
public schools.518 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education,519 the Court emphasized the need for school dis-
tricts that had operated racially segregated school systems to
eliminate the effects of prior segregation.52 The Justices reaf-
firmed the authority of federal courts, when faced with the fail-
ure of such a school district, to (1) create a truly desegregated
school system, (2) fashion a desegregation remedy that could
involve reassignment of students, faculty, and staff within the
district, and (3) supervise expenditures within the district.5 21
Some public school authorities recognized that they had run
racially segregated schools in the past and attempted to subdi-
517. 382 U.S. 198 (1965).
518. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, appeal dismissed
sub nom. Moore v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971).
519. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
520. Id. at 15.
521. See id. (stating that "[oince a right and a violation have been shown, the
scope of a district courts equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad").
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vide their racially segregated school district into multiple, inde-
pendent districts so that they could be in formal compliance with
Brown while maintaining the racially segregated systems. In
1972, the Supreme Court examined two attempts to subdivide
segregated school systems in decisions that hinted that the
times might be changing in terms of the Supreme Court's dedi-
cation to the desegregation principle. In United States v. Scot-
land Neck City Board of Education,22 the Justices unanimous-
ly upheld a federal district court decision prohibiting the cre-
ation of new school districts from a larger district that had been
ordered to desegregate its admittedly racially segregated schools.
All nine Justices found that the attempt to subdivide the school
district was nothingbut an attempt to avoid desegregation.5 23
In Wright v. Council of Emporia24 only a bare majority of the
Supreme Court voted to uphold a district court ruling that pre-
vented a similar action by a school district subject to a desegre-
gation decree. The City of Emporia, Virginia had, by contractual
agreement, been part of a county-wide school district that was
found by the district court to have engaged in de jure segrega-
tion.125 After the issuance of a court desegregation decree
against the county, the city decided to withdraw from the county
school district and create its own district.5 26 The Supreme
Court upheld the district court order by a five to four vote of the
Justices. The four dissenting Justices in Wright were all ap-
pointed by President Nixon.527
In 1974, the Justices once again divided along political lines
when they examined whether a federal court had the authority
to find that a state government was responsible for the racial
segregation in local school districts. In Milliken v. Bradley,2 8
by a five to four vote, the Court held that federal courts could
522. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
523. See id. at 490-91.
524. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
525. Wright v. County Sch. Bd., 309 F. Supp. 671 (E.D. Va. 1970), reo'd, 442 F.2d
570 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
526. Id. at 673 (decree issued June 25, 1969).
527. Wright, 407 U.S. at 471 (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, Powell,
and Rehnquist, JJ.).
528. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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not create school attendance zones that would combine suburban
and metropolitan schools as a means of eliminating the effects of
racial segregation in the city schools. The five member majority
overturned the district court order despite the fact that the dis-
trict court had found that the effects of admitted racial segrega-
tion in the Detroit schools could not be remedied without an in-
terdistrict remedial plan. The Milliken majority was composed of
five Republicans; the four Democrats dissented.529
The Republican appointees would not attempt to invalidate all
forms of interdistrict relief in desegregation cases.5" In 1977,
the Supreme Court revisited the problems faced by the lower
courts in remedying the de jure segregation in the Detroit
schools. The district court desegregation plan had required new
educational components for the Detroit schools that were de-
529. See id. at 757 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 762 (White, J., dissenting, joined
by Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ.).
530. The Burger Court was willing to use a form of "interdistrict" remedy to en-
force the anti-segregation principle outside of the school desegregation setting. In
Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 297-300 (1976), the Supreme Court found that the
lower federal courts had the authority to order the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development to create a comprehensive plan for the placing of
low income, racially integrated housing in both the City of Chicago and its suburbs.
The court's authority would depend both on a factual demonstration that the Chi-
cago Housing Authority and the federal authorities had engaged in the intentional
segregation of public housing units and that the new housing plan that disregarded
city and suburban boundaries was narrowly tailored to correct the past racial dis-
crimination in the public housing program. Id. at 297-300. The Court in the early
1970s was not willing to allow the state and local governments to subvert the
Brown principle through funnelling specialized aid to private schools. In 1973, the
Court ruled that a state could not lend textbooks to students at racially discrimina-
tory private schools, even though the textbook lending program was identical to one
that the Court had ruled could constitutionally be used to give textbooks to students
who attended racially nondiscriminatory religious schools. Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455 (1973). The state could not channel specialized assistance to racially dis-
criminatory schools in any form. For example, although students who attended ra-
cially discriminatory schools could use public parks and facilities just like any other
persons in society, the Court in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974),
found that the government could not reserve public park recreational facilities for
the temporary, exclusive use of classes operated by a racially discriminatory private
school. The Court in the 1970s was supportive of congressional efforts to end private
sector racial discrimination. In 1976, the Supreme Court found that § 1981 of the
Civil Rights Act, which declares that all persons shall have the same right to con-
tract as white persons, prohibited a private school from discriminating between ap-
plicants on the basis of race. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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signed to eliminate the vestiges of the prior de jure segregation
by raising the quality of the city schools. In Milliken Ir' the
Justices unanimously ruled that the district court that created
and supervised the desegregation plan for the Detroit school sys-
tem had the authority to require the state government to pay
one-half of the additional costs incurred by the school district as
it implemented the desegregation plan. 32
Any lower court judge in the mid-1970s should have been
excused for failing to understand the degree to which she was
empowered to issue an order to correct the effects of de jure
racial segregation in a school district. In addition to the two
Milliken cases, other 1970s Supreme Court decisions would show
the Justices wavering in their support for lower federal court
orders designed to remedy racially segregated school systems.
In 1973, in Keys v. School District No. 1,131 the Supreme
Court considered for the first time the scope of a federal judge's
authority to make a finding of de jure discrimination and to
issue a desegregation order in a metropolitan school district
outside of the southern states. In Keys, the lower court had
found that the Denver school district had intentionally taken
steps to isolate African Americans and Hispanic Americans in
some schools.534 The Supreme Court ruled that a finding of the
intentional discrimination in part of the school system shifted
the burden to the school authorities to prove that other schools
within the district that were primarily one-race schools were not
the result of deliberate racial discrimination and that the school
board, to avoid a district-wide desegregation order, must offer
proof to support a finding that the effects of segregation were
limited to specific parts of the district."5
531. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
532. Id. at 288-90.
533. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
534. Id. at 192.
535. Id. at 211. Justice Douglas and Justice Powell each filed a separate opinion.
Justice Douglas would have required a remedy for de facto segregation in recognition
of the fact that state policies can contribute to school segregation even though no
purposeful discrimination in the drawing of boundary lines can be proven in a spe-
cific case. Id at 214-17 (Douglas, J.). Justice Powell argued that the Court should
not be concerned with the subjective intent of government officials but, rather, with
the objective nature of the segregation in the schools. However, his focus on objec-
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The Keys decision appeared to be a strong endorsement of the
power of district courts to eliminate the effects of past racial
discrimination. Only two years later, however, the Supreme
Court overturned a part of a desegregation plan ordered by a
lower court. In Pasadena City Board of Education v.
Spangler,536 the Court ruled that the district court's desegrega-
tion plan should be terminated if, following years in which the
plan had been in effect, the school district had become racially
integrated.537
The 1970s ended with two Supreme Court rulings concerning
school systems in Ohio that demonstrated the severe division
among the Justices concerning the meaning of the desegregation
principle. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had made an un-
challenged ruling that the public schools in Columbus, Ohio and
Dayton, Ohio had been purposely operated in a racially discrimi-
natory manner through the early 1950s.538 The Sixth Circuit
also found that no actions had been taken to dismantle either
segregated school system after the Supreme Court rulings in
Brown and that court-supervised desegregation plans were
needed for each of the school districts. 39 Because the majority
believed that the district court had eliminated the effects of the
prior discrimination, the Justices required the district court to
terminate the desegregation order. The Spangler decision took a
limited view of district court authority in desegregation cases.
In Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,540 by a vote of
tive criteria did not seem to eliminate the view that there would have to be proof of
intentional de jure segregation. Id. at 224 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
536. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
537. Id. at 436-37.
538. Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), affd, 443 U.S.
449 (1979).
539. Id. at 818.
540. 443 U.S. 449 (1979). Justice White wrote the majority opinion in Penick, which
was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Chief Justice
Burger concurred only in the judgment of the Court. Id. at 468 (Burger, C.J., con-
curring in the judgment). Justices Rehnquist and Powell were the only two dissent-
ers in Penick. Id. at 489 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J.). Justice
Stewart filed an opinion that applied to both Penick and Brinkman that was joined
by the Chief Justice. They concurred in the decision concerning the Columbus School
Board and dissented in the companion case regarding Dayton. Id. at 469 (opinion of
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seven to two, the Justices found that lower court orders re-
quiring Columbus to take affirmative steps to create a truly
integrated school system were justified by the fact that actions
taken by the school board after 1954 had increased racial segre-
gation within the school district. In Dayton Board of Education
v. Brinkman,541 the Court upheld the desegregation order for
the Dayton schools by a five to four vote. Justices Blackmun and
Stevens joined Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White in ruling
that the Equal Protection Clause required affirmative steps to
desegregate that school system because the Dayton school dis-
trict had never taken affirmative steps to dismantle the de jure
racially segregated school system it operated in 1954.2 How-
ever, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Powell, and
Rehnquist dissented in Brinkman because they believed that the
federal courts did not have the authority to desegregate a school
system in the absence of proof of intentional racial segregation
after the Brown decision. 3
As the composition of the Supreme Court changed during the
1980s and 1990s, so did the interest of the Justices in the deseg-
regation of our nation's schools. The Supreme Court has not
issued many opinions in school desegregation cases in these
decades. The small number of Supreme Court desegregation
cases from the 1980s and 1990s, however, indicates that the
Court may no longer be committed to enforcing the Brown de-
segregation principle.
Some local school boards and state courts in the 1960s and
1970s were taking voluntary steps to racially integrate their
schools even though there had been no finding of de jure segre-
gation in their school districts. In June 1982, the Supreme Court
decided two cases regarding the ability of state and local govern-
Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring in this case, but dissenting as to
Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979)).
541. 443 U.S. 526 (1979).
542. Id. at 534-42.
543. Id. at 542 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J.). The dissenting opin-
ion of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart was an opinion concurring as to
Penick and dissenting as to Brinkman. Id. at 469 (Stewart, J., joined by Burger,
C.J., concurring in the result in case number 78-610 and dissenting in case number
78-627).
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ments to restrict such actions by state courts or school
boards.544 In 1982, these cases seemed to be no more than
technical rulings regarding the presence or absence of racial
discrimination in government actions taken to restrict the inte-
gration of one-race schools within districts that never had violat-
ed the Equal Protection Clause. A dozen years later, given the
current membership of the Supreme Court, these cases look like
an open invitation to cities and states to take affirmative steps
to continue racial segregation in their public schools.
In Crawford v. Board of Education,545 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of an amendment to the California
Constitution that prohibited the state courts from altering the
school attendance zones or the school assignment of individual
students unless a federal court would have been able to do so to
remedy a proven violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Eight
members of the Court ruled that the state was not required to
go beyond the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause in racially integrating its school sys-
tem.54 On the same day that Crawford was decided, the Su-
preme Court in Washington v. Seattle School District No. I"
invalidated a law, which was adopted through a state-wide ini-
tiative, that provided that "no school board .. shall directly or
indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the
school which is geographically nearest or next nearest to the
student's place of residence... and which offers the course of
study pursued by such a student... .""' This law set out a
wide number of exceptions to the requirement that a student be
assigned to the closest school to his residence.549 Local school
544. See infra notes 546-53 and accompanying text.
545. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
546. Justice Marshall was the only dissenter in Crawford although Justices
Blackmun and Brennan wrote a concurring opinion in Crawford to explain the rea-
sons why they joined the majority in this case whereas they voted to invalidate the
State of Washington's restriction on school transfers that would be invalidated on
the same day. Id. at 547 (Marshall, J., dissenting), 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring,
joined by Brennan, J.). The Seattle case is discussed in the next paragraph of this
Article.
547. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
548. Id. at 462.
549. Id.
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boards would remain free to transfer some students to schools
away from their homes for special education, special care, or
guidance programs, whenever the school board thought it appro-
priate for health, safety, school overcrowding, or other rea-
sons."5 ' A five member majority of the Supreme Court found
that the Washington law constituted a racial classification on its
face because the law gave school boards the power to change
attendance policies and assignments in response to requests
from any group of parents who wanted their children transferred
to schools away from their local districts.551 The only group of
parents and students who were clearly deprived of going to the
school board to have attendance policies changed were those
parents who were interested in racial integration.
552
If Seattle School District were reversed, states would be free
to require school boards to maintain de facto racial segregation
under the mask of protecting "neighborhood schools." Let us as-
sume that a state has school districts with schools that are in
fact racially segregated but that there is insufficient proof of
purposeful discrimination for a federal court to order desegrega-
tion of the schools. If persons in the state desired to maintain
the segregated character of the schools they would want to pre-
vent local school boards from voluntarily taking steps to inte-
grate. It might be difficult for these persons to have state legis-
lation passed that prohibited all school boards from allowing
students to attend a school other than the one closest to their
home. The state might pass a law that allowed school boards to
use student assignment policies to develop schools with good
extracurricular programs or to promote other goals except inte-
gration. That type of law would provide flexibility for school
boards, while guaranteeing that the de facto segregation would
continue. Would the Supreme Court disregard the racism inher-
550. Id.
551. Id. at 470-74.
552. Id. Seattle School District was a five to four decision of the Court. Justice
Powell, who had written the majority opinion in Crawford, believed that the two
decisions were incompatible. The four dissenters did not believe that the Washington
statute created racial segregation or eliminated the ability of those persons interest-
ed in integration to seek the help of governmental processes. Id. at 487 (Powell, J.,
dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.).
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ent in such a system? If we knew that the Seattle School District
case was "good law" today, we might safely assert that the Su-
preme Court commitment to desegregation was as strong as
ever. But Seattle School District was a five to four decision. Only
one Justice from the five member majority (Justice Stevens), and
two of the dissenting Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor) in that case, remain on the Court.
The Supreme Court of the 1980s seemed at times to tease the
proponents of racial integration by raising their hopes with one
case and dashing those hopes in the next.553 In Bob Jones Uni-
553. The conflicting attitudes of the Justices on the Court in the mid-1980s toward
the desegregation principle are well exemplified by Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385
(1986), a case that did not involve school desegregation. The Supreme Court in
Bazemore used multiple majority opinions in order to deal with a racial desegrega-
tion issue. African American employees of a state agricultural service alleged racial
discrimination in the employment and salary policies of their employer. The plain-
tiffs in Bazemore also sought to have the federal courts take action to integrate the
"4-H" and "Homemaker Clubs," which the agricultural extension service had operated
in a racially segregated manner until the 1960s. The Supreme Court's per curiam
opinion found that salary disparities between minority and white workers were the
result of nominally neutral practices that maintained racial disparities between
workers that existed prior to the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Id. at
407. The Court ruled that these employment practices might constitute a violation of
Title VII and that the lower federal courts had erred in totally disregarding some of
the evidence presented by the minority race employees. Id. at 387. A majority of the
Court also held that neither the Equal Protection Clause nor Department .of Agricul-
ture regulations required the lower federal courts to take any action designed to
truly integrate the 4-H and Homemaker Clubs.
In addition to the per curiam opinion, Justices Brennan and White wrote opin-
ions that could both be described as majority opinions. Justice White wrote for five
members of the Court in finding that the agricultural service needed to do no more
than formally eliminate all racial barriers to its local 4-H and Homemaker Clubs,
which it did in the mid-1960s after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in
order to comply with the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 407 (White, J., concurring,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Powell, Rehnquit, and O'Connor, JJ.). These five Justic-
es found that no evidence existed that recent governmental action caused racial
imbalance in any of these clubs, and the majority refused to order the government
to take affirmative steps to integrate these clubs, even though the clubs had been
kept racially segregated by the state prior to the mid-1960s. Id.
Justice Brennan wrote an opinion "joined by all other Members of the Court,
concurring in part" in explaining the basis for finding that the continuation of past
racial discrimination by the employer's facially neutral practices might violate Title
VII, id. at 395, and how the lower courts should have used statistical analysis. Id.
at 397. The Brennan opinion also dealt with some jurisdictional issues regarding the
formation of a class action. Id. at 406. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Mar-
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissenting to the aspect of the Court's ruling concern-
458
SUPREME COURT CONCERN FOR MINORITIES
versity v. United States,5" the Supreme Court held that the In-
ternal Revenue Service was acting within its congressional man-
date when it established regulations that denied tax-exempt sta-
tus to schools that discriminated on the basis of race. The next
year, however, in Allen v. Wright,555 the Court, by a five to
three vote of the Justices, ruled that the parents of African-
American children who were attending public schools in districts
that were undergoing desegregation did not have standing to
bring a class action to examine whether the Internal Revenue
Service was fulfilling its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to
private schools that discriminated by race. The majority opinion
in Allen was written by Justice O'Connor, who was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Powell, and
Rehnquist."'6 Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens dis-
sented in Allen;"7 Justice Marshall did not participate in the
case. It is hard to believe that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice O'Connor would not be joined by at least three of the other
Reagan-Bush appointees in upholding Allen today.
At the close of the 1980s, a core group of four Justices demon-
strated more interest in limiting the powers of lower courts to
create or enforce desegregation decrees than in promoting racial
equality. This core group was composed of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia. Their
ability to control the outcome of the cases at the turn of the de-
cade, prior to the Bush appointments, depended on their ability
ing the desegregation of the 4-H and Homemaker Clubs. Id. at 409 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.). These four Justices
would have required that affirmative steps be taken to remedy the effects of the
past segregation in these types of government services. The dissenting Justices be-
lieved that equal protection principles required lower federal courts to integrate
these state operated clubs, just as the courts must dismantle a racially segregated
educational system that only nominally ended its racially segregated status. Al-
though the majority of the Court in the mid-1980s was willing to enforce the
antidiscrimination principles clearly set out in federal statutes such as Title VII,
there was no longer a majority interested in truly eliminating the effects of past
governmental racial discrimination.
554. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
555. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
556. Id. at 739-66.
557. Id. at 783 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Blackmun, J.); id. at 766
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to secure the agreement of Justice White with their positions.
This point is demonstrated by contrasting a case involving Title
VIII, which prohibits racial discrimination in housing, with a
school desegregation case. Both cases were decided during the
October 1989 Term of the United States Supreme Court.
In Spallone v. United States,558 Chief Justice Rehnquist
wrote for five Justices in ruling that federal courts could not
impose contempt of court sanctions against individual members
of a city council for their refusal to vote in favor of legislation to
implement a consent decree that had been approved by the city
in a Title VIII case. The city council refused to take legislative
steps necessary to implement the remedial order, despite a dis-
trict court order that posed the threat of substantial monetary
sanctions against the city. The district court then ordered mem-
bers of the city council who cast the negative votes that prevent-
ed implementation of the desegregation decree to show cause
why they should not be subject to a contempt of court finding
and monetary sanctions. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and White, held that the
district court contempt sanctions were invalid insofar as the
district court had failed to wait for a "reasonable time" to deter-
mine whether monetary sanctions against the city itself would
force compliance with the decree.559 The Chief Justice's opinion
did not establish any formal legal barriers to implementing
racial desegregation decrees, but the overturning of the lower
court's actions could only be understood as a way of putting
practical roadblocks in the paths of judges who sought to force
recalcitrant local governments to comply with the desegregation
principle.
Justice Brennan wrote a dissent in Spallone that was joined
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens.56  Justice
Brennan was willing to give his colleagues in the majority the
benefit of the doubt concerning their intentions while he simul-
taneously recognized how the lower federal courts would likely
558. 493 U.S. 265 (1990).
559. Id. at 273-80.
560. Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Steve-
ns, JJ.).
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interpret the decision:
[The majority] directs a message to district judges that, de-
spite their repeated and close contact with the various par-
ties and issues, even the most delicate remedial choices by
the most conscientious and deliberate judges are subject to
being second-guessed by this Court. I hope such a message
will not daunt the courage of district courts .... But I worry
that the Court's message will have the unintended effect of
emboldening recalcitrant officials continually to test the ulti-
mate reach of the remedial authority of the federal courts
561
In Missouri v. Jenkins,56 the Court made two rulings con-
cerning the authority of lower federal courts to force state and
local governments to pay the costs of school desegregation reme-
dies. Justice White wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in
Jenkins insofar as the Court ruled that a federal district court
had acted improperly by directly ordering a property tax in-
crease to fund the remedy for racial segregation in the district's
public schools.563 Justice White's majority opinion was joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens only
insofar as the opinion found that the district court acted within
its authority in finding that the city school district should be
responsible for funding the desegregation decree.5" That por-
tion of Justice White's opinion stated that the district court
could order the appropriate state or local governmental units to
take steps to increase taxes in order to fund the decree regard-
less of the fact that certain state laws might otherwise prohibit
those governmental units from increasing their tax rates.565
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
O'Connor, and Justice Scalia, concurred in the judgment of the
Court in Jenkins insofar as it overturned the lower court's order-
ing of a tax increase.5 6 These four Justices disagreed with the
561. Id. at 306.
562. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
563. Id. at 37.
564. Id. at 54.
565. Id. at 51.
566. Id. at 58 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring iii the judgment,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ.).
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portion of Justice White's opinion that allowed lower federal
courts to order local governments to increase tax revenues in
order to comply with remedial orders. Although Justice Kennedy
said that "[flew ends are more important than enforcing the
guarantee of equal educational opportunity," he warned that the
Court's pursuit of racial equality required the "assertion of judi-
cial power in one of the most sensitive of policy areas, that in-
volving taxation, begins a process that over time could threaten
fundamental alteration of the form of government our Constitu-
tion embodies." '67
The Jenkins ruling concerning the ability of district courts to
order tax increases may be overturned by the current members
of the Court. Justices Brennan and Marshall have been replaced
by Justices Souter and Thomas. Even if we assume that Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer will vote to uphold all aspects of the
Jenkins rulings, the continuing authority of lower federal courts
to order state and local governments to take effective measures
to fund remedial orders in desegregation cases is in doubt.
Cases decided in consecutive terms of the Supreme Court at
the start of the 1990s and concerning the termination of district
court ordered remedial plans in desegregation cases can be de-
scribed as "leaving us guessing" as to the vitality of the Brown
desegregation principle four decades after its birth. In Board of
Education v. Dowell, 68 the Court, by a five to three vote, facili-
tated and encouraged a district court order terminating the
desegregation plan for the public schools of Oklahoma City. The
district court in 1963 had found that Oklahoma City had inten-
tionally engaged in racial segregation of the public schools.569
In 1965 and 1972, the district court had issued remedial orders
establishing plans for the integration of those schools. Several
years later, the school board made a motion to close the case
and terminate the remedial order; the school board asserted that
it had eliminated the effects of prior discrimination. In 1985, the
district court found that the school system was in fact a unitary
one; the court ordered an end to the court supervised desegre-
567. Id. at 80-81.
568. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
569. Dowell v. School Bd., 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
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gation plan despite continued racial imbalance in the
schools.7 ° The court of appeals found ending the desegregation
remedial order would result in a number of city schools becom-
ing primarily one-race schools and that continuing the -court
ordered desegregation plan would not impose "oppressive hard-
ships" on the school district or students."1 The Supreme Court
overturned the Court of Appeals decision by a five to three vote.
Justice Souter, having recently taken the place of Justice
Brennan on the Court, did not participate in this case.
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for five Justices in Dowell and
ruled that the court of appeals had been too stringent in its
supervision of the district court and the school district.572 The
majority believed that the lower federal courts, after a remand
of the case, should determine whether the school district had
complied in good faith with the desegregation decree.5 73 The
Chief Justice's opinion directed the lower courts to terminate the
district court's desegregation decree and remedial orders if the
direct effects of the de jure segregation had been eliminated.5"
The Court endorsed lifting the decree even though it might re-
sult in a lessening of the integrated nature of the public schools
in the city.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens,
dissented from the Court's ruling in Dowell, even though he
agreed with the majority's formal statements regarding the
review of lower court desegregation orders.573 Justice Marshall
stated that "the proper standard for determining whether a
school desegregation decree should be dissolved is whether the
purposes of the desegregation litigation, as incorporated in the
decree, have been fully achieved."5 76 But Justice Marshall dis-
agreed with what he saw as the majority's lenient approach to
570. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 606 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Okla. 1985), rev'd, 795
F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
571. Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237
(1991).
572. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 240.
573. Id. at 249-50.
574. Id.
575. Id. at 256 (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
576. Id. at 256.
1995] 463
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
applying that standard. The dissenting Justices believed that, to
be true to the Brown principle, "a standard for dissolution of a
desegregation decree must take into account the unique harm
associated with a system of racially identifiable schools and
must expressly demand the elimination of such schools."577
The battle lines concerning the implementation of Brown
became blurred the next year in Freeman v. Pitts.5 71 Justice
Thomas did not participate in Freeman; the eight Justices who
voted in the case unanimously ruled that a district court, which
had imposed a remedial plan on a school district that had been
found guilty of intentional racial segregation, could dissolve its
remedial order in stages by relinquishing supervision of aspects
of the school district operations as they came in full compliance
with the desegregation principle.5 79 Although there was a
unanimous vote in this case, the concurring opinions written by
Justices Scalia, Souter, and Blackmun interpreted the Court's
ruling differently from each other.
Freeman involved a school district in DeKalb County, Georgia,
which had operated a racially segregated public school system
into the 1960s. In 1969, the district court entered a consent
decree that implemented a desegregation program.580 By 1986,
the district court found that the school district had become a
racially desegregated, unitary system with regard to some, but
not all, aspects of its operations.581 The district court rescinded
the remedial plan relating to those aspects of the school system
that included transportation, physical facilities, extra curricular
activities, and some aspects of student assignments. But the
district court refused to dismiss the entire case, as that court
found that it should retain jurisdiction over some aspects of the
school system, such as teacher assignments. The court of ap-
peals prevented the district court from dissolving any part of the
remedial order until all aspects of the school system had been
integrated.5"2
577. Id. at 257.
578. 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992).
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The Justices were unanimous in Freeman in ruling that the
court ,of appeals should not have prohibited the district court
from relinquishing control of the school system desegregation
plans in incremental stages.5" The Supreme Court remanded
the case to the lower federal courts for a determination as to
which portions of the remedial order should be dissolved and
which portions needed to be maintained to eliminate the vestig-
es of past racial segregation."
Two Justices who concurred in both the judgment and opinion
of the Court in Freeman took different views of the need for
continuing court supervision of previously segregated school
systems. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in both the
judgment and opinion of the Court. A fair description of this
opinion is that it encourages the dissolution of a court ordered
desegregation plan at the earliest possible time at which a
school district might be declared to have achieved a racially uni-
tary status."M Justice Souter also concurred in the opinion and
judgment of the Court, but his view of the Supreme Court's
ruling was different from Scalia's." 6 Justice Souter believed
that the district court should engage in a wide-ranging review of
all aspects of the school system before it ended its supervision of
each aspect of the remedial plan.58 Justice Souter wanted to
ensure that lower court orders controlling the assignments of
students would be dissolved only after a finding that there was
"no immediate threat " s that dissolution of any aspect of the
court ordered desegregation plan would result in continuing
racial segregation. Justice Souter interpreted the Court's ruling
as requiring the lower courts to retain jurisdiction over the case
so that the district court could "reassert control over student
assignments if it finds that this [re-establishment of racial seg-
regation in the schools] does happen."589
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor,
583. Id.
584. Id. at 1450.
585. Id. at 1450 (Scalia, J., concurring).
586. Id. at 1454 (Souter, J., concurring).
587. Id.
588. Id. at 1455.
589. Id.
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wrote an opinion, concurring only in the judgment of the Court
in Freeman.59 They agreed with the majority that a district
court could dissolve a court ordered desegregation in stages. 9'
However, these Justices did not believe the majority had clearly
stated that the lower court should retain jurisdiction over the
school system and that the lower court must take special care in
examining all factors to ensure that any continuing racial imbal-
ance in the schools was not in any way traceable to school board
actions or prior de jure segregation.592
Following the Brown decisions, the Supreme Court ruled that
the "all deliberate speed" concept could not be used to delay the
desegregation of public universities and professional schools.59'
In 1992, the Supreme Court first confronted a situation in which
desegregation of a state university system might mean the de-
struction of one of the "historically black colleges." In United
States v. Fordice,594 the Court was able to both reaffirm the de-
segregation principle and to avoid making a final ruling on
whether states could maintain the provision of aid to historically
black colleges that were designed to provide an atmosphere
conducive to aiding the education of minority students.
In Fordice, the Court examined desegregation problems pre-




593. The Supreme Court never applied the "all deliberate speed" aspect of the
Brown rulings to the integration of colleges or graduate or professional schools that
states had operated in a segregated manner. See Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of
Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956) (per curiam). Even prior to 1954, states should have
been on notice that they would be required to desegregate their institutions of high-
er education. The pre-Brown rulings that began to erode the separate but equal
doctrine involved state institutions of higher education. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) (ruling that exclusion of minority students from the primary state
law school violated the Equal Protection Clause even if the state attempted to pro-
vide minority students with a legal education at a new state-supported law school);
Missouri ex reL. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding the state could not
exclude racial minorities from the state law school by offering to provide them with
financial support at other institutions); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (holding that institution violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause by providing a minority race graduate student with only racially seg-
regated services and treatment at the previously all-white state university).
594. 112 S. Ct. 2727 (1992).
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sented by the State of Mississippi's public university system.59
Mississippi had operated a racially segregated university system
for many years. The racial discrimination of this system had
been evidenced by statutes and openly discriminatory adminis-
trative actions that continued through most, if not all, of the
1960s. In response to actions of the United States Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, the board that controlled the
state university system implemented plans for desegregating its
university system. In 1975, the plaintiffs brought suit against
the state authorities claiming that the state, in fact, had done
little, if anything, to correct the effects of the prior de jure segre-
gation in the university system. The state universities that had
once been reserved for white students continued to have very
few minority students; the historically black state colleges con-
tinued to serve primarily minority students and continued to
receive inadequate funding from the state. In the late 1980s, the
lower federal courts ruled that Mississippi's financial aid and
admissions policies for state institutions of higher education had
been facially neutral since the 1970s, and, therefore, that the
state had met its obligation to dismantle its racially segregated
school system.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed with the lower
courts. Justice White, in an opinion for eight Justices, ruled that
the state had not met its obligation to eliminate the effects of
the de jure segregation in the state university system.596 Jus-
tice O'Cbnnor and Justice Thomas each filed a separate opinion
concurring in the opinion and judgment of the Court in
Fordice.9 7 Justice Scalia was the only Justice who could not
bring himself to join the majority opinion; he filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.598
The O'Connor, Thomas, and Scalia opinions took different posi-
tions on whether states could continue to provide aid for histori-
cally black colleges.
Justice White's majority opinion in Fordice did not resolve the
595. Id. at 2732-34. The facts cited in this paragraph are all taken from the refer-
enced pages of Fordice.
596. Id. at 2743.
597. Id. at 2743-46.
598. Id. at 2746-53.
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question of whether the State of Mississippi would be able to
meet its obligation under the Brown desegregation principle
while maintaining a historically black college within its state
university system.599 Justice White found that Mississippi's fa-
cially neutral university admissions policies, which required
higher standardized test scores for admission to state universi-
ties that had been the white institutions than for admission to
the historically black institutions, and the widespread duplica-
tion of educational programs at historically white colleges and
historically black colleges, appeared to perpetuate the racially
segregated system.6 0 The majority opinion merely remanded
the case to the lower courts so that those courts could determine
whether the desegregation order must require the merging of
some educational programs between the schools and, perhaps,
the closure of some of the smaller state universities, including
the historically black colleges.0 1
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in Fordice to
emphasize that "the courts below must carefully examine Missis-
sippi's proffered justifications for maintaining a remnant of de
jure segregation to ensure that such rationales [the desire to
maintain the historic character of universities serving minority
race students] do not merely mask the perpetuation of discrimi-
natory practices."6 2 Her opinion indicates that there is little, if
any, possibility that she will vote to uphold any state aid to a
school that was primarily designed to provide a special educa-
tional environment for minority students, even if the state elimi-
nated all barriers to the admission of minority students to the
historically white institutions.
Justice Scalia wrote a separate opinion in Fordice that could
be interpreted as either an opinion that would help states main-
tain programs that would serve minority students or an opinion
that sought to undercut the Brown desegregation principle.0 3
Like the majority, Justice Scalia found that Mississippi must
599. Id. at 2737.
600. Id. at 2738-40.
601. Id. at 2743.
602. Id. at 2744 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
603. Id. at 2746 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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demonstrate that it had removed all racially discriminatory
barriers to the admission of minority students to its state uni-
versities. Justice Scalia wrote separately to reject any require-
ment that state universities demonstrate racial balance in the
student bodies at each state school; he left open the possibility
that historically black state colleges might continue to exist.
0 4
Justice Scalia's opinion might allow the state to preserve the
character of historically black colleges by finding that the volun-
tary choice of minority students to attend such a college was
permissible.
Justice Thomas, who concurred in the opinion and judgment
of the Court, seemed to walk a line between the O'Connor and
the Scalia positions.6 5 He noted that the Supreme Court was
not confronting the question of whether a state could maintain
part of a university system that was designed to promote an
educational atmosphere conducive to attracting and retaining
minority students. Justice Thomas said:
[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that there exists 'sound
educational justification' for maintaining historically black
colleges as such. Despite the shameful history of state-en-
forced segregation, these institutions have survived and flour-
ished [it is] indisputable that these institutions have succeed-
ed in part because of their distinctive histories and tradi-
tions .... Obviously, a State cannot maintain such traditions
by closing particular institutions, historically white or histori-
cally black, to particular racial groups. Nonetheless, it hardly
follows that a State cannot operate a diverse assortment of
institutions-including historically black institutions-open
to all on a race-neutral basis, but with established traditions
604. Id. at 2751 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Scalia's separate opinion was written, in his words, to reject "the effectively unsus-
tainable burden the Court imposes on Mississippi, and all states that formerly oper-
ated segregated universities, to demonstrate compliance with Brown L" Id. at 2746.
Justice Scalia would require that the prior discriminatory system be eliminated
through the use of nondiscriminatory admission standards. Id. at 2750. He would
not, however, require further steps to eliminate the effects of prior discrimination in
a state university system. His opinion thus might allow for aid to historically black
colleges, but it might not allow for the true end to the effects of segregation that
harmed minority students in the continuing system in Mississippi.
605. Id. at 2744 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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and programs that might disproportionately appeal to one
race or another.6"
If the Court again reviews a case concerning the provision of
state aid to historically black colleges, we may learn much more
about the attitudes the Justices hold regarding educational op-
portunities for racial minorities. Will the Court allow a state to
provide aid to educational programs specifically designed to help
minority students if the state has otherwise eliminated the ef-
fects of de jure racial discrimination in state educational sys-
tems? Only time will tell. Perhaps Justice Thomas will look for a
way to require states to end the effects of racial segregation in
their university systems while upholding some educational pro-
grams specifically designed to help minority students. The most
recent rulings of the Supreme Court concerning affirmative ac-
tion make it doubtful that the current Justices would uphold
government aid to minority race students.
In 1994, the dedication of the Justices of the Supreme Court
to enforcing the Brown principle is not clear. It is hard to identi-
fy five Justices currently on the Court who would endorse the
use of the remedial powers of district courts to force state and
local school entities to fund programs that advance educational
programs for minority students on a desegregated basis, or who
would oppose the ending of desegregation orders issued by lower
courts in previous decades even though the ending of the orders
might in fact result in one-race schools reappearing in those dis-
tricts, or who would attempt to integrate state university sys-
tems while allowing some historically black colleges to serve the
interests of minority race students.
606. Id. at 2746.
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X. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I admittedly have been quite selective in the
areas of civil rights decisions that I have chosen to examine.
Nevertheless, I believe that my selection of topics gives a fair
overview of the attitude of the Supreme Court Justices toward
the protection of racial minorities during this century. When we
look at the Court's enforcement of federal civil rights statutes,
the uncovering and invalidation of laws that harm racial mi-
norities through seemingly race-neutral language, the use of
affirmative action programs designed to correct the harm our
society has imposed on racial minorities in many areas, and the
approach to the desegregation of schools, it is difficult to say
that we have not seen both the rise and fall of Supreme Court
dedication to civil rights during the past half-century.
The Supreme Court's history indicates that legal theories are
of far less importance than the political affiliation of the Justices
of the Court in determining the outcome of the Supreme Court
decisions concerning racial minorities. In the pre-New Deal era,
the Court had absolutely no sympathy for racial minorities and
was often an active participant in the oppression of racial minor-
ities. Fifty years ago, a Court composed of Democrats became
increasingly concerned with racial equality. Forty years ago the
Court took a bold step toward the protection of racial minorities
in the Brown decision. In the 1960s the Court that was dominat-
ed by Democratic appointees attempted to protect minority race
persons as it decided a wide variety of issues. The Nixon ap-
pointees brought a wavering approach to civil rights. The Rea-
gan appointees to the Supreme Court have been able to narrow
the Court rulings on civil rights cases.
Perhaps the current Court will change direction once again.
Justice Ginsburg might prove to be more of a consistent protec-
tor of civil rights of racial minorities than was Justice White
toward the end of his career. But it would be unrealistic to ex-
pect that Justice Breyer will be more supportive of the causes
and interests of racial minorities than his predecessor, Justice
Blackmun.0 7 Some hope might lie with the fact that President
607. See supra introductory note regarding the appointment of Steven G. Breyer to
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Bush may have had more in common with President Ford than
with President Reagan and that at least one of his appointees
(Justice Souter) will have more in common with President Ford's
appointee (Justice Stevens) than with the Reagan appointees.
However, expecting the current Justices to reverse their course
and return to the 1960s approach to protecting racial minorities
is more of a dream than a hope.
The lesson that the Supreme Court has taught us in the past
quarter century is that the Justices cannot be counted on to pro-
tect racial minorities from oppression in our society. Perhaps
President Clinton, and future Presidents, will make appoint-
ments that will lead the Court to once again protect the civil
rights of racial minorities. Perhaps not. In any event, Congress
is likely to remain a stronger defender of racial minorities than
the Supreme Court in the foreseeable future.
the Supreme Court.
472 [Vol. 36:345
